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**PUBLISHED IN  
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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW is published in January, April, July, and October.

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THE  
QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 600.—APRIL 1954

Art. 1.—THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NEVILLE  
CHAMBERLAIN.

IN recent history there are few subjects in which it is more urgent to get the facts right than the attitude of the British Government to foreign affairs in the years immediately preceding the Second World War. Sir Winston Churchill in the skilful apologia he has just brought to an end has set forth his view. We see the same sort of thing from Sir Lewis Namier, who has recently been knighted at the recommendation of Sir Winston, and from Mr Wheeler-Bennett who, though not yet knighted, has been chosen as the official biographer of the late king. The fiercest of all is Lord Norwich's 'Old Men Forget,' and, since some forget what they find convenient to forget, the idea has been spread that Neville Chamberlain was an obstinate old man who was determined to appease Hitler and Mussolini and who in attempting this threw away opportunities of not only engaging against them but also—and worse—of drawing Russia and America into a grand alliance of defence.

How far is such a view supported by the facts?

To answer this question one needs to examine the problem which Neville Chamberlain inherited from Baldwin: the way he proposed to cope with it; the confidence he inspired in his party as he worked out his policy; the preparations he made for the defence of his country; the politics not only of Germany but of France, America, and Soviet Russia; and finally the state of Europe and of the Empire when Hitler in alliance with Moscow finally launched his war.

In the summer of 1937 the situation in Europe was already tense and the policy of Britain had drifted into ineffectiveness. The prime index to the problem was Stalin's frank announcement that he was working to

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destroy the capitalist system and to disintegrate the Western powers.

At that moment there was much to encourage him. The ramshackle arrangement made at Versailles had already collapsed. Hitler in four years of power had given an appearance of well-being to German economy, which had absorbed six million unemployed, while his factories roared in the production of war material, including tanks and aeroplanes. A sort of inebriation was sweeping from his victory into the turbid minds of the millions of Socialists who gave an enthusiastic support to his slick chauvinism. As early as March 1936 he had changed the strategic position of Germany by breaking the Treaty of Locarno to remilitarise the Rhineland and build that bastion of defence which was known as the Siegfried Line. Not a single country had made any serious effort to restrain him. The protests made at the time by Austen Chamberlain and Sir Winston Churchill had been ignored by almost every organ of the press.

Looking back from the vantage point of to-day, statesmen are inclined to think that they should then have declared war. But the hypothesis is purely theoretical. In the then state of public opinion it was impossible to put forward any such policy in any country. Hitler had not yet shaken the confidence of the world in either peace or the League of Nations. The eloquent adjurations of Sir Winston could never have been brought forward if, instead of a freelance journalist, he had then been a responsible Cabinet Minister. Hitler's power had been allowed to increase, but not without reason. He had changed his country from a chaos that threatened revolution into an order which produced enthusiasm from the masses whom he gulled with recurring promises of peace.

As for the resentment of Western Europe and America, that was concentrated not on Hitler but on Mussolini. There again the warnings of Austen Chamberlain, and indeed of the Foreign Office staff, had been ignored. Italy, though the ally of the Western powers, had found all former doors closed to her emigrants, while her population in a constricted territory was increasing at the rate of 400,000 a year. A country smaller than Texas and with a population of 45,000,000 had the means neither to export nor to place the surplus from her cradles. In these

circumstances it had been agreed according to long-standing treaties that she might expend her energy in the backward mountain region of Abyssinia: and there she had established her position after a successful war, in which she had defied the machinery of Geneva.

Seeing the danger of alienating Italy or leaving her explosive, the diplomats of Paris and London had worked out an agreement under the guidance of Sir Maurice Peterson and the Comte de St Quentin. It was a perfectly reasonable diplomatic device. It was afterwards countersigned by their respective foreign ministers, Lord Templewood and Laval. But public opinion had not been properly prepared. Lord Templewood was obliged to resign and his place was taken by Mr Eden, though he had himself signed approval of the draft proposals. But from then on Mr Eden had proceeded with a policy of sanctions against Italy, and Lord Norwich did not forget how this worked out. 'The half-hearted sanctions we imposed,' he writes, 'served only to infuriate Mussolini and drive him into the arms of Hitler. Doing the minimum of harm, we incurred the maximum of ill-will; and at a time when the wind of fear was rising, and the nations were anxiously watching for indications of weakness or strength, Great Britain appeared before them as a friend not to be relied on and a foe not to be feared.'

Such was the last move made in foreign affairs under the premiership of Baldwin, whose distaste for everything to do with the Continent was so strong that he left Mr Eden a free hand. On this point also the memory of Lord Norwich was perfectly clear.

Such was the situation which Neville Chamberlain had to face when he became Prime Minister. Great Britain was losing both strategic advantage and prestige; and she had hardly begun to rearm while every day Germany was becoming a greater danger to the balance of power; and British policy had thrown into the German scales the country which occupied the strategic centre of the Mediterranean.

It was impossible for the brother of Austen Chamberlain and the son of Joseph Chamberlain to ignore the danger of what was happening. He defined it as mid-summer madness. A man of clear convictions and practical judgments, he had also been brought up in the

tradition of dealing with great issues. For twenty years he had been occupied in Whitehall, generally in high positions : for several years he had been Chancellor of the Exchequer. He decided that as soon as he was Prime Minister he would take the whole situation in hand. His was the habit of looking facts in the face : of calling for all the papers, reviewing them with first his Civil Servants, then his colleagues, putting in front of them the case, inviting a decision, and taking definite steps accordingly. He now applied this method to foreign policy, and announced the result to a secret meeting of the Conservative Party.

The issues he put before it were too plain for anyone to ignore : Germany was becoming dangerous. It was necessary both to take a firm stand against her and leave her with no possible grievance. Both were necessary, as indeed Sir Winston had recently pointed out ; one was imperative ; and so far we had done neither. Therefore he must take a strong line of attempting to draw Germany's interests into a policy of peace with the West ; at the same time, he must take the precaution of restoring the wasted defences of Great Britain ; and besides that he must do all possible to repair the damage caused by the defection of Mussolini, who had both weakened the League of Nations and gained Abyssinia before he left his former allies. The main object of Neville Chamberlain was to break the Axis. Such, then, was the clear-cut policy he put before the party as a whole, and which won enthusiastic assent. Such was the policy of the Cabinet. Such was the avowed aim, therefore, of the Foreign Secretary.

Meanwhile the Spanish War was raging. Beginning in 1936, it had seen Franco make great advances before Baldwin laid down his charge. The issues aroused in England the most violent passions. While Conservatives as a whole strongly supported Franco as a paladin holding his country against the Reds (and this was the view of both international Catholicism and of Standard Oil), the Left ignored the part Moscow had played in trying to force the country into the hands of her own clique, and supported the idea that Franco's enemies represented the claim of parliamentary government against fascist tyranny. This, as a matter of fact, coincided with the claims of the Moscow propaganda.

While fierce debate on these questions distracted Britain and found its echoes in the Foreign Office, the opinion gained ground that Mr Eden's sympathies were with the popular front, and that he viewed with great suspicion the small contributions of troops which Italy and the important contribution of aeroplanes and artillery which Germany had sent to General Franco. When in February 1938 he resigned, this was taken on Franco's side as the equivalent of a great military victory.

Sir Winston Churchill and Lord Norwich give a quite other reason for his resignation : that during his absence in the South of France, the Prime Minister had rejected an offer from Roosevelt to call representatives of the minor powers to Washington to discuss certain political principles affecting small nations. Both Sir Winston and Lord Norwich treat this tentative proposal, which gave no promise in any direction, as one of tremendous importance. It was nothing of the kind. The people of the United States had no intention of involving themselves in responsibilities for Europe or the League of Nations, and everybody knew it. When a year later Roosevelt actually did make a similar move it played into Hitler's hands.

During Mr Eden's absence, the Foreign Office had been supervised by Lord Halifax ; he fully agreed that the important thing was to placate Italy and to recognise her rights over Abyssinia, for it is of course always the British rule to recognise existing governments, even such governments as Moscow. Mr Eden never questioned this universal rule. If he doubted the rightness of what had been done in his absence, he never said so to Lord Halifax or to any member of the Foreign Affairs committee. Lord Norwich makes it plain that he never expressed in the Cabinet any divergence from the policy of the Prime Minister. But nevertheless he did in fact incline towards another policy, and his Chief would question whether, though apparently agreeing, he did really carry out the Cabinet directions. Despatches and conversations alike seemed to reveal his inbred antipathy to Italy. Late at night, and sometimes after he had been dining with Sir Winston or one of his group, he would send a note across Downing Street proposing a departure from a Cabinet decision of a day or two before. Here then came the rub. The Prime Minister was exercising a close supervision of his

Foreign Secretary ; the Foreign Secretary was inclined to act on advice he received from friends highly critical of the Prime Minister. But neither expressed any sign of disagreement in the Cabinet. Lord Norwich, though he was a friend of Mr Eden and by no means an enthusiastic adherent of Neville Chamberlain, avows that he was entirely unaware of a cleavage of opinion. We hope we can trust his memory here, for no other ministers seemed aware of it. Mr Eden confided his differences of view to none of his colleagues, but to a group who thought otherwise.

While this secret personal attrition was high, Hitler began to prepare his rape of Austria. That move would give him power over Czechoslovakia : it would bring his power down the Danube. It would lead him towards the Adriatic. It would change the whole strategic lie of Europe.

The threat sprang to the eyes of every diplomat and every strategist. It meant that if Hitler now continued in firm alliance with Italy, he could strike right or left with shocking effectiveness.

Once again Neville Chamberlain called for a general assessment of the situation ; once again the facts were weighed by the Cabinet ; once again it agreed that at this juncture everything should be done to counteract the blunder which Mr Eden had made when, under Lord Baldwin, he had both alienated Italy and brought discredit on Great Britain. Once again Mr Eden expressed his assent ; but very soon afterwards he made it clear to the Prime Minister that he did not want conversations with Italy to begin before Italian troops had been withdrawn from Spain.

This was the point on which disagreement came to a head : it was nothing to do with Roosevelt or America. It did involve the immediate strategy of the Mediterranean. The Cabinet, still including Lord Norwich, firmly agreed that we could not risk the Mediterranean by alienating either the growing power of Franco in Spain or the central strategic paramourcy of Italy.

But Mr Eden had lost his patience. We now know through the Ciano diary that during that week when he had been arguing that Mussolini had received from Hitler some douceur for not defending Austria, the Italian Ambassador had insisted that he had not, and that knowing of

Mr Eden's attitude he had a channel of communication direct with the Prime Minister. To clinch the matter, Chamberlain saw both Count Grandi and Mr Eden together, and obtained from Grandi assurances that destroyed Mr Eden's case. Before such things could happen, it was plain that Neville Chamberlain's distrust had gone far: it was plain also that on the other side exasperation must follow a show-down. That is the story of Mr Eden's resignation.

Lord Norwich, who was then in full agreement with his Chief, contended in his book in the light of the Italian evidence that the Prime Minister was deceiving the Cabinet and secretly forced Mr Eden to resign. One can understand how the high office and honour Lord Norwich has gained from chiefs who later supported him would persuade him to argue in their favour, that in fact before doing so he had to accept their point of view; but he produces no evidence whatever of the duplicity of his then Chief. *On the contrary, the moves of Neville Chamberlain were devastatingly direct and they brought to an end any indirectness on the other side.*

To succeed Mr Eden he appointed a man whose integrity of character and independence of judgment had been vindicated in a long career, where at every turn he secured by unassuming candour the confidence of both his colleagues and his subordinates. No Prime Minister would ever have entrusted to Lord Halifax a department he intended to administrate himself. Everyone knew that if Lord Halifax was to be Foreign Secretary, he and he alone was to give instructions to the Foreign Office. The suggestion, and it has been more than a suggestion, it has been an insistence, that when Neville Chamberlain was Prime Minister, he was the sole master of Foreign Affairs, breaks down when one considers either the full confidence between Lord Halifax and his permanent staff or Lord Halifax and his colleagues or Chief in the Cabinet. There was a complete confidence on either side.

The problem of foreign policy was to strengthen a Britain, much weakened in the last few years, against the danger from Hitler's combination of perfidy, outrage, and roaring armaments, when it had to be recognised that there was no such thing as collective security, when America stood aloof, and when Russia had announced her intention

of working for the destruction of the capitalist system. If the Western powers sought to solve their problem by war, —so Stalin warned them in 1934—they would see an enormous increase of the Soviet power which the previous war had engendered. As events have proved, those were not idle words. None considered them more carefully than the leader of the Conservative party. He moulded his policy accordingly : it was to control Germany in the West and to allow her *Lebensraum* by extending her economic domain in the East. There she would menace no British interest ; there, if she found an enemy, it would be not the West, but the Russia of that Stalin who had sounded the warning against war.

But in this plan there was a complication : France was bound to the Petite Entente of Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. And this complication contained yet another of which Neville Chamberlain's piercing gaze had soon to take full cognisance : it was that no more in 1938 than in 1936 did the French intend to fight except in defence of their own frontier. The French Staff had decided that to risk their resources and reserves in an attempt to repair the gimmerack contrivances of disparate nationality that had been temporarily tied together after the fatal crack up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be for France neither practical nor prudent. Tacitly, but unmistakably, Paris had let go the Petite Entente. And Hitler knew it.

It was at this point that there arose a certain tension between the Prime Minister and certain diplomats left by Mr Eden in high positions at the Foreign Office. Those diplomats lived on the tradition on which they had been brought up, that of the Anglo-French Entente, which, victorious in 1919, had made its plans, now proved abortive, for Europe. Neville Chamberlain with his business mind saw that if he were to engage against Germany he could not count on the practical support of the army of which Gamelin was commander-in-chief.

The issue was soon put to the test with regard to Prague. Three months after the rape of Vienna, in February 1938, Hitler began to menace it ; in May he withdrew ; in August and September he returned to the fray with a demand for those 3,000,000 German-speaking peoples who neighboured his frontier at Eger, Marienbad, and Karlsbad. When he announced that he was prepared

to launch a war to free them, there was no air force in France. The British Ambassador in Paris reported that there all but a small, noisy and corrupt section were against war. The French Premier Daladier, as early as September 13th, turned to Chamberlain, begging him to intervene with Hitler, and prevent a war.

We now come to that episode in Neville Chamberlain's career where attack has been sustained and venomous. Sir Winston and all his henchmen urge that war should have been declared: that if Britain had then declared war, Hitler would have given in. Mr Wheeler-Bennett, the most persistent in making out the case, has now undermined it. In his latest book, 'The Nemesis of Power,' he proves that the German generals had neither the courage nor the means to revolt against Hitler. The last recruit to this platoon—and not least forgetful—was Lord Norwich.

Many facts need to be remembered. Russia had refused her support, so had large portions of the British Empire; France had no air force, our own was very weak, so was that of Prague. Her neighbours, Poland and Hungary, were prepared to invade to redeem territories they deemed to be rightly theirs. The country had no defence whatever along her extended Austrian border. Her three million Sudetens were against her, within their mountain frontier. From Prague came despatches that important elements sought to eliminate Benes. And the only possible strength was in some tanks which were not put to the test. It is hardly likely that they could have done much against those German forces which a year later smashed up in a fortnight Poland with its army three times that of Prague. If these points have been forgotten by Lord Norwich, he still had little reason to argue that the British Government should go to war in such a cause if its ally, who alone had written obligations, asked it not to do so, and when Roosevelt was doing all he could to prevent a war beginning. If on one side we have the books of Sir Winston Churchill, Lord Norwich, Sir Lewis Namier, and Mr Wheeler-Bennett, on the other we have those of W. W. Hadley of the 'Sunday Times,' and M. Fabre-Luce, those of Lord Maugham and Lord Simon. We have the speeches made at the time by Lord Halifax and by Lord Chatfield, then Minister for the Coordination of Defence. We have

the expressed approbation of Roosevelt. We have the impassioned adherence of the French Government and the enthusiasm of the French and British peoples. These acclaimed Chamberlain as a hero for the skill with which he avoided war on this issue. He received a far greater ovation than had ever been given to a Prime Minister.

To attack Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy over that issue is to say that against the advice of his service chiefs and in defiance of the trust placed in him by the French Government, on an issue that would disrupt the Empire, he should have plunged Europe into a war which diplomacy could and did avoid. On that issue Lord Simon has expressed a judicial opinion once and for all. To join with Lord Norwich in attacking Neville Chamberlain on the issue of Munich is to indulge a wild hypothesis : and the only thing to be adduced in its favour is that a few Czech tanks would have been more effective against him than the whole weight of the French, Belgian, Dutch, and British armies banded together after another twenty months of preparation. The daring conceit that German generals, who in Hitler's most fatal moves still followed him, would in this case have turned against him is gone for ever.

It is true that after Munich Neville Chamberlain did make a *faux pas*. He made an impromptu speech in which he used the phrase 'peace in our time.' But he did this at a moment when he was carried away to share an emotion with the crowds who had been cheering him for hours in the most tremendous ovation, when he was exhausted at his age of seventy after his first flights in an aeroplane, and after weeks of tense council and strained negotiation, when one after another had thanked him for restoring peace to a world threatened with the most cruel havoc.

But that phrase, which voiced too much of the hope in men's hearts before they were driven over the verge of ruin, must not be confused with Chamberlain's view of Hitler or with his foreign policy. His reaction to Hitler had been disgust. He saw in him from the first a man who was willing to hurl Europe into war rather than make wise negotiation, he saw in him a vulgar and dangerous man even though he had immense talents of both exposition and argument. He recognised in Hitler a portentous force of evil, and came back with the strongest feelings of revulsion. But he would not have saved Britain if he had

spoken publicly of these ; his only hope was to speak in public as though Hitler could be held to his promises. And he did speak so. But he pushed on the orders to rearm : he gained time and with his work on the Air Force, as air marshals have attested, made those decisive changes which when the time came saved Britain in the Battle of Britain. Even if there had been nothing more to Munich than gaining time while the Air Force was built up, then it must be admitted that Neville Chamberlain gained that time—he saved England. It was admittedly at a high cost, for he lost the services of Lord Norwich at the Admiralty.

So much for Munich. Hitler soon broke his guarantees. Having received the necessary assurances from Stalin that Russia would not interfere, he drove his tanks and machine guns into Prague and reduced it, though nominally independent, to a vassal state.

Then and then only did it become clear that Hitler's plans went beyond the German-speaking elements of Europe to dominance of the Continent as a whole. What was to be the policy of the British Government in the face of that ?

There was a violent reaction among the British people, and not least the Conservative Party. It was plain that the Prime Minister had been mocked. The whole policy of attempting an understanding with Hitler had been rendered ridiculous by an insult which at the same time added to Hitler's strategic position and which indeed placed Poland in his power, as the fall of Austria had put at his mercy the rhomboid of Czechoslovakia. Hitler enabled Sir Winston and Lord Norwich to say ' I told you so.'

Faced with this situation, the Foreign Secretary put before the Prime Minister the following alternatives : either Hitler is determined on general war, in which case the more who engage against him the better ; or he can still be held back by definite warning—in which case the clearest warning must be given that war will follow the next aggression. Either case urges that we show we will make war the minute he does to Poland what he has just done to Prague. Such, in a sentence, is the argument behind the Polish guarantee.

Sir Winston gave full support to these arguments,

though he omitted to mention this when he wrote his memoirs.

Again and again Neville Chamberlain has been attacked for giving this Polish guarantee. But what was the alternative?

The Left have said that he should have made a pact with Russia and induced Poland and Roumania to accept her help. In point of fact this alternative was not open. Stalin had declared even before Hitler went to Prague that he would not fight until he found his own country invaded. He said quite plainly that he was not going to pull out of the fire the chestnuts which were not his. As for Poland and Roumania, they made it absolutely clear that even if he did they would on no account allow his forces into their territories. A small animal might well hesitate to put itself in the power of a huge serpent which it believes—and as events have proved rightly believes—to be a boa-constrictor.

Since these alternatives were thus precluded absolutely, the only one that remained was to swallow the insult of Hitler and to pretend that Britain attached no more importance to the pledges of Munich than she had done to those of Locarno. It was to throw away any warning to Hitler of the danger of engaging on two fronts. It was to abandon every strategic principle for which Sir Winston Churchill and his friends had been so eagerly contending. It was to invite Hitler to consolidate his position in the east before he turned to such neighbours as Holland, Denmark, or Flanders. It was to trust to a new scheme the sort of strategic blunder forced on the West by public opinion in the matter of the Rhineland, for it would destroy the possibility of a second front. Now Empire and people were united on a clear issue; and when the time came for the last desperate moves, Mussolini withdrew from attack, so depriving Gamelin of his great excuse that he could not engage the defences of France upon two fronts.

It is therefore plain, when one looks hard at the case, that no British Government in 1939 could close its eyes to the fate of Poland. The arguments of Munich compelled it to be firm. Even if no guarantee had been given, public opinion—led as it was by the eloquence of Sir Winston and his parliamentary group—would have forced Britain into the war for which that group clamoured when the time

came. No one has the right to blame Neville Chamberlain for giving the Polish guarantee.

At the same time it must be admitted that no one in Great Britain was cunning enough to see how Stalin would use it. When he combined with Hitler to disrupt Poland, nothing could be done. The irony of the situation was that Hitler thought by obtaining his alliance he had proved to the practical British that they must hold their hand since they could do nothing against Russia and Germany combined, while in Downing Street the argument was that if Hitler would even combine with hated Bolshevism to secure his ends, the sooner one engaged against so frenzied a trickster the better. This contention was based on the view that since Hitler's economy was fundamentally unsound, war would pay him even less than other powers.

At this point the Prime Minister readmitted to the government the leaders of the Churchill group in Parliament. From then on, his policy was unity for war against Germany. But he could claim that at least Italy was not against him ; he had saved the Mediterranean.

And as long as Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were directing foreign policy, they kept their minds clear on three points : that America would give very little help, that Russia was a declared enemy, and that the war was against the Hitler clique and not the German people. Had those issues been kept clear in the years after Chamberlain's death, how different would be the situation now ! The appalling menace of to-day comes almost entirely from the fact that Roosevelt, with his rooted and perverse distrust of British 'Imperialism,' betrayed it, and with it both Europe and the Far East to the astuteness of Stalin. So it is that, as Sir Winston himself wrote—even in 1947 when China was not yet communist—the war left us at its end in face of even greater dangers than at its beginning.

It is to the credit of Neville Chamberlain that he never closed his eyes to the obstinate and astute enmity of Stalin, that he knew he could not really trust Roosevelt. These facts were averted from us while the war was being fought and they are still blinked at by the band of writers who have sought to discredit Chamberlain ; nor could they be rebutted by Professor Feiling when he produced his life of Neville Chamberlain in 1944, because Russia was still

fighting as our nominal ally. But it is time we faced facts now, and reconsider our history accordingly. If we do, the foreign policy of Neville Chamberlain not only receives complete exoneration: we must pay him a carefully assessed tribute for keeping his eye on the dark monster at the horizon. He had in fact a saner mind than even Lord Norwich. He was furthermore as right in his estimate that the French Staff did not really mean to fight as he was in his knowledge that Stalin was aiming at disrupting the Western world; and we must even admit that he was not lacking in sagacity when he did his best to see if by hook or by crook he could use Hitler as a bastion against the vast encroachment of Slav bolshevism which is now the menace of the world.

And what, in any case, was the alternative to his policy? Mr Eden never so much as mentioned an alternative; but Sir Winston spoke of his desire to form a Grand Alliance against Hitler. Well, in the course of time Hitler himself by his attacks on Russia and America forged the Grand Alliance which Chamberlain could not consider because Stalin and Roosevelt refused it; and in what did this Grand Alliance result? In a military defeat for Germany certainly, but at the cost of establishing Russia in a position so paramount that there is no balance of power left in either Europe or Asia. Did this save the British Empire? On the contrary, it first ruined it financially and then imperils it strategically.

And what is the foreign policy of to-day in the face of this greater danger? Another Grand Alliance with Moscow? No, it is the precise equivalent of Neville Chamberlain's policy: to listen to France, and yet not to pretend that she is solid for war; to test every means of avoiding the ruinous clash of arms; to arm to the extent that finances allow; and to use every possible means of detaching any adherents of Russia: in other words to apply the principle of breaking the Axis. This is the policy which Mr Eden is now pursuing under Sir Winston, and which he must pursue. There is no option.

To tell the truth, there was no option under Neville Chamberlain either. To pretend that he could have risked the war before Britain had escaped from the coalition principle of defencelessness is nonsense; if not, he had to see what reason and common sense could do. He did all

they could do. But the dynamic obsessions of Hitler had got beyond them. Hitler was the incarnation of a frenzied vengeance on those arrangements of Versailles, the imbecility, the malignity of which Sir Winston has denounced. Till those were set right and Germany was integrated into the European system, neither Chamberlain nor any other could avert war. When he assumed power, the seven fatal years had already passed.

So if Britain is now ruined and imperilled, if the whole world is disrupted, it is certainly not because of the foreign policy of Neville Chamberlain ; it is because he was not able to apply his sagacity to the confusion of Europe till too late. In his reasonableness and common sense, his coordination of the will for peace with the firm grasp of decision and principle, he incarnated the tradition of leadership in the Conservative Party. It is the best we can have now : and we will be stronger against the great perils of to-day when we recognise that it was the best *we could have then*. The foreign policy of sound Conservatives to-day is still that of Neville Chamberlain founded on the fact that 'war gains nothing, ends nothing and cures nothing.'

ROBERT SENCOURT.

## Art. 2.—THE GREATEST DIPLOMATIST?

ALTHOUGH two hundred years have passed since Talleyrand was born (Feb. 2/13, 1754), it is almost certain that, if a 'Gallup poll' could be taken to-day among the living diplomatists of the world on the question of who was the greatest diplomatist that ever lived, a large majority would cast their vote for Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Bénévent. As his name indicates, he was a son of the *ancien régime*, who began his career as a bishop, was excommunicated and afterwards reconciled to the Church, who survived the Revolution and rose to fame under Napoleon; who after the fall of the Empire was held in high esteem by the restored kings, Louis XVIII and Charles X; who when this elder branch of the Bourbons was in its turn expelled took immediate service under the Orleanist Louis-Philippe and served him as ambassador at the Court of St James for four memorable years.

A remarkable capacity for *tergiversation* assuredly does not bestow on Talleyrand the title of statesmanship, but it does, at least in revolutionary times, exhibit one of the qualifications of a diplomatist. A diplomatist after all represents his country, whatever the régime may be, and it was always Talleyrand's contention that he served France, that he 'only remained true to common sense,' and that he 'never deserted anybody unless they had first deserted themselves.' To Louis XVIII, who was thanking him for his services in restoring the monarchy in 1815, he explained, 'There is something unaccountable about me that brings bad luck to the governments which neglect me'; and he became Louis's premier minister.

In the previous year, 1814, there had been bitter criticism of Marshal Marmont for being the first to desert Napoleon in front of the very gates of Paris. Talleyrand's defence of him was that his 'time-piece was a little fast.' Talleyrand's own political watch never went wrong. His displacements were so timed as to land him in the right place at the right moment, and to enable him to direct the foreign policy of France whatever the name of her transient ruler.

He had a ready reason for each of his political cat-

jumps, which, it has to be admitted, always coincided with the wishes of the country ; and it was an age when political knavery and personal libertinism were easily excused. Even his extraordinary series of love-affairs was in the fashion of the day, and the amazing fascination which this ugly and limping old man still exercised over women much younger than himself was no doubt partly due to his acute understanding of human nature—which incidentally is the foundation of good diplomacy. In any case his rascalities and his ribaldries were subordinate to his diplomacy. He has often been accused of allowing himself to be bribed by foreign governments. He probably did. But his explanation would have been that he first made up his own mind which was the policy that would most greatly benefit France ; and he then allowed himself to be persuaded to adopt that policy for a handsome consideration. Talleyrand liked to leave the lead to others, even when he prompted them to take the line he wanted. It was his peculiar form of self-effacement, which is another valuable expedient of diplomacy. There is nothing dramatic in the ordinary successes of diplomacy, for its best work is preventive. Crises, explosions, wars are the failures of diplomacy. Its victories, as Lord Salisbury wrote in this 'Review' 92 years ago,\* are made up of 'a series of microscopic advantages : of a judicious suggestion here, of an opportune civility there : of a wise concession at one moment, and a far-sighted persistence at another.' All these means and devices Talleyrand commanded.

His talent for *bons mots* was also made to serve him well. When Napoleon taxed him with having amassed an enormous fortune and asked him how he had done it, he reply was that he had bought all the government stock he could lay hands on on the eve of 18th Brumaire (the date of the *coup d'état* which finally established Napoleon in power) and sold them again on the day following it. And though famous for his wit, he was equally famous for his discretion and impassivity. During the last revolution he lived through, in 1830, he was standing at his window and looking out at the fighting in the street below him. 'Hark, we are winning,' he exclaimed. 'We—

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\* 'Quarterly Review,' January 1862, 'Lord Castlereagh.'

who are we?' cried the bewildered band of cronies, adventurers, and dependants who by that time were never far away. 'Hush, not a word,' he replied. 'I will tell you to-morrow'—and all the time it was he who had helped Thiers to work for the forcible removal of Charles X then being enacted.

He was not a creator of events. He did not invade foreign countries or carve out kingdoms for his relatives. His skill was to modify, to divert, to regulate, always in conformity with the interests of his country as he saw them. His rival, Chateaubriand, said of him: 'Il signait les évènements, il ne les faisait pas.' But is it not possible that his sway over events was in the long run greater even than that of Napoleon, whom he survived in active life by 20 years?

France would certainly not, without Talleyrand, have obtained the relatively favourable terms of peace which his advocacy obtained after the fall of the Empire; and when later the clauses of the Treaty of Vienna referring to the Low Countries had to be revised, Talleyrand it was who helped Palmerston to render an immense and permanent service to the independence of Belgium. In 1814, when the Allies entered Paris, the Emperor Alexander of Russia had greeted him with the words: 'It is you who have brought us here'; and on a subsequent occasion Alexander said, 'When I arrived in Paris I had no plan. I referred everything to Talleyrand; he had the family of Napoleon in one hand and that of the Bourbons in the other; I took what he gave me.' Talleyrand primed Louis XVIII in the art of kingship; at the Congress of Vienna he isolated Russia and Prussia and drew to his own side not only England and Austria but the whole body of the minor German States; in January 1815 he persuaded the British and Austrian Governments to sign a secret treaty with him in defence of the principles of the Peace of Paris—the chief of which he proclaimed to be 'legitimacy,' for he always found a high-sounding label to attach to his policy of the moment. The Foreign Office correctly described the despatch in which he expounded this principle as a 'piece of drollery.' Talleyrand, nevertheless, won the respect of our hard-hearted Duke of Wellington; and when Napoleon reappeared on the mainland of Europe from Elba, Talleyrand instantly decided to have nothing to do with him.

His native prescience told him that Napoleon's bid would fail. And however enthusiastically Napoleon was received on his march from the Mediterranean to Paris, the complete failure of France to rally round him after Waterloo proved that Talleyrand's view corresponded to the deliberate and final judgment of the French people.

Talleyrand was, in fact, the pendulum that always swung back to normal, the ballast of the good ship 'La France' for forty years. Throughout his long career he was faithful to three causes : the stability of his country, the appeasement of Europe, and friendship with Great Britain. He had not the masterful greatness to control the forces which militated against these purposes. He did not possess the urge of constructive statesmanship. But his steadiness of aim amid internal cataclysms and foreign wars raised him far above the level of normal diplomatic achievement. It was statesmanship which made him a good European in an age of rampant nationalism. And the policy of co-operation with Britain which he advocated became, after many vicissitudes, the Entente Cordiale, and is now part of the statute of Western Europe. In his augural mind the two stabilities, that of Anglo-French unity and European civilisation, were inter-connected, as he showed in his remarkable outburst to Madame Rémusat : 'Get this into your head. If the English constitution is destroyed, the civilisation of the world will be shaken to its foundations.'

But perhaps, after all, if Talleyrand is mentioned in the salons and council-rooms of diplomacy to-day, it is more likely to be to quote his sayings than to recall or estimate his political achievements. How often has his famous reply to Madame de Staël been quoted to relieve a temporary conversational embarrassment ! The brilliant de Staël and the attractive Madame de Flahault being both favourites of the amorous Minister, and the latter rather in the ascendant at the moment, Madame de Staël put him in the dilemma of asking him in the presence of her rival which he would wish to rescue, should both of them have fallen into the river. 'Madame de Flahault, I suppose,' said Talleyrand, 'for you certainly have the air of being a good swimmer.'

In his earliest days, when some fool of a revolutionary sought his advice how best to start a new religion,

Talleyrand told him: 'go and get yourself crucified and rise again the third day.'

During a debate in the Constituent Assembly Mirabeau, in answering Talleyrand's arguments, said he was going to enclose him in a vicious circle. 'Good God,' interpolated Talleyrand, 'are you going to embrace me?'

He found it expedient to leave Paris and go to London in 1792, and managed to have himself appointed to an official post there. George III received him coldly and the Queen turned her back on him. When he left St James's Palace Talleyrand confided to his friend de Biron, 'The Queen was quite right, for she really is very ugly.'

One of Napoleon's generals was talking contemptuously of civilians, whom he called *pékins*. 'Excuse me, general, but whom do you mean by *pékins*?' asked Talleyrand. 'We call all who are not soldiers *pékins*,' was the answer. 'Ah, I see,' said Talleyrand, 'just as we call *militaires* all who are not civil.'

When Talleyrand was Grand Chamberlain to the Emperor, a lady had to take the oath of loyalty on accepting a Court appointment. She came to Talleyrand for the purpose dressed in an elegant but very scanty evening dress. 'Your skirt, Madame, is very short for one who comes to take a vow of fidelity,' commented Talleyrand.

When he became Napoleon's Foreign Minister he coined the two cynical epigrams which are often taken too literally: 'Surtout pas de zèle'; and 'La parole a été donnée à l'homme pour dissimuler sa pensée.' But his circular memorandum to the novice diplomats of the first Republic had contained wise and sober advice.

How much responsibility rests on Talleyrand for the execution of the Duc d'Enghien is often debated; but it seems in any case to have been the occasion for another of Talleyrand's most cynical utterances: 'It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder.'

When the commonplace M. Maret was created Duc de Bassano by Napoleon, Talleyrand said to a friend, 'I only know one person stupider than Maret, and that is Bassano.'

But he could be lighter in his sarcasms when the victim was a personal friend, as was de Narbonne, who fancied himself as a poet. Out walking together, de Narbonne began reciting some of his own verse: Talleyrand hap-

pemed to see a man who passed them yawn. 'Look out, Narbonne,' he exclaimed, 'You always talk too loud.'

When Talleyrand decided to withdraw his support from the Emperor, Napoleon, enraged, told him angrily that he knew Talleyrand would expect to be regent if he died, but added, 'Bear this well in mind; if I am ever dangerously ill, you will die before I do.' To which Talleyrand made answer: 'Sire, I did not need that warning to address to heaven the most ardent wishes for your Majesty's preservation.'

Somebody told Talleyrand that his old enemy Chateaubriand had grown deaf. 'Yes,' said Talleyrand, 'he has become deaf since people have ceased to talk about him.'

Of another rival, Fouché, it had been remarked that he had a great contempt for mankind. 'Quite true,' said Talleyrand. 'That man has studied himself very thoroughly.'

During the Congress of Vienna a meeting was held up because one of the ambassadors had not arrived. Soon word was brought that he had died on the way to the meeting. After some moments of embarrassed silence Talleyrand was heard asking himself *sotto voce*, 'What can his motive have been?'

When the news of Napoleon's death arrived in London, the person sitting next to him at dinner exclaimed, 'What an event!' 'It is no longer an event,' corrected Talleyrand; 'it's just news.'

The Duke of Wellington, as we have noted, had found it possible to trust Talleyrand in negotiation, and Talleyrand said of the Duke in 1837: 'He is the only man who has ever spoken well of me.'

On the other hand a singularly sharp rejoinder to Talleyrand is attributed to Louis-Philippe by the Abbé Terray. The French king was visiting him on his death-bed. 'I am suffering the torments of Hell,' groaned the sick man. 'Already?' said Louis-Philippe.

Better authenticated is Talleyrand's last recorded jest. His doctor was announced. Talleyrand whispered to his footman: 'Tell him I regret very much that I am not well enough to receive him.'

'There is nothing less aristocratic than unbelief,' had been one of Talleyrand's sayings; and he died in the arms of the Church, for he had negotiated his last treaty, with

the Abbé Dupanloup, during the weeks before his death on May 17, 1838. The old sinner's errors had to be recounted and a correspondence was exchanged between the Archbishop of Paris and the Pope, in which Talleyrand took an eager interest, before a suitable form of absolution could be drawn up. If, in his own episcopal days, he had won some thirty thousand francs in gaming—'at the chess club,' he had explained—he had also promulgated proposals of both clerical and political reform which, if adopted, might have staved off the Revolution ; so it was not un-fitting that a large-minded Pope should have allowed him to receive extreme unction, which Talleyrand, according to Duff Cooper, accepted in the manner prescribed for a bishop, hands closed, with palms downwards, and murmuring, ' Do not forget I am a bishop.'

A. L. KENNEDY.

P.S.—A friend of mine with long diplomatic experience, hearing that I was engaged on this article, wrote me a letter in which he compared (politically) the late Lord Tyrrell with Talleyrand. Tyrrell also 'had immense intriguing powers, always used in a good cause.'

## Art. 3.—THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC COMMITTEES.

WHEN I am asked, as happens quite frequently, about the various Atlantic Committees which are springing up in the different countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I am not always quite certain how to answer. It hardly seems sufficient to say that they have the same functions in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as the League of Nations Union had to the League of Nations before the war, or as the United Nations Associations are to the United Nations Organisation since the war. It seems to me that we should think of these Committees as something more than merely docile supporters of what is presumably the principal plank in their countries' foreign policy, something more even than N.A.T.O. 'ginger groups.' I am therefore tempted sometimes to say that, in addition to their more conventional functions, these Committees collectively make up a kind of voluntary opposite number to the Cominform—the 'Natinform,' if you like. I say 'voluntary' because the Atlantic Committees have come into existence as a result of a spontaneous voluntary movement in each country and not by Government order. It is true, of course, that these Committees and their associates in each of the N.A.T.O. countries do quite often seek the advice and guidance of governments, just as the International Atlantic Committee often consults Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., or members of his staff in Paris. But the whole movement is a voluntary one and in that sense is very different from the Cominform, which, through the pressure brought to bear on it by the Soviet Government, puts out purely official propaganda throughout the Soviet Union and her satellite countries. Our Western way is, of course, more democratic and also, I believe (perhaps surprisingly), more effective. Undoubtedly those working for these Committees do put more energy and enthusiasm into their work because it is they themselves and their educational organisations who have worked out their plans and not their governments.

It was in 1949 soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty that I returned to England from the Embassy in Paris with an American wife and an enthusiastic supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

sation and its implications of Atlantic Union. In making a speech in Sussex to introduce my wife to friends in England, I began at once to extol the virtues of the Atlantic Alliance. I even went so far as to suggest that in the same way as my father, Lord Bessborough, largely by reason of his French wife, had become a fervent supporter of the Franco-British Alliance and indeed Chairman of the Franco-British Society, so I felt that some kind of Atlantic Society should also be formed to support Atlantic union in the broad sense of the term. We were all Atlantic citizens now ! In this domestic atmosphere was the idea first born in my own mind.

Two years elapsed, however, before I was called on to do anything practical to implement it. As a Governor of the British Society for International Understanding I knew that the society sometimes held international study conferences on different aspects of foreign affairs ; and when Mr John Eppstein, the society's director, suggested in 1951 that that society should arrange for the following year at Oxford a Study Conference on the Atlantic Community, the proposal naturally seemed to me most worthy of support. Thanks to the governing body of the society, and their enthusiastic chairman, Instructor Rear-Admiral Sir Arthur Hall, it was decided to go ahead with the idea and form an organising committee of which I was asked to be chairman. Our own Foreign Office, the N.A.T.O. Secretariat, and the various missions of the N.A.T.O. countries in London warmly supported the plan ; and as a result of the energy and hard work of Mr Eppstein and his staff there gathered together at Oxford in September 1952 the first International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community.

At the official N.A.T.O. meetings at Ottawa and Lisbon in the previous year, the idea was stressed that the Atlantic partnership should not be confined to defence alone, but should extend in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty to other fields for the well-being of the peoples of the Atlantic Community. Members of the organising committee agreed that some method should be found for creating a true Atlantic Community spirit. The Treaty had been signed ; the alliance existed ; and it now seemed necessary to show that a thriving community existed among the peoples in support of it. Although showing remarkable progress in

itself, it did not seem enough that the armed forces of the different countries should agree to come directly or indirectly under what would seem to be foreign command, nor for the forces to train and fraternise together and the staffs to work as a single team. Nor, so far, did the joint planning of economic resources seem to have been altogether sufficient to inspire the Atlantic peoples to be as proud to belong to the Atlantic Community as to be citizens of their own countries. The time seemed more than ripe for the *peoples* of these countries, and not merely their governments, officials, and armed services, to come closer together. As I said at the opening meeting at Oxford, it was for us to recommend the best means by which the aims and implications of the Atlantic Treaty might become better known in each of our countries whether by the old and tried methods of the schoolroom blackboard or the more advanced facility of the television screen. It seemed necessary to show that consideration of the moral, social, educational, and economic aspects of the Atlantic Community was essential if the alliance was to prosper in the long run.

It seemed to be generally, if regrettably, realised that the people in the N.A.T.O. countries, even if they understood the meaning of the initials, did not understand the complicated machinery of the Organisation. If it meant anything to them, it meant mainly long periods of military service and increased taxation for rearmament. If in some countries there was no actually hostile element, there was in others an indifference which amounted in some cases to a dangerous form of neutralism. It was clear that the only way to counteract this was to build up a much greater body of informed opinion. This informed opinion would be based not only on the military necessity for the Treaty, but on the idea that the Atlantic Community should be something spiritually constructive, something which, as the late Count Sforza said, would prove to be like *Magna Carta* in England, a combination of inviolability and a process of continual creation. The organising committee for the Oxford Conference, with representatives, official and unofficial, from the fourteen countries, worked not only with members of the Embassies and Legations of N.A.T.O. countries in London, but also with the support of such organisations as the Foreign Policy Association in the

United States, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and similar societies, both expert and popular, in each N.A.T.O. country. It was fortunate also in obtaining the co-operation of members of Mr Justice Roberts's Atlantic Union Committee in America and 'The Friends of the Atlantic Union' in England, presided over by Sir Hartley Shawcross.

Delegations at Oxford coming from the fourteen countries included parliamentarians, university men, representatives of the Press, radio, TV, and films, as well as officials from the different Foreign Offices, Ministries of Education, and the armed forces as advisers and observers. In order to ensure the fullest freedom of discussion, the Conference passed at its first meeting a resolution to the effect that members would speak in their personal capacities and would not be considered to be committing the departments or organisations which they represented. The Conference soon divided itself up into commissions dealing with Schools and Universities, Adult Education, the Press, Radio, Television, and Films. Although unofficial, the Conference was given a great deal of official support and encouragement in messages from Her Majesty the Queen, our own Foreign Secretary, Mr Anthony Eden, and many others. Ambassador Draper, the United States Special Representative in Europe, Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., and permanent delegates from the N.A.T.O. headquarters in Paris were present in person and addressed the conference.

The Conference's recommendations, which were adopted unanimously, covered a wide field. It was resolved to encourage within each N.A.T.O. country a popular movement which, taking account of what had already been achieved in the direction of the unification of Europe, would lead the governments to establish a permanent system of co-operation in the political, social, cultural, and economic as well as the military fields. It was agreed that the nations of the Atlantic Treaty should have a better understanding of the heritage which they have to defend, of the spiritual and material advantages of the freedom which they enjoy, and of the values of the civilisation which they represent. It seemed particularly appropriate that Greece and Turkey should recently have been included in the Alliance as well as Italy, for did not the common

heritage of the Atlantic Community spring from Greece, Rome, and Byzantium?

The practical proposals were straightforward. They included, amongst others, the recommendation that communications be made easier between each N.A.T.O. country; that exchange control should be less strict; that formalities at the frontiers should be eased in appropriate cases; that Atlantic Identity Cards should be issued in lieu of passports; that Atlantic holiday camps should be organised; that books and other publications should be exchanged in order to encourage what the French described as the interpenetration of cultures which complement one another. It was recommended that school text-books should contain up-to-date information about the Atlantic Community; that there should be an exchange of professors and students on a wider scale, and that summer courses on the Atlantic Community countries should be organised. A whole series of recommendations were adopted concerning the spread of adult education about N.A.T.O. through the great national organisations and in the armed services. It was also recommended that units and formations of the armed forces should be exchanged and that there should be international instruction and exchange of civil servants, as was already being done within the framework of the Brussels Treaty. Further recommendations which may be of special interest in this country were that discussion programmes and lectures on N.A.T.O. should be broadcast and televised as extensively as possible; that television films, newsreels, documentary and feature films should be regularly exchanged; that there should be an annual award for the best film based on themes of comradeship between the N.A.T.O. nations; that there should be international co-operation in educational films; that military training films should be exchanged, and a series of 'Know Your Allies' films be made about the peoples of the Atlantic Community.

It was recommended that there would be great advantage in establishing within the Atlantic Community increasing contact between groups of persons of the same professions, as for instance between doctors, teachers, authors, scientists, and engineers, etc., and that national Atlantic societies or movements, such as are now being formed, should be established in each country and state

where they did not already exist. This was perhaps the most important single recommendation, since it is for these national societies or Councils to examine the extent to which the recommendations apply in their country and whether any other methods may usefully be employed to achieve the same ends. Finally the Conference established a Continuing Committee, now called the International Atlantic Committee, to follow up its recommendations.

This International Committee, appropriately meeting at the old London home of that great American conciliator, Benjamin Franklin, with M. Bidault, the French Foreign Minister and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, and his predecessor, M. Kraft, former Foreign Minister of Denmark, as its Honorary Presidents, has been actively following up these recommendations, as have the different national organisations in each country since the Oxford Conference. In each country popular societies are now at work publicising N.A.T.O. More booklets are being sent to schools. Conferences are being held. In conjunction with the European Youth Campaign the International Atlantic Committee is planning to arrange an exchange of 400 young people between Europe and North America. More is heard of N.A.T.O. on the world's radios ; David Selznick has offered an award for the best film on international understanding in N.A.T.O. countries ; and it will have been seen that the exchange of military units has been to the forefront in the minds of the authorities concerned.

While much has thus been done to implement the Oxford recommendations where they are applicable or practicable in each country, still further energy, enthusiasm and hard work are required if we are to achieve our aim of a true Atlantic Community spirit. At Oxford Lord Ismay asked us to find a new name for N.A.T.O. Ambassador Draper urged us to consider questions of immigration and the mobility of labour. Other economic and financial questions are ripe for discussion. The Netherlands Atlantic Committee held a national Atlantic Community Conference at The Hague in March 1953. There were international meetings in Paris in June leading up to a bigger international Atlantic Conference at the end of August at Copenhagen, when the decisions of the Oxford Conference were carried a significant step further.

At Paris in June the conference was entitled 'N.A.T.O. and the Problems of Western Rearmament.' It was held at the *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère* and one of its results was the creation of a *Comité Français pour l'Etude de l'Organisation Atlantique*. The Conference, of which Mr Alfred Coste-Floret was Chairman and Signor Quintieri Deputy Chairman, included representatives or observers, all serving in a personal capacity, from twelve of the fourteen member nations. It divided into two Commissions. One, at which first Mr Budden of Canada and then Mr Faaland of Norway presided, considered and reported upon the economic and financial aspects of rearmament. The other, of which Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor was chairman, produced a report on public opinion and rearmament which, having been debated and amended in plenary session, was finally adopted by the whole Conference. It may be said to have been a valuable barometer of opinion at a stage when recent Soviet tactics, with the hopes of a *détente* which they engendered, had had a considerable effect in several countries.

At Copenhagen I was thus able to say that, since Oxford, a great deal had been done despite a notable lack of funds. At the time of the Oxford Conference only two national bodies existed specifically to win public support for the Atlantic Treaty; they existed in Denmark and Norway. There were, it was true, important Atlantic Union organisations in the United States, Britain and the Netherlands either already formed or coming into being at that time, but their object was not simply the educational task of winning support for the existing treaty, but of considering more advanced projects for the integration of the Atlantic Nations and the enlargement of existing official organisations. Since the Oxford Conference, however, important voluntary organisations had emerged in the United States with the support of General Ridgway, who addressed their first big meeting; in Britain under the presidency of Sir David Kelly; and in Belgium thanks to the personal interest of Mr Van Zeeland. In other countries organisations such as the French *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère*, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Greek Council for Public Enlightenment and the Italian Institute for the Study of International Politics had greatly extended their educational

work in support of N.A.T.O. In Turkey and Portugal interministerial committees had been formed to consider the implementation of the Oxford recommendations and to co-ordinate public information on N.A.T.O. Our own Foreign Office, the American State Department, and the Danish Foreign Ministry had produced illustrated pamphlets on N.A.T.O. N.A.T.O. itself had organised and financed exchange visits of groups of journalists from N.A.T.O. countries. They had arranged a touring Atlantic Exhibition and a conference on Troop Information and Military Relations.\* A series of 'Know Your Allies' films about the peoples of the Atlantic Community was in the course of production. Summer schools and Youth Congresses had been devoting their attention to the Atlantic Alliance; and the Press and radios of many countries had made notable contributions to the same cause.

The Copenhagen Conference consisted of some 150 delegates representing the same walks of life in the fourteen countries as at Oxford. However, in the subject-matter of the Conference, no attempt was made to go over the whole ground covered the previous year. At Oxford what may be described as a ten-year programme was adopted for the use of all available institutions and media in the instruction and formation of public opinion upon N.A.T.O. and the Atlantic Community; and it is in pursuit of that long-term programme that, one by one, national Atlantic organisations are coming into being. At Copenhagen it was decided to proceed with the federation of these organisations and to give special attention to the interests and aspirations of two important groups among our peoples—organised labour and organised youth. At future conferences it will no doubt be wise to arrange special meetings of other groups or professions to discuss matters of common concern with their 'opposite numbers' from other Atlantic countries.

It had also been proposed to have, as a special topic for Copenhagen, the question of implementing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but the terms of reference of the Commission concerned were enlarged by the International Committee, at the request of the Netherlands At-

\* This conference was held to discuss means of improving information of troops about the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance and their relations with the civilian population of allied countries in which they are stationed. Among other interesting data the fact emerged that 200 British girls, but only six French girls, marry American servicemen every month.

lantic Committee, to include 'the Promotion of the Atlantic Community' in general.

The majority of the valuable recommendations made under this head by the Second Commission, which worked under the able chairmanship of Dr Nord of the Netherlands, met with general approval. It was particularly the resolution which suggested the convening by the North Atlantic Council of a periodic assembly of parliamentarians—a kind of Atlantic Parliament—which caused divisions of opinion. It was approved by the Commission, in which the supporters of the proposal were concentrated, but it was found, on consideration by the Bureau, that while the heads of the Netherlands, Norwegian, and United States delegations said they would vote for it, the leaders of the ten other national groups present declared that they would feel obliged, on various grounds, either to abstain or to oppose it, were it put to the vote. Foreseeing this situation, I had already proposed in the Second Commission the adoption of a resolution recommending that a representative number of parliamentarians be included in each national Atlantic Committee and that these parliamentarians from each country should meet from time to time as an Atlantic Parliamentary Group within the proposed federation of national organisations rather than within N.A.T.O. itself. The hope was confidently expressed that the Secretary General of N.A.T.O. and the permanent delegates on the North Atlantic Council would receive such a group at the Palais de Chaillot, in the same way as members of the Study Conference on Western Rearmament held in Paris in June had been received. While this resolution was adopted unanimously, a majority were agreed that there could be no question of attempting to suppress the earlier proposal, the more so since it was believed to have the support of the Norwegian Government. It was agreed therefore to note the resolution and, since it was of intimate concern to N.A.T.O. itself and Governments, to ask the International Atlantic Committee to bring it to the attention of the Secretary General and take his advice about it. This solution was approved by a majority of the Plenary Session, though a few members asked that their abstentions be put on record.\*

\* Since then the North Atlantic Council has been actively considering methods by which parliamentarians might be more closely associated with N.A.T.O.'s work.

These differences of opinion, which are always liable to occur in an assembly drawn from the free nations of the European tradition, have been indicated partly because of the attention which they received in the Press. But it is also important to recognise that, in a movement which sets out to unite all 'who accept the North Atlantic Treaty and the obligations which it creates for its signatories,' however diverse their interests and polities, new ideas will often be put forward, which cannot command unanimity forthwith among nations so different in their political institutions and outlook, but which merit serious public discussion. In such cases it is for voluntary associations of citizens and for Member Governments to consider freely and independently whether or not to give support to these ideas. As Mr Eppstein, the Secretary-General of the Conference, said in his report,\* this is the stuff of which our free society is made.

There was no difference about the main object of the Conference and of all who participated in it, which is to sustain the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation both for defence and for the constructive purposes defined in the Treaty, and to reinforce it with a wide-awake, convinced public opinion. It is in any case hoped that the various proposals put forward will stimulate thought and action in many countries: for example the recommendations regarding the establishment of an *Atlantic Community Cultural Centre* and an *Atlantic College*. It was suggested that the *Collège d'Europe* at Bruges should be consulted about this. The voluntary international organisation which the Copenhagen Conference has resolved to build up throughout the allied nations should not only be of practical assistance to the North Atlantic Council, but should also thus become a permanent and useful element in the consolidation and development of the community of Atlantic peoples, which is the beneficiary, as it could be the champion, of the whole rich heritage of our Western civilisation.

The Copenhagen Conference elected as its President Sir David Kelly, the former British Ambassador in Moscow and Chairman of the British Atlantic Committee. Sir David's experience in the Soviet Union is of course of very great value to the cause of Atlantic co-operation. As

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\* 'Report of the Second International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community': Price 2s. 6d. from 36 Craven Street, London, W.C.2.

Chairman of the British Committee he has already brought together representatives of a large number of organisations in England, such as the United Nations Association, the English-Speaking Union,\* the Friends of Atlantic Union, the United Europe Movement, the European Youth Campaign, the Allied Circle, the Federal Union, the Trade Union Congress, the Federation of British Industries, the National Council of Women, the Association of Education Committees, the National Union of Teachers, the Service Directorates of Education, the National News Letter, the Anglo-Belgian Society, the Anglo-Hellenic League, the Anglo-Italian Society, the Anglo-Netherlands Society, the Anglo-Norse Society, the Anglo-Portuguese Society, the British American Associates, the Danish Society and the Franco-British Society, amongst others.

In his speech accepting the Presidency at Copenhagen Sir David emphasised the transcendent importance of the work we had undertaken. We were meeting because we all recognised that the cause we served—the Atlantic Community—was nothing less than the material defence of all our spiritual values, above all, that primary value, the freedom of the individual human person to work out his destiny against the encroaching tide of lawless, mechanical, collective force. We did not claim that Western man was essentially different from other men. All men had the capacity for Reason and Law. We *did* claim that we had a great tradition and a way of life which we ought to defend at all costs. The work was only begun, but we would succeed. In this confidence, and with a true sense of mission, Sir David asked us to get down to the work of the Conference, inspired by the knowledge that we could make of it a turning-point, a beacon amid the encircling gloom.

Another highlight at Copenhagen was the important address given by General Gruenther, the first since he took up his command as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe. The speech received very considerable publicity in all the N.A.T.O. countries, and if the impact of this kind of conference upon public opinion is to be judged by its

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\* The E.-S. U. and the British Atlantic Committee are organising important public meetings in April to mark the fifth anniversary of N.A.T.O. At these meetings well-known European statesmen and General Gruenther will be speaking.

publicity, the Conference certainly achieved its aim of 'bringing N.A.T.O. to the people.' General Gruenther intimated that, while the Western powers now have sufficient strength to withstand any attack by Soviet forces at present stationed in Occupied Europe, we still did not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out attack by all the forces which the U.S.S.R. might make available for Western Europe. While we could launch powerful atomic attacks deep into Soviet territory, we still would not be able to defeat a major Soviet invasion of Western Europe. There was no evidence that the armed strength of the Soviet *bloc* was growing weaker. On the contrary, all intelligence reports indicated that it was increasing. In Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in August there was no hint that the Soviets planned to make any concessions to the West. Nor by January 1954\* has there been any such indication. As General Gruenther pointed out, the intention declared at the 19th Soviet Congress that the major Soviet effort would be directed toward the dismemberment of N.A.T.O. and the progressive isolation of its member-states could only be assumed still to hold good. The plan of world Communism had been published and republished in every corner of the earth. No one could have any doubt about it.

However desirable, therefore, four-power conferences with the Soviet Union may appear to be, we must have no false hopes about the possibility of peaceful co-existence with a power whose declared policy is the destruction and disintegration of our Atlantic Community. But we must also remember that the North Atlantic Treaty is not solely a strategic expedient. It also represents the long-term policy of all our Governments who hope that the Atlantic Community will remain in being as an economic and social grouping of countries even if and when the *military* necessity for it no longer exists. It is for that reason that the Atlantic Committees emphasise the importance of Article 2 of the Treaty and the obligations which it involves in our common heritage and civilisation.

In the United States the work of informing public opinion about N.A.T.O. is admirably undertaken by the American Council on N.A.T.O. Inc., which is the American

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\* Since the Berlin Conference Mr Eden has in effect told the House of Commons that there can be little doubt that the Soviet aim still is to destroy our defensive alliance.

member of the International Atlantic Committee. At Copenhagen the American Council tabled an excellent memorandum on the reduction of misunderstandings between America and Europe. As this memorandum pointed out, criticisms of America in Europe include such questions as alleged war-mongering, McCarthyism, anti-Communist hysteria and America's unwillingness to make equal sacrifices in the common cause despite her generosity. Europeans also tend to criticise the American Congress for their increasing opposition to either trade or aid, and they note the instability of American opinion and the inability of the President to make and carry out long-range commitments under the United States constitution.

Criticism of Europe in America includes the issues of appeasement, trading with the enemy and ingratitude on Europe's part for all the assistance which the United States has given them. Americans have also tended to criticise Europeans for their unwillingness to share the sacrifices in Korea; for their alleged failure to make good economic use of United States aid, and their unwillingness to unite and to put their own houses in order. There is, indeed, a whole series of general and specific issues which tend to disrupt American-European relations; and it was for this reason that the American Council recommended at Copenhagen that perhaps the most constructive single function which the Atlantic Committees could undertake would be to provide the machinery for an information exchange programme which would promote understanding on issues currently in dispute. The American Council rightly believe that a plan for the exchange of newspaper articles, speakers, and radio and television programmes is essential to the preservation of the Alliance. The International Atlantic Committee is therefore giving these proposals active consideration. In accordance with the recommendations of the Copenhagen Conference the Committee is also engaged, in co-operation with its member organisations, in drawing up the draft constitution for the union or federation of the existing Atlantic groups. It is hoped that a constituent conference will be held in Paris in May to adopt this constitution. Much still remains to be done. Recent figures published by the International Press Institute indicate that over 75 per cent. of the people in Britain and the U.S.A. still do not know what

the initials N.A.T.O. mean. But there are already some hopeful signs.

In medieval England, even after *Magna Carta*, there were four official languages : Latin, Norman French, Provençal, and Saxon, and it was some time before English became the principal tongue. In the N.A.T.O. countries there are half a score of widely spoken languages and yet these fourteen countries have agreed to accept English and French as the official N.A.T.O. tongues. They are accepted not only by the officials in Paris but were also unanimously adopted at our Conferences at Oxford and Copenhagen. Here, at least, is some progress towards an Atlantic *esprit de corps* ; some progress towards what Mr Acheson described as 'the unity of belief, of spirit, of interest . . . the product of centuries of common thought and the blood of . . . simple. . . men.' Before the Oxford and Copenhagen Conferences, the majority of delegates attended religious services at which the *Veni Creator*, the hymn to the Holy Spirit, was sung, and it was clear that those present were at one with their Moslem colleagues in recognising how wide and deep is the measure of agreement among men of good faith. I believe that in these different ways we have helped to lay the foundations of that larger community spirit and that we may now build confidently upon them.

A high N.A.T.O. Admiral has said that the N.A.T.O. navy is a reality. I know that it is ; and I hope it will not be considered impertinent if I recall that in Latin *nato* means 'I swim.' But if *nato* means that we can swim, it also means that we can walk (on our own feet) and that we can fight for our ideals in the air, on the sea, and on the land. But does *nato* also mean that we can think ? Can we of this community on which the future of the free world depends, also evolve a common philosophy based on ancient Greece and ancient Rome and on the democratic principles which have grown up in the West ? I believe we not only can, but have to a large extent already done so. But let us continue the struggle and let us not faint nor fail in this long battle for the minds of men.

DUNCANNON.

NOTE.—Since the above was written Canadian and Turkish Atlantic Committees have been created, so that a majority of the N.A.T.O. countries now have active unofficial organisations in being. With the formation of French and Italian Committees it is hoped that before long a German Atlantic Committee may come into being—that is to say when Western Germany takes her place within the Atlantic Community through membership of the European Defence Community.

**Art. 4.—TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE MEANING OF HISTORY.**

HAS history a meaning, and if so wherein does the clue to that meaning lie? Such questions as these, which in themselves are by no means novel, have from one point of view or another very considerably exercised the mind of our epoch. Philosophically conceived, they are characteristic of the modern world rather than of antiquity or the middle ages, inasmuch as history studied for its own sake is a comparatively modern thing. In earlier ages men's interest in it was restricted by practical ends and by the little available knowledge; as a rule they were concerned only with the traditions of their own tribe or nation, or else with a past not clearly distinguished from the legendary Golden Age when civilised usages first appeared and mankind for the most part lived more happily than in the decadent after years. But the modern world, with its immense command of factual information, has tried to look at history as a whole, and in particular to establish the conclusion that within history as a whole there is some discernible law of progress.

The notion that history reveals a generally progressive movement has had, and still possesses, a great many adherents. They contend that this alone makes history intelligible. Others, however, feel no such assurance and hold that if history is intelligible the key to its intelligibility must be sought elsewhere. Latterly, for reasons not difficult to discern, this debate has quickened. To a certain type of mind, whose delight is in traversing the marches of philosophy, sociology, and politics, such speculations are of unfailing attraction. Unfortunately, the impression conveyed is apt to be that of men talking at cross-purposes. We may well object that the very idea of 'explaining' history as a whole is presumptuous; for who, indeed, could possess the necessary qualifications? Historians will approach the question from their angle, philosophers, sociologists, and theologians from theirs; but a synthetic view is altogether premature and may turn out to be impossible.

It would appear, then, that our initial difficulty lies in the misconception of the problem itself. 'History' is an

ambiguous word : it may mean one thing or it may mean another, according to the level, so to say, at which we choose to study it. A Christian answer to our questions will have to presuppose interpretations of historical data at levels with which the Christian thinker is himself not directly concerned. Take, for example, the notion of progress. Many Christians seem to feel that to admit it is to betray some essential principle of Christian belief. Yet the refusal to do so amounts to a denial of incontrovertible fact. No doubt progress can become, and has become, a quasi-religious doctrine, a secularisation under rationalist influence of insights which in origin are Christian. But because the problem has been misunderstood the kind of antithesis so often encountered in current debate is likely to prove false. It is simply not to be disputed that a great deal of progress has occurred in history ; nor need we suppose that, given an era of world peace, we shall not continue to observe astonishing evidences of its persistence. But we must be clear in our minds as to the plane of history whereon such progress may with confidence be reported. What most of us appear to imply by it is really nothing other than the sustained accumulation of means or instruments : first, in the narrowest sense, technological ; but also, more widely, as the accessories of life classifiable in terms of acquired knowledge, culture, and even moral understanding. At this level we are dealing with the *acquisitions* of the human race. History as the interplay of personal forces is left on one side or slipped within a convenient parenthesis.

The latter conception, however, may be said to show us history at a second level, in which it appears rather as a sequence of crises involving decisions. Here we are confronted with the 'rise' and 'fall' of civilisations, with great historical 'challenges,' with human actions. Such history is personal and dramatic. It is preoccupied with men and not merely with the things which men have made. Its substance is *events*. If the former view of history is to be described as 'abstract,' this latter is appropriately called 'concrete.' It clearly is the kind of history about which Christianity can have something relevant to say. Yet the difficulties which it presents to the student are all the greater. Can it be said to possess a 'total' meaning ? How, indeed, are we to analyse it ? For here we are in

the realm of freedom, in which issues are ever uncertain and ambiguous.

But the Christian thinker may look at history on yet a third plane. Before, however, we consider this let us examine the prior levels in some detail. The first we will venture to designate as the broadly progressive; the second as the human or existential.

## I

We have used the word 'progress'; but how and where exactly has progress occurred? The short answer is, of course, in man's *tools*. For man is not merely an animal, and his tool-using capacity is one of the sure proofs of his superior endowment. But he not only makes the tool for the job he has immediately in view, he keeps it for use on subsequent occasions. Thus does he accumulate his implements, while by experience in their manipulation he is able to vary and improve them. So although men die, their artifacts remain and skill in employing them is continued and perfected. The increasing range and variety of these implements, along with growing proficiency in their use, constitutes a progressive development.

But the different forms of instrumentality at mankind's disposal are clearly not limited to his technical equipment. Scientific knowledge considered in its widest scope is itself a body of means. Acquired in many and various fields of experience, it accumulates, layer upon layer, as it were, through the centuries. Such permanence has of course been made possible, in the first place, by the device of the written word, and more particularly by the invention of the printing press. This knowledge is increasing by an irreversible process, since information once gained has no need of rediscovery. Every new fact, every fresh idea takes its place in the growing pile, to be available for use when occasion requires. We may regard, therefore, in the well-known words of Pascal, 'the whole sequence of human beings, throughout the whole course of the ages, as the same man living on and learning something all the time.' The record of man's inventions and discoveries appears to be both continuous and unitary, however diverse the kinds of genius, individual, national or racial, which have severally contributed to it. Its unity is indeed the more evident

because of its essentially impersonal character. For the person of the inventor or discoverer is of merely marginal significance, an odd fact to be noted and forgotten. 'Impersonal' history is doubtless concerned with humanity *in abstracto*, but not with men as such, whose individuality has no demonstrable relevance to the study of the development of knowledge and power.

But we may extend our regard further still. There has been increase not in scientific knowledge alone: the moral consciousness has become larger—broader and in some respects deeper. Ethical ideas have developed and have found new spheres of applicability. Man has grown in knowledge and understanding of himself, with the prospect before him of the manifold aspects of human experience, moral and spiritual no less than material and technological. His total life-experience must thus itself be considered as a continuous growth or acquisition, in evidence of which stand his unnumbered achievements in the realms of art, letters, and spirituality. For all these things, like man's scientific knowledge, can be viewed as distinct and apart from himself and his historic existence. As the content of the collective tradition of human civilisation and wisdom, they are seen to constitute a separate order of reality, a world within a world—a 'whole' if not self-explanatory yet self-complete, objective and anonymous.

So envisaged, progress is seen to have occurred on a truly vast scale and to cover immense areas of life. As the sum total of the products of human culture and civilisation it involves nothing less than the entire field of instrumentality. Yet as obviously does it *not* exhaust the essential meaning of human experience. On the contrary, it relates only to what may be called, in a general way, 'the mind of man'—to knowledge, understanding, insight, and skill considered simply *per se* and regardless of the living movement, the concrete drama, of human existence.

At this level history can hardly be said to confront Christian theology with any vital issue. But Christianity, born of the religion of the Old Testament, brought into the Graeco-Roman world, with its merely cyclical conception of history as a predetermined and unending repetition of the same types and patterns, a view of time in which the course of events is unique and irreversible; of certain events, furthermore, which in a quite special sense are

significant and 'sacred.' Time, it taught, has been punctuated, as also it began, by certain occurrences in which the divine hand is decisively manifest ; occurrences of which the Bible is the authoritative record. Not only, according to Christian teaching, does man's life in every age derive its ultimate meaning and value from these events, but the 'sacred history' as a whole reveals how all events, crises, and decisions are severally unique and purposeful, as occasions for freedom of choice. For men become more or less truly themselves in accordance with the options they make. History, therefore, in the Christian view, is not simply an illusory show or mirage but a form of reality of momentous importance, in which men may indeed gain or lose their souls.

With progress, then, as we have defined it, Christianity can, it would seem, have little or no encounter ; for upon the kinds of *means* which men have devised and conserved for use it has no particular comment to pass. Rather, for the Christian *qua* Christian, interest centres not upon the abstract and anonymous but upon the concrete and personal. Christianity does not condemn technical knowledge and its application to human requirements. It has no wish whatever to question that this knowledge, in itself, is for man's benefit. The Fall, according to Christian dogma, does not lie in Adam's discovery of means of alleviating the conditions of his terrestrial existence ; and man's knowledge of his environment and his skill in technique are, therefore, not to be identified with disobedience to the divine command. His sin is in rebellion against God at a much deeper level, ending in a radical hostility to God's will and estrangement from his life. In conquering nature man cannot truly be said to sin against it. What he does sin against is brotherly love, and in doing so he may, and, alas ! all too often does, make perverted use of a knowledge which itself is ethically neutral.

Yet although acceptance of the Christian standpoint does not imply any repudiation of man's historic adventure in knowledge, nor a depreciation of the resources and ingenuity of mind which have been devoted to it, the fact remains that this great endeavour is not, fundamentally, a matter of importance for Christian theology. For we have characterised it as essentially abstract and anonymous, and Christian faith is concerned much less with the 'mind of

man' than with the lives of men. The significant thing is what men, viewed concretely either as individuals or in their various groupings, do for the good or ill of their souls. Christianity seeks to account for man not merely in this or that aspect of his existence but in his totality. It may and readily does admit progress as both a fact and a value. But faith in progress is no part of the Christian creed.

## II

Objection may, however, be raised, in anticipation of what is to follow, that in concentrating on the personal aspect of history we shall now have simply to abandon all idea of historical continuity and confine ourselves to purely individual experience. But this is not so. On the contrary, what we have in view is a form of history no less authentic. Its dynamic is the interplay of human motive and action. It possesses its own appropriate categories, to be denoted by such terms as 'crises,' 'zenith,' 'rise,' 'decline,' 'period,' and 'epoch.' As primary evidence of what I mean it has to be considered that whereas there is only one *humanity*, there have been many *civilisations*. Humanity, indeed, is an abstract entity ; men, as the historian sees them, must always be assigned the context of a particular civilisation.

There is no proper study of man apart from his civilisations ; and these, again, must be understood comprehensively as a way of life, the embodiment of a life-purpose. It has been a too frequent practice of historians to interpret a given epoch wholly or mainly in terms of certain key-notions : for example, eighteenth-century Western civilisation defined as the age of Reason, or of Tolerance, or of the emergent idea of Equality. But the values of a civilisation are always objectified, or actualised, and it is as actualised that we must first study them. They are the fruitful permeating influences in the whole conduct of life, social and individual : we discover them in the way people live, how they earn their daily bread or distribute their goods, what their habitations are like, or their social customs, modes of dress and amusements. But it is also true that we do not fully comprehend a civilisation merely by examining its implements ; rather do we have to discover what were men's guiding purposes and aspirations, for

history is ultimately a study of *ends*, of human aims, of which the means thereto are never the finally determining factor. A civilisation is thus the sum total, in a given age and place, both of men's overall desires and of their particular modes of self-fulfilment. It is a body of ideas expressed in a concrete way of life.

We have remarked that 'existential' history has its own distinctive categories, with which the conception of history simply as progress is largely unconcerned. In contrast with the 'rectilinear' view which we associate with the idea of continuous advance, existential history is cyclical. Civilisations follow one another, that is to say, like rotating wheels. For the historian both views are legitimate, since they enable him to see the past from two different angles. The former may be characterised as the technical, the latter as the ethical ; the key to the understanding of the one is the idea of progressive accumulation, to that of the other the idea of crisis.

Our appreciation of the latter aspect of history has been much enriched and deepened by the work of Professor Toynbee. A civilisation, as he sees it, is marked by successive situations each of which is in the nature of a challenge : situations brought about by conditions of the physical environment, over-population, a crisis in the class struggle, the problem of racial or religious division, etc. These challenges must be answered, since failure brings decline and perhaps eventual extinction. How the answer is given determines a civilisation's future. If the response is creative the civilisation will survive and very likely go forward to new achievements. The fatal thing is the missed opportunity, the inability to make the necessary adjustment. But—and this is a point Toynbee stresses—at the moment of challenge there is always an area of free choice. A civilisation at a crisis in its history must therefore act, either creatively and so progressively, or else by taking refuge in 'the old ways' in the hope of thus conserving its values. Hence we have periods of 'revival' and 'decadence', of 'stagnation' and 'advance'.

It is virtually impossible to write history without employing such terminology as this. We usually take it for granted, without examination, and do not stop to relate it to our common assumptions about progress ; yet on this plane there is always the possibility of regress.

Clearly, however, the view of history as a dialectic of challenge and response is more nearly in line with the interests and presuppositions of the Christian theologian. But it must not be over-simplified. A civilisation is a highly complex thing and does not rise and decline all of a piece. We find on investigation that each strand, so to speak, which goes to the making of its texture has a history of its own, and that a crisis in one sphere of life may have little direct bearing on any other. A period of political stagnation may very well witness a flowering of the arts, and vice versa. The ages which we call great are those in which we do find something like a synchronisation of more than one kind of excellence.

Hence the unity of history as it appears under the aspect of progress becomes a multiplicity when we study it in its concrete being. It is divisible into cultures, civilisations, and periods, and these again yield a still greater complexity when we begin to examine the living tissue itself. It then becomes very difficult to speak of progress in history as a whole, for we seem unable to discover any ' law ' of history simply as such, and to profess to have done so is the consequence of a too radical selection and simplification of the facts in the interest of an *a priori* principle. In order to exhibit a clear dialectical pattern the historical process in its full existential reality has to suffer much pruning and distortion. Almost all philosophies of history are premature and inadequately founded. The requisite logic of analysis is not available to us, and lacking it we are obliged to fall back on dogma.

A further mark of what we have called ' concrete ' history is in the elemental significance it assigns to events and personalities. We must allow, of course, that the old-fashioned method of studying the past by reference mainly to dynasties, battles, and treaties reduces historiography to a mere cataloguing of arbitrary occurrences, a chronicle of the accidental and irrational, unworthy of the name of science. By contrast the modern method seeks to view the historical process from a higher point of vantage and to comprehend it in terms of an intelligible relation of cause and effect. The modern historian will relate his researches to certain governing ideas, e.g. the influence of geographical position and climate, the principles of social evolution, the development of techniques. But the new method also has

its dangers, of which the most insidious is that the past thus causally 'explained' tends to become depersonalised. History is revealed as a closed system of 'laws', with no room for the contingent and unpredictable. But in this case it will cease to be history as generally understood and become something else—which indeed is what positivists desire.

In concrete history, moreover, we have to realise the importance of the rôle played by politics. Politics are concerned with human relationships in respect of the organisation and exercise of power. We speak pejoratively of 'power-politics', but the question of power is central in all politics. Politics of whatever kind involve rulers and ruled and concern the nature, extent, and limitations of the authority exerted by the one and the obedience due from the other. A people's life and destiny are therefore inseparable from its political history. National leaders are political figures, men exercising power over their fellows, and because they exercise such power able to control or at least influence with effect the shape and course of historical events. For historical events, even though unwilling and unanticipated in the form in which they actually occur, are commonly the outcome of political decisions.

It is therefore in its political aspect that the morphology of civilisations is most readily intelligible. Though let us also beware of claiming overmuch for politics. The contemporary world is apt to go too far in identifying a nation's life with its political organisation and in supposing that its welfare is something wholly at the instance of political action. Much else besides the decisions of governments determines the character and quality of a civilisation and so the character and quality of men's lives within it. To assume that there is an immediate co-relation between historical events and (let us say) the development of the arts and sciences is without justification. Certainly we have no warrant for the view that a nation's life is 'enriched' by every extension thereto of the devices of political control.

Nevertheless, a people's political crises are events of very great significance. They may be compared to physical illnesses: the patient may recover his full health and vigour or he may languish and die. Thus to regard history

as past politics is not in itself a mark of an immature understanding of its essential nature. But the political factor in history has a further meaning. Politics defined as the organisation of power imply a relationship of responsibility as between rulers and ruled, and how that responsibility is borne and exercised must be morally judged. Power, as we have so often been reminded, corrupts, and political ambition is much the most fruitful source of human strife and suffering. Political action, therefore, so far from being merely amoral or beyond moral criteria, is rather the acid-test of men's consciousness of the distinction between right and wrong. And if a nation suffers for its wrong-doing it is not blind fate or misfortune but retribution.

It is at this point that we begin to see the relevance of a *theology* of history. For when we approach a valuation of the historical process in terms of crisis and moral responsibility we can no longer continue the pretence that history and theology are matters wholly disparate. In the Old Testament, where the ideas of responsibility, moral failure, and consequent retribution are worked out with peculiar insight, they are in fact seen to merge. An indispensable function of the theology of history to-day is to work out, within the context of our own twentieth-century world and by the aid of the knowledge of human nature which the study of psychology now affords us, a criticism of the times analogous to that of the Old Testament prophets—not forgetting the connection which seems always to exist between material greatness and moral decline.

A theology of history must rest upon an appreciation of history as a sphere of freedom—of authentic choice and responsible action. But where there is freedom there is always room for culpability. The purely instrumental or progressist view, on the other hand, takes no account of this. The student of history on its merely abstract plane may very reasonably sustain his optimism, but in the realm of decision and crisis there is always ambivalence. Yet as between this existential reading of history and Christian theology there is far more affinity than between the latter and the rationalism whether of Condorcet or of Hegel or of Marx—all of whom deny, implicitly or explicitly, the only real ground on which a theology of history can be erected.

## III

But history for the Christian means something more than the sphere of social crisis and rational decision, of human greatness and human depravity. If he sees there abounding evidences of man's moral defects, yet sin alone is not the substance of the Christian creed. For the Christian believes not in sin but in salvation. And he believes that the way of salvation has been historically revealed. The crux of the problem is, therefore, the relation of this 'sacred' history to the history we try to interpret according to purely 'secular' categories. Wherein does the Christian view of time differ from the non-Christian? We can do no more here than sketch an answer.

History, for Christian theology, possesses a meaning. Equally true is it that that meaning is not evident to casual inspection, nor indeed—and certainly as regards its detailed movement—even to faith. We may admit the paradox, but must deny that it involves a contradiction. Unless the Christian were convinced that history has meaning, earthly endeavour would appear futile; he could do no more than await his summons to the next world. On the other hand, he is in no position to point to history at any particular juncture and declare that its meaning, in relation to the whole, is precisely such-and-such; nor is his confidence in the ultimate intelligibility of history a form of insurance against risk, fear, and frustration. In other words, human affairs do not lose their character of ambiguity even under the light of what the Christian holds to be divine revelation. But in what sense, it will be asked, can the Christian continue to talk about a 'meaning' in history if history remains thus enigmatical? Must not enquiry stop short at the second or 'existential' level, with all its confusion and apparent inconsequence?

The Christian's reply must be that he believes in a God who is also a Providence. 'Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine.' 'Even the very hairs of your head are all numbered.' As are men's personal lives, so is history as a whole present to the divine mind and—whatever our difficulties in trying to state it theologically—subject to the divine will. The Christian believes that it is God according to whose purpose the historical process

is orientated. History, therefore, must have a meaning ; it is not merely capricious, fortuitous, or tragically absurd. And this meaning is declared, so he contends, by revelation ; by which he implies not simply a publication of theological truths but a series of events in time. These events cohere and form a pattern. As the Bible bears witness, they are God's scheme of education for the human race. Their rhythm of death and resurrection forms an intelligible whole, consonant with reason. Thus it is that a Christian, in so far as he is loyal to the principles of his faith, is not intimidated by the apparent incoherence and perversity of history, with its rough ends and tangled threads. Without the interpretation of faith it might well be as ' a tale told by an idiot ' ; but the believer is confident that its course is crossed by a sequence of events which, in the profoundest sense of the word, is *critical*. The Christian lives in the ' real ' world of crowding, haphazard occurrences, but sees also beyond it. He does not profess to be able to explain its problems and perplexities, but he is inwardly assured that these, if explicable, can be so only by ultimate reference to a structure of belief based upon the ideas of moral responsibility, sin, and redemption. Hence secular history is seen to fall within the framework of a sacred history, indeed to form part of it and to be unintelligible when dissociated from it.

But what significance and value, then, does Christian theology attach to the rational or progressive element in history ? The Christian, let it be said, will not despair on account of the ambivalence and uncertainty in the course of human affairs. He is never to be afraid of history, never to lose heart at thought of the temporal consequences of men's actions. An attitude which, like that of the Gnostics of antiquity, is world-renouncing in the sense of attempting to ' contract out ' of history, is, with its evident repudiation of moral responsibility, heretical and sub-Christian. Christian eschatology, therefore, implies not only a hope of heaven but a hope for history itself. Hence it is the foe of defeatism and cynical disillusion, the mood in which so many in Europe found themselves on the morrow of the last war. If it be true that the ' total ' meaning of history is as yet (and probably always will remain) inexplicable, we also have no right to seek to discredit history by means of a philosophy which,

like M. J.-P. Sartre's, pronounces it to be intrinsically pointless and absurd. In a word, the Christian attitude to the future is positive : it is aware that there is always an obligation to be accepted, a work to be done. It assumes that secular history, although under judgment of the sacred, has nevertheless a legitimate autonomy, with a logic or *rationale* of its own. This logic it is a Christian's duty to try to understand ; indeed the effectiveness of his moral action is in no small part dependent upon his success in basing it upon such understanding. To some extent, therefore, he is obliged to work out for himself a philosophy of history in the ordinary sense of the term. For such a philosophy may well possess considerable pragmatic value : in so far as Marxism, for example, can afford him relevant insights into the nature of the historical process he must needs pay close attention to it. But what the Christian cannot do is to allow the claims, at any rate within the existing limits of knowledge, of a philosophy of *history in its totality*, as both enclosing the whole of man's past and defining his future. He is convinced that history has meaning, but that that meaning is not so plain as to justify confident attempts to state it in the form of a dogma. For with all the advantages now open to us for the scientific study of the past, in regard to history as a whole we still find ourselves in face of an enigma, a mystery. But the enigmatic and the mysterious are at least tokens of what it most concerns us to realise : namely, that the future is a realm of freedom and that the independent human spirit is a decisive factor in the shaping of it.

B. M. G. REARDON.

## Art 5.—CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

THE Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which began its work in 1949, published its report at the end of last September. The intervening years were spent in taking evidence here and in a visit to the United States paid by a representative delegation from the Commission. Evidence was taken there, visits were made to prisons, and the State law on homicide was studied. The Report with appendices and index runs to over five hundred pages. It would be safe to say that no such full and detailed report on the law of murder has ever been attempted or accomplished in England.

Continental as well as British systems of law as established in the Colonies and Dominions have been reviewed, the views of Judges, Prison Chaplains, Police, Prison Warders and even of Executioners, have been sought out and reproduced at length. Organisations which have for their avowed object the abolition of capital punishment have propounded their arguments, although abolition was not within the terms of reference. Medical opinion, particularly on the question of insanity and criminal responsibility, has been consulted fully. The result of all this as set out in the report provides a general plan from which every aspect of the subject can be viewed. The only criticism, if any, which one could be inclined to make is that the report is if anything too full and lacks condensation. But this does not take away from the solidity of the work which has been done or from the credit which is due to the chairman, Sir Ernest Gowers, for the production of what is really a monumental work.

When all is said and done about the limitation of capital punishment for murder, the question narrows itself down to one small focus, but one which unfortunately contains within it the germ of many dissentient views. Even when manslaughter has been excluded, the facets of murder are manifold, yet English law knows but one penalty for it, and that is death. Once a verdict of guilty of murder has been found, then with the statutory exception of persons under the age of eighteen and pregnant women, the judge has no option in the matter. ' Taken from this place to a lawful prison, and there to a place of execution and that you there suffer death by hanging and that your body be after-

wards buried within the precincts of the prison in which you shall have been confined before your execution': such is the invariable and inescapable formula of sentence. The facts of the case may be such that every one in the court, except perhaps the prisoner himself, knows that he will undoubtedly be reprieved by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. But that does not matter, the dread words of doom must be pronounced. It is a situation in which justice and mercy alike cry aloud in the streets for some alleviation, and yet the path is strewn with difficulties, not all by any means the children of legal formalism.

The Commission reviews the main suggestions which have been made for remedying this situation and cutting down the sentence of death to an area of narrower limits. The layman and the lawyer alike have an interest in seeing how this is proposed to be done so that when the time comes for legislative action they may be ready with assent or criticism. During the time the Commission has been sitting we have not been allowed to forget the felony of murder—life and property in this country have not the security that all law-abiding citizens would wish and it is somewhat significant that within the last twelve months a new offence has been created, namely that of carrying a lethal weapon without reasonable excuse. The use of the gun and the knife as an aid to robbery is common, house-breaking and burglary have been on the increase: we can no longer pride ourselves on the fact that such weapons are alien to the code of the British criminal. Unhappily we are not proposing to legislate for something that is steadily on the wane, but this should not prevent us from correcting blemishes that exist in the law. It has always been our legitimate boast that fairness to the criminal tends to reform crime itself.

One proposal of the Commission which may be dismissed with comparatively brief consideration is to adopt a redefinition of the crime of murder which would abolish the doctrine of 'constructive malice.' By the term 'constructive malice' is meant the old-time legal doctrine that, when a man kills another in pursuit of the commission of a felony, malice must be inferred and the killing is presumed to be with malice aforethought even though it be unpremeditated and quite unintentional. The extreme example of this was the imaginary case propounded by Foster, where a man

accidentally kills another in shooting at one of his fowls with intent to steal it. Such a man under this doctrine would be guilty of murder and would be sentenced to death.

It is true that this doctrine of constructive malice has been whittled down considerably of recent years. As the result of decisions by the Court of Criminal Appeal it has been accepted that, unless the felony contemplated by the accused was one involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm, a jury is not justified in a verdict of murder and the crime was manslaughter. But there is still a debatable ground confined almost entirely to cases where the accused in order to commit larceny or robbery points a loaded weapon which goes off and kills the victim. It has been pleaded, and probably quite truthfully in many such cases, that the weapon was used to frighten only, the discharge was accidental. Nevertheless juries have brought in verdicts of guilty of murder in such cases which have been sustained on appeal—see *R. v. Jarman*, [1945] 31, Cr. App. R. 39. It is quite probable that by a majority vote of public opinion such a verdict is justified even if the discharge of the gun was really accidental, but there is considerable legal feeling the other way.

The Commission have suggested the abolition of the doctrine of constructive malice in its wider sense, but would put in a saving clause that 'if the accused was party to the doing in connection with the killing or anything that might reasonably have been expected to cause bodily harm to a human being he should be guilty of murder.' Some of us who have had a gun go off in our hands by what seemed to be the mere act of looking at it might be inclined to hold that the man who deliberately points a loaded gun at another to intimidate deserves no consideration if it goes off and kills—he should not be heard if he pleads 'accident.' For this reason the writer ventures to predict that when it comes to proposed legislation the doctrine of constructive malice will not be disturbed, and it will be left to the good sense of juries to apply or withhold it in each individual case. If they think the plea of accident is substantiated by evidence that they can believe, they can bring in a verdict of manslaughter, and can be relied upon to do so.

Another field which the Commission explored was the possibility of classifying murder into two degrees, First and

Second, with the suggestion that the death penalty should be reserved for the First degree only, imprisonment for life to be the punishment for murder of the Second degree. This is an avenue which has always held a certain fascination for the layman ; it has been adopted in other countries —why not give it at least a trial here ? The idea of this classification comes primarily from the United States. It springs from the enactment of the Pennsylvania Statute of 1794. The statute dates from an era when American law was still very much under the spell of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone, and the mere fact that it went out boldly to challenge the then accepted idea of murder under British law shows that even at that date the American lawyer was not afraid of originality.

The Statute begins by enacting that 'no crime whatsoever, hereafter committed (except murder of the first degree) shall be punished with death in the state of Pennsylvania.' Then it goes on—

' Be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That all murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kinds of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree : and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree ; and the jury, before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain in their verdict, whether it be murder of the first or second degree ; but if such person shall be convicted by confession, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly.'

In order to round off the story in America, it may be stated that two degrees of murder have been accepted in all but ten States of the Union : in one of these ten States (Maine) capital punishment has been abolished, while in the others the court or the jury have a discretion to reduce the sentence of death to life imprisonment or in some cases even to imprisonment for a term of years. The classification adopted by those States which have accepted the principle of degrees of murder is based upon that of the original Statute of Pennsylvania and the words 'deliberate and premeditated' are the key to the conception of murder of the

first degree in those types of killing which have not been specifically scheduled as of the first degree.

Here, then, is something which the layman is inclined to accept as a panacea: nothing can be simpler. Take out certain kinds of murder—poisoning and the like—which are abhorrent to all humanity. Call these murder of the first degree, and say that they are to be punishable with death. Then as regards the residue, if the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated' let it be set in the first degree like the more heinous murders already scheduled, but if the element of deliberation and premeditation be absent, let it be relegated to the second degree in which the punishment is something less than death. In this way the death penalty may be reserved for the hard case only, where even the Royal Prerogative would be very chary of exercising its power of reprieve.

This is a tempting argument, but it has all been tried before and found wanting. Classification of murder was recommended by the Royal Commission of 1864, and in the fifteen years that followed various bills for the purpose were introduced by successive governments, but none of them reached the statute book. Sir William Harcourt when Home Secretary, 1881-2, devoted much attention to the problem. He at first proposed to introduce a Bill confining murder in the first degree to murder committed with 'intent to kill,' but after consulting eminent members of the Bench and Bar he eventually came to the conclusion that it was impossible to frame a definition which did not include cases that ought not to be included and exclude cases that ought to be included. He therefore abandoned the attempt. The last and final effort at classification of murder into degrees was made in 1948, when the Bill which resulted in the present Criminal Justice Act was under discussion. It will be remembered that the Bill as it stood contained a clause abolishing capital punishment altogether. The Government of the day did not feel justified in forcing through the clause in view of the strength of the opposition to it, and a compromise clause dividing murder into degrees was introduced in its place. This compromise clause pleased nobody and it was as a result of its being dropped that the Government gave an undertaking to set up the Royal Commission whose report is now before us.

The whole difficulty about classification lies not in the

listing of murders of a specific kind in the first degree, but in the interpretation of words such as 'premeditation,' 'deliberation,' and the like which are to give other murders the label of the first degree. When it comes to practical examples it will be found that in the end these words must acquire technical and juristic meanings which play havoc with the definitions. This conclusion is perhaps best expressed in the words of the Report itself which refer to the proposed clause in the Criminal Justice Bill that apply to such classifications generally.

' In the compromise clause of the Criminal Justice Bill, 1948, an attempt was made to select categories of murders which are usually of an atrocious character and are also those in which the deterrent force of the death penalty is thought to be most effective and to be most needed for the protection of the public and of officers of the law. The categories selected on this basis comprised murders committed in connection with such crimes as rape, robbery, etc., murders committed in resisting arrest or escaping from legal custody and murders by systematic poisoning. The ground for keeping poisoning cases within the scope of the death penalty was that they are peculiarly atrocious because of their cold-blooded and treacherous character and that there is special need to retain in respect of such crimes the deterrent force of the death penalty because in the opinion of many people they are especially liable to escape detection. The inevitable result of this method of classification was to exclude from the scope of the death penalty many murders which are no less atrocious than those falling within the selected categories and to include in each category murders which may be much less atrocious than the generality of murders comprised in the category. The murder of a Prime Minister by a political fanatic may be as atrocious as the murder of a policeman by a criminal resisting arrest: yet the former was excluded and the latter included. The systematic poisoning of a husband by a wife to whom he is persistently cruel may be no more atrocious than the killing of a wife by a husband who covets her money; yet the former was included and the latter excluded. Whatever may be the criteria by which categories of murder are selected such anomalies appear to be inevitable. However atrocious or dangerous to the public may be the generality of murders comprised in a selected category, murders will occur from time to time which fall within this category but are so different in character and circumstances from the generality of murders belonging to the category that they cannot be classed as murders which fall outside all the selected categories and yet

are more clearly cases for the death penalty than some of those which fall within the categories.'

That portion of the Report which deals with the practical working of the classification of murders in the States of America is of particular interest. The American lawyers who gave evidence on it more or less admitted that they could see no uniform purpose running through it and did not believe that juries gave much attention to the legal theories which it attempted to set up. But it was very useful as an expedient for dealing with capital charges. Juries were often quite willing to convict of murder of the second degree where they would have found a man innocent of murder if unclassified. It also avoided the wrongful necessity of sentencing a man to death when it was certain that he would ultimately be reprieved. There was also another result of classification which lawyers rather than laymen will appreciate. It enabled the prosecution to bargain with the accused. If he would make a plea of guilty of murder of the second degree, it would be accepted and the necessity for a trial avoided. Such bargaining as between murder and manslaughter is not unknown to practitioners in England, though it does not often come out into the open. It is quite common between the prosecution and defence in other crimes. It has great practical uses, though you will not find it mentioned in the text-books.

For the reasons given above, the Commission find the classification of murders to be impracticable and do not recommend it. Legal opinion will probably be with them, but it is one of those matters in which English law might very well have taken the same trend as it did in America after the Pennsylvania Statute. In that case we should probably be commending it and pointing out that its very lack of logic is its chief virtue in practical affairs.

The suggestions for mitigating the death penalty dependent upon the re-definition of murder, and the classification of murder into two degrees, first and second, involve questions which have been under debate for a long time, in fact for a period of nearly a hundred years. There is no novelty about them except the changing points of view which invariably declare themselves on all subjects over a lapse of years. But another proposal now comes up for consideration in which the Commission have broken what is absolutely new ground in England. The proposal

is that in every case where there is a conviction for murder the judge or the jury should have a discretion to substitute a lesser penalty than that of death. Starting out with the proposition already referred to, that in a large proportion of cases (39 per cent. over the last fifty years) where the death sentence is pronounced a reprieve is granted by Royal Prerogative and the sentence is commuted, the Commission say, and most people will agree with them, that this is wrong as a system of law. When it is remembered further that in an appreciable number of such cases every lawyer in the court, including the judge, knows that the sentence of death will never be carried out, there is something cruel about a system that admits of it. It is menacing the prisoner with a threat that cannot be fulfilled, a particularly mean form of bullying. It will never be possible to weed out the evil altogether, because everyone agrees that whatever happens the Royal Prerogative must be still preserved, but the proposal if adopted would have a tangible effect in reducing the number of cases in which it would be necessary to pronounce the sentence of death.

Before offering any criticism of this proposal it may be as well to see how it is suggested that it should be exercised, for this is an all-important matter. A description of the procedure will be limited to that to be used when the discretion is left with the jury, because the proposal to leave it with the judge is less likely to call for debate. Most laymen and lawyers would be quite prepared to accept a judge's finding in the matter, but the onus is too great a one to throw on a single individual, and there is little likelihood of it being adopted. As regards the jury it is suggested that in every case where there is a verdict of murder the same jury should have the right to say whether there are 'mitigating circumstances' or not. If the answer is 'yes,' then the sentence of death would not be pronounced, but imprisonment for life, or a lesser period, substituted. This would in effect be the trial of a new issue after the main decision of guilt was arrived at. The defence would be entitled to produce evidence 'in mitigation' just as they may now do in all cases short of murder, where the accused 'pleads' or there is a finding of guilt. On the other side, the prosecution would be able to produce the police record, a thing that must be kept secret until the jury have given their verdict. The part of the prosecution in these pro-

ceedings could be largely that of *amicus curiae*, and would be limited to that of presenting the police report. There would be no suggestion of 'demanding the death penalty,' as is done under certain European systems of law. The defence would have the right of addressing the jury. There would be little or no need for a summing up by the court. The jury would then bring in their finding of mitigating circumstances or not and the sentence would automatically follow. The recent practice by which a plea of guilty is accepted even in murder cases would be prohibited and the prosecution would be put upon strict proof. But this would not add much to the length of a trial, as in a case where the accused makes no fight, proof would be comparatively simple.

Criticism of this proposal to leave life and death to the jury has not been slow to appear, and it is likely to prove the most controversial suggestion in the whole Report. On Dec. 16 of last year the proposal was debated in the House of Lords on a motion by the late Viscount Simon which was highly condemnatory. The law lords who spoke were unanimous against it, and the Lord Chief Justice even went the length of announcing the ultimatum of his resignation if the new procedure were carried into effect. Lord Samuel added the weight of his years and his experience as Home Secretary in supporting the judges.

The proposal was denounced as new, as giving to a jury a power which was not only new but alien to their present function as judges of fact alone. Juries were notoriously liable to be swayed by emotion ; they had nothing to do with punishment, but must arrive at their verdict regardless of the consequences, a thing which under the new proposal it would be impossible for them to do. They would always have in their mind's eye the thought that they could have a second cut at the case in which they could whittle down if necessary the rigour of a verdict of guilty. There would soon be a body of conflicting findings all over the country which would bring justice into disrepute. The field for the *ad misericordiam* appeal by counsel would be greatly widened ; he would be able to make it now deliberately and crudely, and not by those delicate and subtle touches which are the legitimate glory of all great advocates. In the result juries, who are always only too willing to save a man from the gallows, would almost invariably give way,

and in a few years the office of the executioner would be almost a sinecure. Worse than this, there would be cases in which juries would be overcome by the horrible details of some case and would find no mitigating circumstances, although a balanced and dispassionate consideration might reveal that they were there.

The above are some of the criticisms that have been raised. It would not perhaps be fair to put them all into the mouths of speakers in the House of Lords debate, but they were either made there or are to be inferred. Many more might be added, and they are certainly weighty and are to be treated with the utmost respect.

But when all has been said in criticism, it is to be remembered that this suggestion of leaving a discretion to the judge or the jury is put forward by the Commission as the one practical way in which the death sentence can be mitigated in murder. Short of this, although the modification of the McNaghten rules, to be dealt with below, may give some accused a better chance of being found 'guilty but insane,' there is no real way of getting over the fence of pronouncing a death sentence which will not be carried out. The proposed change would not avoid this always, but would go a long way towards it. Law lords and judges who spoke against it had no constructive proposal to put in its place. It has been said by many, moreover, that murder is so serious a matter that anyone found guilty of it should be sentenced to death. The sentence will deter others, and teach the accused a salutary lesson, even if he is to be reprieved. With the greatest possible respect the writer ventures to express his own view, which is that within limits the proposal made by the Commission is perfectly practicable and could at least be tried. The praise which has often been lavished by the bench on the virtues of the jury system is surely not to be limited to the value of twelve men in deciding a question of fact. It is submitted that their ability to pronounce on the heinousness of the crime in the man whom they have tried is equally valuable, and that subject to safeguards the question of whether a man is to die or live is meet to be entrusted to the judgment of twelve men of his own flesh and blood. The responsibility would be well placed, the burden honourably shouldered.

The question of mental responsibility in trials for murder is something that does not touch the re-definition of the

crime, the limitation of the death penalty to certain types of murder, or the discretion of judge or jury to substitute some lesser penalty than that of death. In the area of mental responsibility the facts of the murder are admitted, but it becomes a question for the jury to determine whether the accused is fit to plead or if he is fit to plead whether he may not be ' guilty but insane.' The issue of unfitness to plead may be dismissed in a word. The criterion of unfitness to plead is wide. Insanity here means insanity in the ordinary medical sense. If the jury find the accused unfit to plead on arraignment he is not tried, but is detained during Her Majesty's pleasure. During the fifty years 1900 to 1949, of 3,130 persons committed for trial on a charge of murder 425 were found to be insane on arraignment and dealt with accordingly.

The accused may be fit to plead at the time of arraignment, but he may put up the defence that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. This is a very different matter. It at once brings into play the yardstick of the *McNaghten Rules*, which have been the accepted criterion of mental responsibility ever since they were propounded by the judges in the year 1843. The gist of the Rules lies in the sentence ' that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it he did not know he was doing wrong.'

The *McNaghten Rules* are now more than a hundred years old and have been the subject of increasing controversy both among laymen and among doctors and lawyers. The best that can be said about them is that they are clear and direct and can be understood by a jury ; they have stood the test of time and juries have not been afraid to strain them in the prisoner's favour when they thought just. Against this it is said that they are archaic ; they take no account of the many shades of degree between complete and 'partial insanity' ; they have not kept pace with the march of medical science in the study of the effect of mental abnormality upon responsibility ; and though juries may

have been able to strain them in the prisoner's favour, they are a rampart that the Court of Criminal Appeal cannot surmount. By their application there is little doubt that murderers are sentenced to death who are bound to be reprieved by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, and some may have been executed who in the eyes of modern thought were not responsible for their action when they did the deed.

In this welter of argument, criticism, and attack, it has been very difficult for the Commission to propound any course, impossible to put forward a suggestion that is not open to criticism. The majority view of the Commission (there were four dissentient members) was that it would be better to abrogate the rules altogether, a course which will be unlikely to commend itself either to the public or the specialists, or failing abrogation, to adopt an extended formula which is moulded largely on the lines of that put forward by the British Medical Association. The suggested formula is as follows : 'The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the act the accused as a result of disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act, or (b) did not know that it was wrong, or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.' A glance at the new formula will show that its main feature is an admission in law of the theory of 'irresistible impulse.' This was pleaded for by Sir James Stephen more than seventy years ago, was accepted by the Atkin Committee of thirty years ago, and was supported before the Commission by such an authority as Lord Justice Denning.

Space prevents further discussion of the McNaghten Rules here, but the writer hazards the forecast that something like this formula will ultimately be adopted and form the basis of legislative action. It will not resolve all doubts on a subject where it seems impossible to reconcile medical and legal opinion, but it will go a certain way. One controversial topic in particular lurks in the phraseology. It still preserves the term 'disease of the mind' while introducing the term 'mental deficiency.' The proof of the existence of a 'disease of the mind' remains one of the greatest difficulties that a defence advocate has to face ; there will still be cases in which the jury will have to strain the formula if justice is to be done.

J. C. ARNOLD.

## Art. 6.—QUEEN ELIZABETH I's LEGACY TO THE STUARTS.

IT is a truism of the classroom that the theme running through the history of the first two Stuart kings is the ever-widening breach between the King and the parliamentary majority, and that the root cause of the breach was the dispute about the exercise of sovereign power in the State, a dispute brought to a head by the Stuarts' claim to Divine Right. Thus, the significance of any political event during the period between the accession of James I in 1603 and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642 is to be rightly assessed only when it is seen as part of that process. A particular quarrel might be provoked by the imposition of a customs duty on a cargo of currants belonging to merchant Bate, but this was only an example of the general quarrel about who had the right to levy such a duty—King or Parliament. Similarly, during something like a decade, successive parliaments, avowing that the Duke of Buckingham was the source of all the nation's ills, urged first James and then Charles to dismiss him from his position of royal adviser: but beyond any personal animus against Buckingham lay the deeper question of who had the right to appoint ministers—King or Parliament.

So through the whole gamut of the quarrels: whether about money, the appointment of ministers, religion, foreign policy, or the control of armed forces, each question at issue was a particular example of the general question of where sovereignty lay in the State. The principle underlying that issue had been propounded by King James in his book 'The True Law of Free Monarchies,' published in 1598, that is, five years before his accession in England, and was implicit in all his political dealings throughout his reign.

But does this necessarily imply that the ultimate responsibility for the Civil War must rest upon James I? There is first of all to be considered the question of who was right as a matter of political principle—James and Charles or their Puritan opponents. He would be a rash man who would give a categorical, unqualified answer in either sense to that question: perhaps we should rather say that he would be an ignorant man. If the question

was to be settled by an appeal to tradition, the answer would undoubtedly favour the King. Though the theory of Divine Right may not hitherto have been formally enunciated in England, there is no question who exercised sovereignty during the Tudor era. Parliament's business was not to govern the country, but—in times of national emergency or exceptional need, when the King was unable to 'live of his own'—to authorise him to levy taxes so that he might govern. During the forty-four years of Elizabeth's reign, Parliament was actually in session on an average less than two months each year. There is no doubt who chose ministers, or determined the religious settlement, or controlled foreign policy during Elizabeth's reign or, indeed, the reigns of any of the Tudors. If the issue between the King and his opponents was to be settled solely by an appeal to the past, the verdict would be in the King's favour.

In fact, however, the issue turned not on a political theory as such, but on the practical application of constitutional custom. The deepening conviction on the matter of religion, the rapid fall in the value of money, the general effects of the mere passage of time, all these combined to produce a new political situation needing sensitive and adroit handling by the monarch. And sensitivity and adroitness were precisely the political qualities that the early Stuarts lacked. It is because the early Stuart kings misunderstood and mishandled the contemporary situation—witness, for example, Charles I's fantastic attempt to arrest the Five Members—rather than because they held a wrong political theory, that the verdict must go against them.

This, however, by no means exhausts the question of the degree of responsibility resting upon the Stuarts for the Civil War. Can we be quite sure that if there had never been a James I—if, that is, Elizabeth had married and had had a son, or daughter, to succeed her on the throne—the dispute over sovereignty would have been avoided? The answer to this aspect of the question is obviously to be found not in James I's reign but in Elizabeth's. It is the relations between Elizabeth and her parliaments that alone can provide evidence to show what kind of parliamentary inheritance fell to James and therefore what were the nature and degree of responsibility which lay

upon him for his, and his son's, chronic disagreement with their parliaments and so for the final breach in 1642.

Fortunately for our enquiry, during recent years there has become available to the student of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an increasing volume of material on the reign of the first Elizabeth. Our supreme indebtedness in this matter is to Professor J. E. Neale who has devoted his professional life to the elucidation of Elizabethan parliamentary history. To date, his labours have produced three major works on this theme, with at least one further one to come, as well as a mass of articles contributed to various learned journals. His latest work, '*Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559-1581*' (published 1953), is particularly illuminating on this subject of James I's parliamentary inheritance.\*

One fact stands out with almost startling clearness from even a first perusal of the parliamentary history of Elizabeth I's reign, namely, that however firmly the Queen kept governmental control in her own hands, her parliaments were far from passive political tools. Nor was their activity limited to the closing years of the reign; even her first parliament showed unmistakably that it had convictions of its own. These convictions centred round the twin topics of religion and the succession to the throne. The nine subsequent parliaments of the reign maintained the attitude of the first and, almost without exception, were outspoken in expressing that attitude. So important is the light which these events throw upon the relationship between the early Stuarts and their parliaments that they are worth exemplifying in some detail.

When Elizabeth ascended the throne, the movement that was to become known as the Counter-Reformation was already taking shape in Europe. At the forefront of this movement stood Philip II of Spain, who regarded himself, with deep and passionate conviction, as the Church's champion, the leader of the forces of Catholicism against the Protestant heretics. Nevertheless, Elizabeth chose Protestantism for herself and for the State. In so doing, Elizabeth and her advisers recognised, as the mass of her subjects at first did not, the mortal danger in which

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\* All the quotations in this article are made from the above-mentioned book and are made with Professor Neale's permission. For this permission the author expresses his grateful thanks.

England would stand as the result of this decision. She must have foreseen that she was thus virtually constituting England as Protestantism's champion in Europe and that, almost inevitably, the day would come when the full force of the Counter-Reformation would be directed against her. At that crisis it would be of supreme importance that England should present a united front to the enemy. It was therefore equally important that her religious settlement should be as all-embracing as possible: that it should be so framed as to enable men and women of widely differing views to accept it, and that those unable to accept it—mainly Roman Catholics—should be as little embittered as possible. Hence the moderate and, as far as possible, unprovocative nature of its settlement. Time would show the wisdom of the Queen's decision. But time would show also the growth of discontent among many Protestants because her settlement did not conform to the Calvinist pattern. These Protestants were the germ from which would grow the Puritans of the early Stuart period. Herein lay the first cause of the friction between Elizabeth and the Commons.

Closely connected with it was the Succession. One of the themes running through all Elizabeth's early parliaments was the prayer that the Queen should marry; for if Elizabeth did not, by marriage, produce a direct heir, no one could say with certainty who the rightful successor would be. The facts of the contemporary situation will make clear the nature of this uncertainty. The third Succession Act of Henry VIII (1544) had given to Henry the right to name his successor. There were three branches of his family from among whom a successor might be chosen: (1) his own children, Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth; (2) the descendants of his elder sister Margaret who had married James IV of Scotland; and (3) the descendants of his younger sister Mary who had married, as her second husband, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, by which marriage there were two daughters, Frances and Eleanor. Henry VIII's will directed that, after his own children, the crown should devolve first upon the descendants of the Lady Frances (that is, Lady Jane, Lady Catherine, and Lady Mary Grey), and second upon the descendants of Lady Eleanor (that is, Lady Margaret Strange). Thus Henry's will passed over the

Scottish line represented by Mary Stuart, Queen of Scotland; even apart from this, it was widely held in England that, Scotland being a foreign country, Mary Stuart was an alien and therefore incapable of inheriting the English crown, just as any alien was incapable of inheriting an English estate. Of the other possibilities, Lady Jane Grey, the former 'Nine Days' Queen,' had perished on the scaffold, so that presumably the order of claimants would be Lady Catherine Grey, Lady Mary Grey, Lady Margaret Strange. Yet this solution would in fact satisfy no one. When Henry VIII made his will he expected that at least one of his three children would produce an heir; the Suffolk line was included merely to cover a possible emergency. Only one really satisfactory solution of the problem was possible, namely, that Elizabeth should marry and should have children of her own. Had she died early in her reign there can be no serious doubt that the country would have found itself embroiled in civil war, the outcome of which would have been unpredictable. Hence, the continual requests of successive parliaments, from her first parliament onwards, that the Queen should marry were not mere factious interferences with Elizabeth's proper and personal freedom of action in such a matter: they were inspired by a deep sense of urgency for the country's welfare.

Moreover, in the sixteenth century, with its primitive medicine, lack of scientific knowledge about food, and unhygienic domestic conditions—even in royal palaces—human life was far more precarious even than it is in the twentieth. The relevance of this to the succession was brought home to the nation forcibly in October 1562, when the Queen was attacked by small-pox. At one stage she lay unconscious and her death seemed imminent. Nor was this an isolated event. Periodically Elizabeth had bouts of illness, and a long life was not to be taken for granted for her, any more than for the other children of Henry VIII. In such circumstances her subjects' anxiety about the succession and, in view of the danger from abroad, their concern for the safety of England were inevitable. It was this sense that no time was to be lost before a solution of the succession problem was found, lest England's security be jeopardised, which lent urgency to the parliaments' appeals—almost their demands—that the

Queen should either marry or recognise a successor. And it was mainly out of this sense of urgency that there arose between Parliament and the Queen frequent passages of arms which showed Parliament's rising spirit and which prepared the way for the final breach in the Civil War of 1642.

During the first (1559) parliament of the reign, the two chief subjects of debate were the religious settlement and the succession to the throne, the latter involving also the Queen's marriage. But the four years that elapsed between the first and the second parliaments served only to intensify the nation's determination to press for a solution of the succession problem. This determination was strengthened, as we have seen, by the Queen's critical attack of small-pox in October 1562. In January 1563—that is, almost as soon as the second parliament met—petitions were addressed to the Queen begging her to marry and to fix the succession. Not until the close of the first session, on April 10, did she reply, and even then the reply was typically evasive: perhaps its general sense is appropriately conveyed by one of her own phrases, 'A silent thought may serve.' Parliament interpreted the Queen's answer, with some justification, as an implied promise to settle the succession, by marriage or otherwise. And possibly the promise was seriously intended. Before the end of 1563 negotiations were on foot for a marriage with the Archduke of Austria, and they were still in progress—if 'progress' is the right description—when the parliament reassembled for its second session in September 1566. As a result, the Queen was still unmarried and the succession was still unsettled. Small wonder that there was a widespread feeling, both in Parliament and in the country, that the Queen was evading the issue, and an equally widespread determination to force her to keep her promise.

This theme continued to run throughout the remainder of the session. When, for example, one of the Queen's Council urged that the grant of a subsidy should be considered, the Commons cried :

'No! no! we have express charge to grant nothing before the Queen gives a firm answer to our demands. Go to the Queen, and let her know our intention, we have in command from all the towns and people of this Kingdom, whose deputies we are.'

Before the session was ended, the Lords themselves had petitioned the Queen to satisfy the Commons, and then with the Commons had made a joint approach to deal with the succession. This second approach drew from the Queen a lengthy speech, evidently prepared with great care and delivered to a deputation of thirty members of the Lords. It included the following characteristic words :

'I will marry as soon as I can conveniently, if God take not him away with whom I mind to marry, or myself, or else some other great let happen.... And I hope to have children, otherwise I would never marry.... I am your anointed Queen. I will never be by violence constrained to do anything. I thank God I am endued with such qualities that if I were turned out of the realm in my petticoat, I were able to live in any place in Christendom.... As soon as there may be a convenient time [to deal with the succession] . . . I will deal therein for your safety, and offer it unto you as your Prince and head, without request ; for it is monstrous that the feet should direct the head.'

For once, Elizabeth had failed to sense the atmosphere. When, next day, her reply was reported to the Commons the record is that 'All the House was silent.' Even when she expressly commanded that the House should refrain from further debate on her marriage and the succession, Paul Wentworth 'moved whether the Queen's commandment was not against the liberties.' The fact was that Elizabeth had lost control over the Commons, whose position was strengthened by the Lords' support. At last she was compelled to recognise the situation. On Nov. 25, 1566, through the Speaker, she announced her unequivocal surrender :

'The Queen's Majesty . . . for that no scruple or doubt should remain in the minds of her loving subjects, either of her Majesty's displeasure towards them, or of any other thing that might prejudice them, contrary to her good meaning, is pleased to revoke and cancel those commandments as needless to be sent, assuring herself that all her good and loving subjects will stay themselves upon her said answer, without pressing her Majesty any further therein at this time.'

Small wonder that 'it was taken of all the House most joyfully, with most hearty prayer and thanks for the same.' Two days later the subsidy bill was read.

The House had won a notable victory which would be a precedent not to be forgotten by either side. Almost more significant for the future than the victory itself was the method by which the Commons had won it, namely, by making the grant of a subsidy depend upon the withdrawal of the denial of the Commons' freedom of debate. Here we reach very near the heart of our enquiry. To assert that Stuart parliaments were consciously imitating the tactics of their Elizabethan predecessors would be an assumption unwarranted by the facts. Nevertheless, it is clear that essentially the positions of the Elizabethan and of the Stuart champions of parliamentary rights were identical. The characteristic dispute of Charles I with his parliaments was whether consideration of grievances or of supply should have precedence. Though there may not have been any deliberate imitation of Elizabethan precedents in this matter, the general attitude of Stuart parliaments towards the monarch was in reality only a development of that of the Tudors.

Later Elizabethan parliaments saw some change in the issues on which the Queen was challenged, and from time to time some variations also in the heat engendered by the challenge, but throughout the reign successive parliaments maintained their independence of policy and action.

By the time that Elizabeth's third parliament met in 1571, the succession issue had become relatively less important. Darnley had been murdered, Mary Stuart was a refugee in England, the Netherlands had revolted against England's arch-enemy, Spain, and the Pope had issued his 1570 Bill against Elizabeth. At the base of all these events (except perhaps the first) was religion, and it was therefore natural that religion was the subject with which the 1571 parliament was most concerned. In this matter also the Queen adopted a policy which was fiercely challenged by an influential section of the Commons. Her aim was to present as far as possible a united front to the Counter-Reformation threat. To this end she sought the goodwill of her Roman Catholic subjects by allowing what might be called a negative toleration within specified limits. By a declaration of January 1570, she undertook that none of her subjects should suffer 'any molestation . . . by way of . . . inquisition of their opinions for their consciences in matters of their faith, remitting that to the

supreme and singular authority of Almighty God, who is the only searcher of hearts.' Her only proviso was that her subjects should show themselves 'in their outward conversation quiet and conformable to the law by attendance at church.' More striking still was the reinforcement of these assurances by a declaration in the Star Chamber in June 1570 (that is, after the Papal Bull) which included these sentences :

'Her Majesty would have all her loving subjects to understand that as long as they shall openly continue in the observation of her laws and shall not wilfully and manifestly break them by their open acts, her Majesty's meaning is not to have any of them molested by any inquisition or examination of their consciences in causes of religion.'

In spite of this, the parliament, from the first day of its session, insisted on debating the religious question. A bill was introduced to compel everyone to receive Communion at least once a year on pain of the heavy fine of 100 marks. Foremost in advocating this measure were William Strickland and Peter Wentworth. Strickland went further. He introduced a bill to reform the Book of Common Prayer in ways that were known to be contrary to the Queen's wishes. Yet the Commons showed its general approval of the measure by giving it a first reading. During the Easter recess, Strickland was summoned before the Privy Council and was forbidden to sit in the House. When the Commons reassembled his absence was noted. Indignant speeches were delivered and there were widespread assertions of the principle that the proper body to whom Strickland should render account of his conduct was the House of Commons. The next day Strickland took his place once more in the House, to the manifest joy of his fellow-members. Once again Elizabeth had yielded so as to avoid allowing the dispute to reach the stage of crisis. But this could not obliterate the fact that her wishes had been openly defied and that the Commons' support had won liberty for a Member. On May 29 Elizabeth dissolved the parliament.

Between that date and the meeting of the next parliament, a year later, there were important national developments. The latter part of 1571 brought to light the Ridolfi Plot to depose or kill the Queen and to marry Mary

Stuart to the Duke of Norfolk. So many problems arose from this plot and its ramifications that another parliament was summoned to meet on May 8, 1572. Two days later Lords and Commons appointed a committee to consider the problems connected with Mary. This set the tone of the whole parliament, much of whose activities went to try to force the Queen's hand to execute Mary. The joint committee, on May 19, reported that it was in favour of two bills: the first to attaint Mary of high treason and the second to render her incapable of succeeding to the throne. During the sittings which followed, a series of members spoke earnestly and strongly in favour of the first bill, urging that only Mary's death could give safety to the Queen, to the State, and to members themselves. The tone and content of the speeches show that members spoke with a sense of desperate urgency. Moreover, Lords and Commons were in complete agreement on the issue. Yet Elizabeth refused to commit herself by definite action. She shrank from sending Mary to execution and from all the consequences of such an action, both at home and abroad. As a result, since the demands for the first bill grew more insistent, Elizabeth on June 2 sent Norfolk to execution.

If she hoped thereby to appease her Lords and Commons, she was soon to be disappointed. On June 5 a bill to deal with Mary passed through its final stages in the Lords (where it had been mooted two days before Norfolk's execution). Three weeks later it had passed the Commons and awaited the royal assent. But when, on June 30, Elizabeth arrived to prorogue Parliament, she again refused to commit herself: she used soft words, said that there were some things in the bill 'not as yet to her whole and perfect liking,' and therefore, in order to allow further consideration, she postponed a decision until the next session, which was to open on Nov. 1.

As events turned out, the Houses did not reassemble on the given date in 1572. Indeed, repeated prorogations put off the second session until Feb. 8, 1576. But Elizabeth had not heard the last of the business. The Commons had barely assembled on Feb. 8 when Peter Wentworth rose with a speech which he had been waiting two or three years to deliver. Avowing that he realised the seriousness of what he was about to say and the personal risks he would

run in saying it, he spoke strongly and plainly against the Queen's repeated attempts to interfere with Parliament's freedom of debate and action :

' How could any Prince more unkindly intreat, abuse, and oppose herself against her nobility and people than her Majesty did the last Parliament ? Did she not call it of purpose to prevent traitorous perils to her person, and for no other cause ? Did not her Majesty send unto us two bills, willing us to make a choice of that we liked best for her safety, and thereof to make a law, promising her Majesty's royal consent thereto ? And did we not first choose the one and her Majesty refuse it, yielding no reason . . . ? Yet did we not nevertheless receive the other, and agreeing to make a law thereof, did not her Majesty in the end refuse all our travails ? . . . Will not this her Majesty's handling, think you Mr Speaker, make cold dealing in many of her Majesty's subjects towards her again ? I fear it will.'

The Commons were, plainly, aghast at Wentworth's audacity. One can almost hear the gasps of astonishment and alarm from his hearers as he proceeded with his speech. He was not allowed to complete it. The House itself handed him to the Sergeant and appointed a committee to examine him. Thereupon he was imprisoned in the Tower, where he remained until near the end of the session. The Vice-Chamberlain, Hatton, then informed the Commons that the Queen, convinced of Wentworth's sincerity, was releasing him :

' She was absolutely persuaded that his speech proceeded of abundance of zeal towards her,' and she had ' not only forgiven but forgotten the inconsiderateness of the same, and did accept him to be in as good grace and favour as ever she did before.'

Whether we can any more confidently accept at their face value the reasons which Elizabeth gave for this action than we can her professed reasons for other actions is doubtful. It is usually safer to ignore her professions and to concentrate on her actions. And the plain fact is that Peter Wentworth had publicly reproved the Queen for her duplicity and had survived almost with impunity. True, the battle for complete parliamentary freedom was far from being won ; this was indeed but the first of several imprisonments that Peter Wentworth would serve for similar offences. But the significance of the speech is plain. Professor Neale's comment is :

' It was surely the most remarkable speech hitherto conceived in the Parliament of England. . . . He was wrong, utterly wrong in his own generation ; but the future hallowed his doctrine. He, indeed, as much as any of his colleagues, shaped the future.'

To some extent relations between the Queen and her parliaments mellowed as the reign proceeded. This was due not to the parliaments' abandonment of their liberties but rather to changed conditions which changed also the national temper, which, in turn, was reflected in the attitude of the Commons. Hence, disputes between Elizabeth and successive parliaments underwent a change of emphasis. Also, as the crisis of an open breach with Spain developed, Parliament became increasingly loath to hamper the Queen's government or to give to her enemies the impression of division within the State. Now and again the Commons' restlessness was liable to break into open discontent. At such times Elizabeth can be watched treading delicately. Fuller and more authoritative treatment of the parliamentary history after 1581 will doubtless be made available in the volume which Professor Neale has yet to publish. But enough is known to show that, even at the end of the reign, when reverence for Gloriana was at its height, Parliament was still zealous for its rights, of which zeal the controversy over monopolies in 1601 is the final proof. This episode also shows us Elizabeth still handling a restive parliament with her old, consummate skill. Would she have so acted if she had not learned her lesson from the 1566 parliament ; or would she have allowed the plain speaking of 1601 if Peter Wentworth had not been even plainer in 1576 ?

The tragedy of the early Stuarts was that they failed to learn the same lesson. The tussles of 1563, 1566, and 1576 prove that parliaments did not become obstreperous suddenly in 1603 merely because they took a personal dislike to Scottish James. They had been obstreperous to Elizabeth, whom avowedly they adored. Their immediate reasons for disputes with James I and Charles I were, naturally, different from those for their disputes with Elizabeth. But the temper that they showed was the same : even Sir John Eliot never said bolder words to Charles I than Strickland and Peter Wentworth had said to Elizabeth. Moreover, their tactics were the same—

redress of grievances before the granting of supplies. Between Elizabeth and the Stuarts there was one decisive difference: she sensed when a dispute had reached its dangerous limit and, not less important, she knew how to withdraw from the contest so as not only to leave no bitterness but rather to win enthusiastic loyalty thereby. Her yielding in 1566 'was taken of all the House most joyfully with most hearty prayer and thanks for the same.' The effect of Elizabeth's yielding on the monopoly question in 1601 (the details of which lie beyond the period of this survey) is more striking still. Hers was an art that the Stuarts never acquired, or desired to acquire. 'Take not this as a threatening (for I scorn to threaten any but my equals) but as an admonition,' declaimed Charles I at the opening of his third parliament; and Charles's supreme act of folly in invading the House of Commons to arrest the Five Members would be inconceivable in Elizabeth.

Here we are brought back full circle to near the starting-point of our survey: what might have happened if Elizabeth had listened to her parliaments' entreaties to marry and to produce a direct heir to succeed her? In one sense the answer is beyond human power to guess. But the events of Elizabeth's reign suggest that even a son or daughter of Elizabeth, with all the characteristic Tudor flair for personal diplomacy, would not have been without his difficulties. Yet even this cannot exonerate the Stuarts for their colossal blunders in handling their parliaments. To whatever degree those parliaments learned their tactics from Elizabethan parliaments, James and Charles utterly failed to learn wisdom from Elizabeth. It was this practical difference rather than any difference of political theory, or even of circumstances, which mainly explains Elizabeth's success and the Stuarts' ruin.

S. REED BRETT.

## Art. 7.—BYRON'S RIVERS.

THE opinion expressed not long ago by an enthusiast for Alpine scenery that 'It is quite untrue that Byron loved the majesty of the mountains,' with perhaps the further implication that the beauties of Nature made no genuine appeal to him, might give rise to an animated discussion. Apart, however, from the poet's repeated declaration that his love of mountains sprang from his earliest associations with the Scottish Highlands, that 'land of mountain and of flood' which he roamed over as a boy, it will probably be sufficient for the ordinary person to recall the stanza of 'Childe Harold' which enshrines :

' . . . Far along,  
From peak to peak, the rattling crags among  
Leaps the live thunder ! Not from one lone cloud,  
But every mountain now hath found a tongue ;  
And Jura answers, through her misty shroud,  
Back to the joyous Alps, who call to her aloud ! '

Or the lines in 'The Giaour' which begin : ' As rolls the river into ocean.'

Had this sceptic criticised—as many have done—certain sensuous 'jars' in Byron's descriptions of scenery, his argument might have had some cogency. Though certainly by no means as distasteful as the lapse by which Anglo-Indian writers used to liken the Taj Mahal by moonlight to 'a coy maid,' the 'jars' can be irritating ; as when, for example, the magnificent lines just quoted are prefaced by a likening of the storm's splendour to 'the light of a dark eye in woman.'

But it is of Byron's rivers rather than of his mountains that one would write here, certain that his appreciation of them rings true, even though it too may occasionally threaten a discordance.

If woods, hills, and rivers seem equally to have attracted, say, Spenser in his poetry, rivers come nearest to mountains with Byron. His river-mentions are, indeed, abundant, some of them resulting from personal acquaintance, others from his imaginativeness and reading. Had he been able to realise his early hopes of seeing Persia, Abyssinia, and India, we should probably possess stanzas

about their scenery equalling in beauty any which he wrote of Europe.

Among his rivers, as we know, the Rhine takes pride of place : the 'castellated Rhine' of 'Don Juan'; the 'fair,' 'lovely,' and 'wide and winding Rhine' of 'Childe Harold,' its 'hills all rich with blossom'd trees,' its cities of 'far white walls'—and, of course, the 'deep blue eyes' of its women.

'Childe Harold' paints the river in so many guises besides those just mentioned, as it flows past its vine-clad slopes. It is 'majestic,' it 'nobly foams and flows,' it 'exults' and it 'abounds,' in times of violence it has often been 'discoloured' by carnage. But ever it remains *his* river ; until at last he bids it 'a vain adieu,' for 'there can be no farewell,' he says, 'to scenes like these.'

Rhone almost rivals Rhine in Byron's imagery, that turbulent early portion of it which, as Spenser says, 'springs from the sky.' It is 'swift' and 'quick' in 'Childe Harold,' where also 'the blue rushing of the arrowy Rhone' most admirably describes it,\* just as does 'blue Rhone in fullest flow' of 'The Prisoner of Chillon,' where it passes through Lake Leman. 'The colour of the Rhone at Geneva,' Byron writes in an illuminating footnote, 'is blue to a depth of tint which I have never seen equalled in water, salt or fresh, except in the Mediterranean and Archipelago.' 'Swift Rhone,' he says elsewhere (if, possibly, with just that touch of a discordance), 'cleaves his way between heights which appear as lovers parted,' through mountains 'where the mightiest of the storms has ta'en its stand.' And, of himself :

' Sky, mountains, river, winds, lake, lightnings ! ye,  
With night, and clouds, and thunder, and a soul  
To make these felt and feeling, well may be  
Things that have made me watchful ; the far roll  
Of your departing voices is the knoll  
Of what in me is sleepless . . . '

In 'Don Juan' the picture is of Rhone, 'by Leman's waters wash'd,' dashing 'all bluely through the serene and glassy deep' of the lake, 'mingling' with it, yet 'separate.' Did Byron ever see the Danube ? Possibly he may

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\* Cp. the 'flashing Rhone' of Belloc.—P. R. B.

have done so at its source, journeying there from Switzerland in 1816, or at its delta during his expedition to the Black Sea from the Bosphorus six years previously, past where 'the dark Euxine roll'd upon the blue Symplegades.' His words for the river have not the appeal of those for others which we know he saw—except, perhaps, in the great instance in 'Childe Harold' in which he shows the dying gladiator, unheeding 'the inhuman shout which hailed the wretch who won,' keeping his eyes where his heart was, 'far away . . . where his rude hut by the Danube lay':

'There were his young barbarians all at play,  
There was their Dacian mother—he, their sire,  
Butcher'd to make a Roman holiday.'

But here, of course, the appeal is different.

We find other mentions of the Danube in 'The Bride of Abydos,' where Selim tells Zuleika of the home 'by Danube's tide' and of 'fearful news' from its banks, as also in the reference to Sobieski's victory over the Turks beneath the walls of Buda in 'The Siege of Corinth.' In 'Juan' the most striking of some half-a-dozen mentions of the river are those which satirise warfare. One, describing the capture by Suvarov of the fortified city of Ismael, relates that though reputed to be impregnable by land, it was defenceless from the river, so that when the Russians brought gunboats to bombard it, it quickly fell, the Turkish garrison being unable to do more than cry 'Allah!' and 'Bismillah!' Another passage tells how, as the walls begin to crumble, the enemy gun-flashes shine, 'a mirror'd hell,' upon the waters. Further on we hear of the city's end: 'Far flashed her burning towers o'er Danube's stream, And redly ran her blushing waters down,' while 'Of forty thousand who had mann'd the walls, Some hundreds breath'd—the rest were silent all.'

The Oder, as is to be expected, bulks largely in 'Werner,' but the references to it, like the poem itself, are not important, and Byron had no personal experience of the river. The account of the half-drowned 'Excellency,' however, who had swallowed enough of it in his forced crossings \* 'to have burst two peasants,' is amusing; and a footnote which reminds us that the Oder frequently

\* Made, à la Byron, with five post-horses, a monkey, a mastiff—and a valet.

crossed and recrossed the northern frontier of Silesia is of interest when we think of the 'Oder-Neisse Line' to-day.

Tiber and some other Italian rivers Byron knew well and loved ; and they are among those of which he writes most attractively. 'Old Tiber ! . . . rise with thy yellow waves,' he cries in his great fourth canto of 'Childe Harold,' 'and mantle her distress'—the distress of classic Rome, 'whose holy dust was scatter'd long ago.' As he gazes from the wooded hills overlooking 'Nemi's glassy lake' he sees 'afar the Tiber winds.' In 'The Prophecy of Dante' its 'saffron water' is 'deepen'd into red' and 'thick with dead.' It will remain 'a mournful river' down the years because of invasions 'from Brennus to the Bourbons.' Why, he asks, when enemy hordes cross Alps and Po, cannot the rocks fall and crush them and the floods 'whelm them for ever ?' Avalanches are quick to bury the poor pilgrim and Eridanus (the Po) to drown the peasant and his harvest : they would be better employed in exterminating the barbarians ! In 'The Deformed Transformed' the Constable of Bourbon's soldiers vow to turn 'Tyber all red' ; and later in the same is an invocation to 'yellow Tiber' to keep Rome intact to its Romans ; and when a dying defender begs for a drop of water he is told by Cæsar : 'Blood is the only liquid nearer than Tiber !'

Unforgettable are the lines in 'Manfred' :

'I do remember me that in my youth,  
When I was wandering—upon such a night  
I stood within the Coliseum's wall  
Midst the chief relics of almighty Rome ;  
The trees which grew along the broken arches  
Waved dark in the blue midnight ; from afar  
The watchdog bay'd beyond the Tiber. . . .'

But there are Italian rivers which Byron loved even more than Tiber. 'Smiling Arno wins us,' in 'Childe Harold,' 'to the fair white walls of Florence.' In 'Don Juan' the shrunken flow of the river in summer is likened to a widow's tears, which once were as copious as its winter flood. Lines in 'Dante' show that exiled poet as envying the dove, whose wings can waft him 'where Apennine looks down on Arno' and his 'inexorable Florence.'

Brenta, along whose banks Byron had ridden so blithely

during summer days at La Mira, is in 'Childe Harold' the 'deep-dyed Brenta' of some of his happiest inspiration. There is too the cascading Velino (tributary of the Nera), which he calls an Italian Phlegethon, and which inspires still grander poetry. The lines from :

' The roar of waters ! From the headlong height  
Velino cleaves the wave-worn precipice '

to 'Charming the eye with dread—a matchless cataract' and the words about the iris-prisms on its spray at 'glittering morn' are, surely, the *ne plus ultra* of description.

In Byron's notes \* is also named the Anio (now 'Aniente'). Its falls are among the Sabine hills beloved of Virgil, and it joins the Tiber a little to the north of Rome. The memorable lines on Trasimene tell of the well-named Sanguinetto, which runs through the plain which saw the battle. Byron apostrophises :

' Thou Clitumnus ! in thy sweetest wave  
Of the most living crystal that was e'er  
The haunt of river nymph, to gaze and lave  
Her limbs where nothing hid them . . . ';

and reminiscent of Macaulay's 'Unwatched along Clitumnus grazes the milk-white steer' is the almost identical passage in 'Childe Harold'; while the river too is 'purest god of gentle waters . . . most serene of aspect, and most clear.' (To-day it is the 'Clitunno': it was supposed by the Romans to turn white the sacrificial oxen on its banks.)

And yet, in reading attentively among Byron's Italian rivers, one is tempted to give foremost place to the Po, to which fine river he devotes, besides the half-dozen or so references in 'Childe Harold,' 'Beppo,' 'The Prophecy of Dante,' 'The Deformed Transformed,' and 'Francesca di Rimini,' a special poem of thirteen stanzas, written in the spring or summer of 1819, and beginning :

' River, that rollest by the ancient walls  
Where dwells the lady of my love, when she  
Walks by thy brink . . . '

\* Though not in his text. Similarly, in 'Don Juan' there is a note about the Ronco, on whose banks, near Ravenna, he saw a memorial to the battle (1512) between the forces of Julius II and the King of Spain. 'I canter by the spot each afternoon,' he says.

He calls it 'deep and ample,' its wave 'wild,' and its speed 'headlong,' 'a mirror of my heart.' 'Sweeping dark and strong,' it is his 'congenial river'; and in the last stanza's 'to dust if I return, from dust I sprung' he echoes something of 'Could I remount the River of my years' written four years earlier at the Villa Diodati. But if the latter poem in its despondency shows him ready to quit a life whose 'stream of hours,' he says, flows between banks which are 'withered,' these Po stanzas return avidly enough to the old sensuousness.\*

Tagus, Guadiana, and Guadalquivir are the Iberian rivers of Byron's poetry. Tagus, as is well known, he reached by sea, five days out from England, on his first departure, July of 1809. In 'Childe Harold' he describes it as 'dashing onward to the deep,' there to pay its 'fabled golden tribute,' a reference to the traces of gold that may be found amid its sands; and before many days have passed he has swum it from shore to shore, just as, nearly a twelvemonth later, he will swim the Hellespont. He notes that 'Tayo' (as he calls it) does not divide Portugal from Spain, as he thinks it ought to, but that, instead, a 'silver streamlet' does so, which has 'scarce a name.' (Actually it is the Caia.) The Guadiana he crossed during his subsequent ride with Hobhouse to Seville, at which city he saw the Guadalquivir, before journeying the short stage to Cadiz to embark for Malta. Of the first-named he says

'Dark Guadiana rolls its power along  
In sullen billows, murmuring and vast,'

and marks the occasion of his seeing it by the lines wherein he appeals to 'lovely Spain, renowned, romantic land!' The Childe (probably Byron himself) 'prick'd his steed' over the plain of Albuera, 'glorious field of grief' that it was so soon to be. The other river we do not find spoken of again until in 'Don Juan' we have Seville given as Juan's birthplace, 'beside the river, a noble stream called Guadalquivir.' A little later Juan bids farewell, as his ship sails, to the land 'where Guadalquivir's waters glide,' to his mother—and to 'dearest Julia.' A last mention of Guadalquivir occurs when the shipwrecked Juan struggles ashore in the Cyclades, strong swimmer that he has become

\* It should be mentioned, incidentally, that Byron *may* have had the lesser river, Po di Primaro, in mind when he wrote the stanzas.—P. R. B.

since wont 'to lave his youthful limbs' in it and since he has 'learnt to swim in that sweet river.'

The rivers of Greece, Albania, and other classic and historic lands belong for the most part to Byron's first time abroad (1809-11). He writes of them often from personal acquaintance (though, of course, Lethe, as in 'till Lethe quench life's burning stream,' and Styx are figurative). Of the two Eurotas which used to be found in Greece one could wish that named in the second canto of 'Childe Harold,' under 'Fair Greece! sad relic of departed worth,' to be the Thessalian stream which joins the Peneüs (nowadays 'Salambria'), and which was also called 'Titaresus,' but actually it is the Iri, which enters the Gulf of Laconia, and is the river which was worshipped by the Spartans. Byron exhorts the Greeks to rise along its banks and emulate the deeds of the 'hopeless warriors of a willing doom' in the 'sepulchral strait' of 'bleak Thermopylae.' In the same canto he speaks of the 'Laos,' in Albania, which was really the Aöus (now 'Viosa'), calling it 'wide and fierce,' and recording in a footnote that when he saw it it was 'as wide as the Thames at Westminster.' It was, he says, 'the finest river in the Levant: neither Achelous, Alpheus, Acheron, Scamander, nor Capster approached it in breadth or beauty.' 'Fair Tempe,' he adds, 'can boast no charm that the Albanian vales do not possess.' (It is interesting to recall—if a personal note may be permitted—that in the most famous of all 'Handbooks' to Greece one noticed, many years ago, that 'Aöus' had been substituted for 'Laos' in a quotation of the relevant stanzas.)

Further historic streams mentioned by Byron include the Borysthenes (Dnieper), to cross which from the east into what was then Ottoman territory was Mazeppa's fervent prayer, only granted after he had undergone many hardships; 'and never,' he confesses, 'had I such welcome for a river!' The Vorkla's junction with the Dnieper is spoken of in a footnote about 'dread Pultowa's day' in this same poem of 'Mazeppa,' that battle of July 8, 1709, wherein Charles XII was so disastrously defeated by the Russians; as is also the Bug, in crossing which, after the battle, Charles and Mazeppa were nearly captured. Classic Pactolus, in Lydia, is in 'The Deformed Transformed' 'rich Pactolus' whose 'amber waves' are

' roll'd o'er sands of gold, softened by intervening crystal ' ; but is only mentioned as a quip in ' The Age of Bronze,' together with Rubicon, Pruth, Seine, and Nile—a somewhat incongruous mixture—in the course of some bitter invective. References in ' Don Juan ' to the Neva are rather ribald ones.

Certain classic rivers and streamlets Byron deals with further, sometimes in his text, at other times in notes, and the latter are also supplied by Hobhouse, or (in the ' Definitive Edition ') by E. H. Coleridge. Acheron (the ' Kalamas '), which to Spenser and Milton is ' black ' and ' bitter,' is likewise ' black ' for Byron ; but also it is ' couch of ever-welcome rest,' where ' peace awaits ' him. Achelous, Greece's longest river, on the contrary, is ' white,' as indeed is indicated by the name which it bears to-day of ' Aspropotamo.' ' Old Scamander ' (Spenser's ' divine Scamander '), nowadays the ' Mendere,' and its tortoises find brief mention in the text of ' Don Juan,' where a note makes further comment on the Anatolian tortoises, abounding there among the scrub-ilexes, as we know them to do to-day. Of the several streams called ' Cephisus ' to be seen in Greece, that spoken of in ' The Curse of Minerva ' is the one in Attica which waters the Athenian plain before entering Phalerum Bay. ' Meek Cephisus stream,' explains Byron in a footnote, ' is indeed scanty, while Ilissus has no stream at all,' thus going even further than did Milton, who termed it ' whispering.' Dirce and Ismenus, one flowing to the west and the other to the east of Thebes, figure in ' Childe Harold ' notes, where Byron tells us that he drank, while in those parts, of half-a-dozen streamlets, and they had ' a villainous twang ' about them.

As we move elsewhere among his rivers we find, scattered throughout ' Hours of Idleness,' ' Hebrew Melodies,' and ' The Prophecy of Dante,' mentions of ' Jordan's flood ' and ' waters of Babel.' We read of Israel's dereliction, ' whose shrines are desolate, whose land a dream,' while ' Arabs' camels wander ' over plains not theirs. The four rivers said to have enclosed the Garden—Pison, Hiddekel, Gihon, and Euphrates—are named in ' Cain,' where Byron calls them ' limpid streams of Eden.' ' They would not cleanse my soul,' laments Cain to Adah.

Euphrates, of course, takes pride of place in 'Sardanapalus,' but Tigris occurs only in a footnote concerning an inundation which threw down portions of the walls of Nineveh, a fatal omen. On Euphrates the effeminate monarch's galley rides and his pavilion is set up, 'garlanded, lit and furnish'd.' Exhorted by the priests at least to respect 'Chaldea's starry mysteries,' he answers glibly that he does so :

'I love to watch them in the deep blue vault  
 And to compare them with my Myrrha's eyes ;  
 I love to see their rays redoubled in  
 The tremulous silver of Euphrates' wave  
 As the light breeze of midnight crisps the broad  
 And rolling water, sighing through the sedges  
 Which fringe his banks : but whether they may be  
 Gods, as some say, or the abode of gods,  
 As others hold, or simply lamps of night,  
 Worlds, or the light of worlds, I know nor care not !'

The complete and flippant hedonist, in fact, though by no means a coward, as his end will show, and with irresistible appeal to Byron.

Perhaps one may here recall Landor's skit on the lines in 'Hebrew Melodies' which declare that : 'We sate down and wept by the waters of Babel, and thought of the day When our foe, in the hue of his slaughterers, Made Salem's high places his prey, And ye, oh her desolate daughters ! Were scatter'd all weeping away.' For 'Babel' Landor substituted 'Camus,' and for the last two lines : 'While damsels would show their red garters, In their hurry to scamper away.'

Byron riposted, in 'Don Juan,' with : 'that deep-mouthed Boeotian, Savage Landor.'

Other rivers about which Byron writes, and which, in spite of his early longings, he never saw, may perhaps be noticed. Niger, even more than Neva, lies beyond his scope, and except for some North American names in editorial notes we find no mention of New World rivers. The Niger reference in 'Don Juan' is mere persiflage, just as it is in 'The Vision of Judgment' (even though here the words show familiarity with the nature of Niger's delta), while of his few mentions of the Nile the most striking are those in 'The Age of Bronze,' where he talks of its 'famous flood' and of the 'dark shades of Forty Ages' cast by the

Pyramids (reminiscent to us of the '*Quarante siècles vous contemplent!*' of Napoleon's exhortation to his soldiers). Unforgettable, too, the lines in 'Childe Harold' which call the Castle of St Angelo 'imperial mimic of old Egypt's piles' and 'travell'd phantasy from the far Nile's enormous model,' and when in 'Don Juan' we read of 'Nile's sun-sodden slime.'

Ganges and Indus would seem to be the only Indian rivers to figure in Byron's poetry, the first-named being twice mentioned in 'Sardanapalus,' and again in that poem of magnificent opening,\* 'The Curse of Minerva,' where he combines it with the Indus. The 'Sardanapalus' mentions show the monarch disdaining all idea of military exploits, such as those in which his ancestress, Semiramis, had led the Assyrians 'to the solar shores of Ganges,' there to perish in their myriads. If *that* be glory, he cries, 'then let me live in ignominy ever!' And why do his subjects murmur if he prefers living in peace to leading them to 'dry into desert's dust,' or 'whiten with their bones' the Ganges' banks?

Very minatory are the lines in 'The Curse of Minerva' regarding the two rivers, as in scathing terms the Goddess condemns the abstraction of the Elgin Marbles:

'Look to the East, where Ganges' swarthy race  
Shall shake your tyrant empire to its base;  
Lo! there Rebellion rears her ghastly head,  
And glares the Nemesis of native dead;  
Till Indus rolls a deep purpureal flood,  
And claims his long arrear of northern blood.'

With more to the same effect. What an opportunity the lines might have afforded, much more recently, to the enemies of our rule in India!

'Byron's genius,' writes John Nichol, 'required a stimulus; it could not have revelled among the daisies of Chaucer, or pastured by the banks of Doon or Ouse, or thrived among the Lincolnshire fens.'† Certainly, in comparison with his Rhine, Po, or Tiber, his British rivers do not amount to much. Yet, with due regard to Nichol's dictum, one still finds Byron's use of our rivers (both north and south of Tweed) attractive.

\* Opening transferred later to 'The Corsair.'—P. R. B.

† 'English Men of Letters,' edited by John Morley, Macmillan, 1884.

Deeside, of those early days which first stirred his love of scenery, is beautifully commemorated in 'When I Roved a Young Highlander,' of 'Hours of Idleness' (its attractions so enhanced for him by the presence of one of his 'Marys' \*). In one place he tells how he 'breasted the billows' of its 'rushing tide,' and in another calls it 'thou sweet-flowing Dee.' Later, in 'The Adieu,' he regrets ever having left 'Mar's dusky heath and Dee's clear waves.' Many years later still, and in fact the year before his death, he recalls the 'blue hills and clear streams' of Scotland, naming particularly the Dee and Don, and the latter's celebrated bridge near Aberdeen, concerning which, he says in a footnote, there was a superstition which 'made me pause to cross it,' but which also had 'a black deep salmon stream below.' In 'English Bards and Scotch Reviewers' he reaches the Border, and records the ludicrous so-called 'duel' once fought there between Moore and Jeffrey, for which 'Tweed ruffled half her waves to form a tear,' while 'the other half pursued its calm career.' The river figures again in 'Hints from Horace,' in a similar vein of banter. The location of 'Lora' in 'Hours of Idleness,' or whether it is a stream at all, is doubtful. The name is introduced in a stanza of great beauty about 'the lamp of heaven' shining on its shore. One would like to think of it as the Ossianic 'Falls of Lora,' near Loch Etive, in Argyllshire, but that the mention of Alva, which is in Clackmannan, seems to preclude this.

Cam and Granta, of Cambridge days, frequently occur, of course, in the early poems : 'Granta's sluggish shade' and 'Cam's sedgy banks,' of 'Thoughts Suggested by a College Examination,' are evocative and nostalgic ; while the allusion to the examiner who 'Of Grecian drama vaunts the deathless fame, Of Avon's bard rememb'ring scarce the name' is a good example of revenge on a tiresome tutor. Granta, in 'English Bards,' is 'hoary,' and 'her Pegasus a full-grown ass, whose Helicon is duller than her Cam.'

Reverting to 'Hours of Idleness,' we have that ever-pleasing picture of Harrow days which shows us Byron and his companions at play. While some, it will be

\* Did not somebody once say that he was 'unco wasteful' of them?—  
P. R. B.

remembered, engage in their various games 'beneath the noon tide sun,' others

'With slower steps direct their way  
Where Brent's cool waves in limpid currents stray.'

Middlesex Brent and Paduan Brenta were to be happy memories for Byron. The other English stream in which he bathed was the little Grete, near Southwell.

It is Thames (sometimes for scansion's sake called 'Thamis') that, perhaps, has most appeal to Byron among English rivers. In that 'Curse of Minerva' whose minatory nature has already been noticed we find foretold the vengeance of 'the Furies' upon London, when her fleeing inhabitants will turn to gaze on 'the column of ascending flames,' and see 'Havoc' 'shake his red shadow o'er the startled Thames.' Gentler is the mention of it where 'Childe Harold' contrasts some of London's Sunday recreations with those of Seville or Cadiz: in the latter the bullfight, with all its thrills and horrors; in cockney London 'the spruce citizen, wash'd artisan, and smug apprentice' taking their weekly airing. Through various suburbs, in 'coach of hackney, whiskey, one-horse chair, and humblest gig,' they converge on Hampstead, Brentford, and Harrow, while 'each pedestrian churl,' delighted when a horse jibs on a hill, makes fun of them. Other citizens go boating on the Thames with their 'ribbon'd fair' ones, or speed along 'the safer turnpike.' Yet others climb Richmond Hill, 'scud to Ware,' or betake themselves to 'the steep of Highgate,' to dance till morning.

Perhaps the last of Byron's river-mentions is that towards the conclusion of 'Don Juan,' written not long before the final scene at Missolonghi. Not now is it a case—though these were no invention—of 'my blood being all meridian,' or 'the hum of human cities torture' to one who yearns for deserts. He speaks of 'the gentle sound of Thamis' as he hears it (through Juan's ears) on entering London.

P. R. BUTLER.

## Art. 8.—THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN SCOTLAND.

THE visitor to any Scottish town to-day (except, possibly, one of the major cities) who asked to be directed to the local Episcopal Church would be likely to draw a blank—unless he had the luck to encounter a faithful member. If he asked for the English Church he would easily enough find his desired place of worship with its 'English minister,' known to his flock as the Rector or as Father —, but regarded by most of the community as some sort of misioner from the Church of England to the Sassenach dwelling in Scotland, who must be permitted their own rites, and to those Scots who, from affectation of gentility, an English education, or sheer perversity, have been lured from the pure native faith of Presbyterianism. That Episcopacy is the true and ancient Church of Scotland, in direct descent from the Church of the saints—Ninian, Kentigern and Columba—who brought to Scotland the Gospel and the Sacraments, is a fact rarely admitted or remembered. The legend is accepted that Presbyterianism, by being established and endowed, is peculiarly and thoroughly Scottish; that Scotland is peculiarly and thoroughly Presbyterian. It is all very well for the English, poor bodies, to be Episcopalian and say their prayers out of a wee book, but your true Scot should be as devoted to his Swiss Kirk (founded in Geneva), with its English accretions (the Westminster Confession and the Catechisms), as he is to porridge, whisky, golf and Association football.

To be fair, that last sentence expresses the views only of the less-instructed Scots, but these are very numerous. They are hardly to be blamed; for the teaching of Scottish history omits many essential truths: among them the fact that the triumph of the new Presbyterian over the ancient Episcopal Church came about through political manceuvres and as a result of what some might call a misplaced and exaggerated loyalty on the part of the Episcopalian. The faith of our fathers is largely forgotten; the Church that maintains 'Evangelical Truth and Apostolical Order,' obedient both to Scriptural and to traditional authority, guarding the Sacraments, teaching the Faith once delivered to the saints—that Church is, for

the most part, tolerated as an exotic importation, commended chiefly for the negative virtue of not being R.C.

To be tolerated is, however, more comfortable than to be persecuted, and Scots Episcopalians may now worship in peace and freedom: a freedom greater than that enjoyed by the sister Church of England. Disestablishment has its advantages; as when the Church desires to revise her Prayer-Book or her canons, to appoint her bishops, to order her ecclesiastical affairs. The use of the Scottish Prayer-Book (revised in 1929 from the edition of 1911) is obligatory; but it is usually a matter for congregational choice whether the Scottish or the English Communion Office be followed; both are contained in the Prayer-Book, and in some churches they are used on alternate Sundays or at alternate Celebrations. It is also a matter of choice or local tradition whether a church is 'High,' 'Low,' or 'Moderate' in ritual and ceremonial. On the whole there is less diversity than may be found in England; and the teaching is invariably Catholic and apostolic.

Partly from choice, partly from necessity the post-Reformation Church maintained the utmost simplicity of ritual and ceremonial. Episcopacy was positively and definitely anti-Papal, anti-Roman. There was in the seventeenth century even a Calvinistic element in Episcopalian teaching; and for a time many Episcopalians hoped and worked for reconciliation with the Presbyterians, at least with those of the more liberal and gentle sort. It seemed that Episcopacy might be maintained by the Scottish nation as a whole; and indeed so many of the people were of that persuasion that this was no mere dream. On the Presbyterian side, many were prepared to accept bishops.

The first restoration of Episcopacy was in 1610—after the period of the Titular Bishops, nicknamed the 'Tulchan Bishops.' (A tulchan is the Gaelic name for a stuffed calf-skin, put beside a cow to induce her to give milk.) These bishops were appointed to sees, without being consecrated, and their chief function was to draw the revenues for the 'Reformed' nobility. But in 1610 three Scots priests were duly consecrated bishops: Spottiswoode of Glasgow, Lamb of Brechin, Hamilton of Galloway—in London by the Bishops of London, Ely, Worcester, and

Rochester. This fact of consecration by English bishops has been used by ill-instructed opponents to prove that the Episcopal Church is entirely and exclusively English—as if nationality had anything at all to do with the validity of orders. It was necessary at that moment for the Scots Church to apply to the English for a renewal of the succession; all that mattered was that in England the apostolic chain was still held unbroken, and could again link Scotland to the Catholic Church. The absence of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York was, on the part of the English Church, a tacit acknowledgement that no claim of jurisdiction could or would be made.

So the ancient order was restored and the faithful in Scotland were part of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church; but not in peace or security. The Stuarts were to prove most luckless defenders of the Faith. Against the determination of James VI and I and of Charles I to restore and maintain Episcopacy there was marshalled a growing force of fanaticism. The sect of extreme Calvinists was winning much power and influence, especially in the south-west of Scotland. These men were opposed to bishops and to kings; they hated all traditional order and ceremonies, because such order and ceremonies were maintained by the Church of Rome which they abhorred, and because, in their pride, they thought themselves called to set up a new system, to teach new doctrine, to arrange the household of the Church in an economy uncontemplated by the Apostles.

Along with the restoration of the Episcopate, King James attempted a revival of sound practices in the Five Articles of Perth, which enjoined: (1) That the Holy Communion was to be received kneeling. (2) That private Communion was to be given to the sick and in other cases of necessity. (3) That private Baptism was also, in necessity, to be administered. (4) That the great Feasts—Christmas, Easter, Whitsuntide—were to be observed. (5) That children were to be instructed in the Catechism and then confirmed.

The English Prayer-book of 1552 was in common use. The traditional usages of the Scottish Church had not been lost. Both were used and collated in the Prayer-Book of 1637, prepared and revised by Bishop Maxwell of Ross and Bishop Wedderburn of Dunblane, with the help and counsel

of Archbishop Laud ; and popularly named, or mis-named, Laud's Liturgy. This misnomer has clung to it, as has the legend that when it was first read, in St Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh, one Sunday in July 1637, an obstreperous lady called Jenny Geddes hurled her stool at the head of the Dean, with the protest : ' Daur ye say Mass at my lug ? ' It has made a good story for three centuries of school-children and of visitors to St Giles ; that it is mythical appears to be of no importance to its hearers. It is, however, true that there was a riot and one of the first magnitude ; probably instigated by the anti-Episcopal nobility and conducted by a throng of willing ' stooges ' who were not very thoroughly versed in matters of liturgy. It is also accurate to refer at that period, and that period only, to the Cathedral of St Giles ; Edinburgh had been made a bishopric by Charles I. (In the medieval, Roman jurisdiction Edinburgh was part of the Archdiocese of St Andrews, as it is to-day when there is a Roman Archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh.) St Giles is now properly termed ' The High Kirk of St Giles,' being no longer the seat of the Bishop of Edinburgh.

The riot was no single incident. Edinburgh had been infected by the Calvinistic fever, and when the National Covenant with its fiercely anti-Catholic declarations was prepared, it was signed in Greyfriars Churchyard by a sufficient number of people—in the Lowlands—to make credible, even to our day, the claim that it was a true statement of the belief and sentiment of the people of Scotland. It was, in fact, an expression of party-sentiment, of regional feeling. The country north of the Forth rejected it, led by the ' Aberdeen doctors,' those wise divines who held and taught the essential, Catholic (not popish) doctrine that has been held ' quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.'

Aberdeen, in university, diocese and district, has always been a kindly mother to the Church ; the name of one of the doctors, Forbes, is one of the most honoured in Episcopal annals. Had the teaching and spirit of these men prevailed, the history of Scotland would have been very different, especially in things of the mind and spirit ; but fanaticism won the day. The south-west was populous and clamorous ; the mob was inflammable. A Presbyterian Church Assembly, held in Glasgow, after making

many calumnious charges against the bishops deposed them from office, rejected Episcopacy *in toto*, and set up Genevan Presbyterianism in its place.

The Church went into the shadows ; but the Faithful Remnant endured. The succession was maintained—one bishop, Sydserf of Galloway, living to see the Restoration of Charles II. The Covenanters were openly against the king, and Scotland's share in the martyrdom of Charles I is a grievous memory.

With the Restoration came the re-establishment of Episcopacy. Four new bishops were consecrated : Sharp—the ill-fated Archbishop of St Andrews—Leighton, Fairfoul, and Hamilton. Leighton's is a name and memory still revered ; under his influence, and that of others of like holiness of life, wisdom, and charity, the moderate Presbyterians might have been led back to the Church. There were those who accepted the royal patronage and were disposed to live peaceably with their Episcopal brethren. But still the zealots and fanatics prevailed : the Covenanters or (as they were sometimes called from the name of one of their leaders, Richard Cameron) the Cameronians : rebels against any established Church, rebels against the Throne.

Charles II, if not a pattern of domestic virtue, was well endowed with tact and tolerance. Leighton and he made a good team—in worldly wisdom better than Charles I and Laud ; but even superhuman wisdom and holiness, with all possible diplomacy, could hardly have prevailed against the rage of bigotry that swept over southern Scotland. And when Charles's successor, James, who had no gift for popularity, extended his tolerance to Papists and openly avowed his conversion to Rome, he 'coupit the creel' (to use a vivid Scotticism which may be Englished : 'upset the apple-cart'). His unhappy reign ended in flight and exile, and his throne was possessed by his unfilial daughter, Mary, and her very peculiar husband, William of Orange.

One of the strangest and strongest legends in Scotland is that the Covenanters were saints and martyrs—a legend cherished even by members of the present Establishment, whose opinions and practices would have been anathema to those same 'saints' ; by Presbyterians of devoted loyalty to the Throne and an adherence to their own Kirk that does not exclude appreciation of the Anglican liturgy

and devotion. The courage of those zealots is no mere legend, and for that they may be respected. They did, some of them, suffer the penalty of treason. It was not a merciful age. But their sufferings have been magnified and exalted as if they matched the agonies of the martyrs of the early Church; their cruelty when they were in power has been conveniently forgotten, as has the persecution of the Episcopalians in both the seventeenth and the eighteenth century.

At the Revolution of 1688 Episcopacy was the Established Church of Scotland and also the Church of the people. It was not an Episcopalian but a Presbyterian observer, the famous 'Jupiter' Carlyle of Inveresk, who said that it then held 'more than two-thirds of the people of the country and most of the gentry.' So it might have remained, but for that fateful interview between William and Bishop Rose of Edinburgh, in 1689, in Whitehall.

'My Lord,' asked William, 'are you for going to Scotland ?'

'Yes, sir,' answered the bishop, 'if you have any commands for me.'

'I hope,' suggested William, 'you will be kind to me and follow the example of England.'

'Sir,' replied the bishop, 'I will serve you as far as law, reason, or conscience will allow me.'

This answer was not ambiguous to the new monarch, who had excellent powers of reason and enough conscience to understand the bishop's implicit meaning. He turned his back, literally and metaphorically, on Scots Episcopacy in the person of its spokesman; and from that day the Episcopal Church in Scotland has been disestablished, disendowed, legally a nonconformist sect. Bishop Rose has been blamed for quixotic loyalty, for lack of adroitness. Her alliance with the Stuarts has indeed been a luckless one for the Church. But by some standards, loyalty, however quixotic, is a virtue. An oath of fealty to one king is not to be transferred to another.

Presbyterianism, having declared its loyalty to the incoming monarchs, was now set up, with endowments and emoluments, as the Established Church of Scotland. This position was fortified at the Union of Parliaments, in 1707, when this Church secured the oath of Queen Anne, and of her successors, to maintain and defend the Presbyterian

Establishment in Scotland. (This does not mean, as is popularly believed, that the sovereign when visiting Scotland must attend only the services of the Established Church ; that precedent—it is no more—was set by Queen Victoria.)

Queen Anne herself favoured Episcopacy, and gave sympathy and aid to the harassed little Church in Scotland. The Act of Toleration in 1712 made Episcopacy legal ; and her reign made a brief interlude of peace for the Faithful Remnant. It brought the English Prayer-Book into common use, through the royal gift of many copies : the Church in the Restoration period had no complete Prayer-Book, 'Laud's Liturgy' being out of use. There were 'the wee bookies' containing those elements and usages of liturgy that were later intercalated into the English Prayer-Book to form the authorised Scottish Prayer-Book. The complete Scottish Liturgy was not printed until 1764.

After Queen Anne's death came the conflict between the old loyalty and the new allegiance to the Hanoverian dynasty. The first Jacobite Rising in 1715 ended in tragic failure. So many Episcopalians (though not all) were actively Jacobite that the Church was marked with the name of rebel, and was made to pay heavily for her allegiance to the King over the Water. A Penal Act of 1719 forbade, under pain of imprisonment, any Scots Episcopal priest to officiate for more than nine persons gathered together, above the members of his own household, unless he abjured King James (VIII and III, son of the first exile) and prayed for George I as King. A few clerics and their congregations 'qualified' in this way ; and those who refused were not without a certain holy adroitness in evading the penalty. It was not difficult so to arrange a congregation that only the permitted number were present in one room or place ; others gathered on the threshold, in a passage, outside the window—not in the actual meeting-place but well within sight and hearing.

The Church in the eighteenth century, as in the seventeenth, was in matters of ritual and ceremonial austere ; to the eye it would appear 'Low Church.' But the teaching was unswervingly Catholic and Apostolic. A modern parallel may be found in the Church of Ireland—also disestablished—where the same sound teaching and tradition

are maintained, with an outward appearance almost Presbyterian in simplicity.

The ethos of that period may be found in contemporary writings : among others in the works of Henry Scougall, whose 'Life of God in the Soul of Man' was published posthumously in 1677, with a memorial preface by Bishop Burnet. Scougall, a priest in Aberdeenshire, was a friend of Bishop Leighton, and much of his temper : a scholar and mystic, loving especially the teaching of Thomas à Kempis and of St Teresa. His book is one of quiet and steady devotion. Like Brother Lawrence, he knew and practised the Presence of God in common life. Faith and prayer were daily bread, air and water to the soul. Religion was life—'the Life of God in the Soul of man'—its quickening and 'its permanence and stability.' It was needful for the faithful in those troubled times to have a religion that wore well, that was 'no fugitive or cloistered virtue.'

Perhaps there was less than we would desire, less than we in our happiness have to-day, of sacramental worship in itself. There seems to have been comparatively little meditation on the Sacramental Presence of Our Lord—though always the teaching of that Presence in the Holy Communion and always Reservation for the Communion of the Sick. There was in this regard the sad but inevitable reaction against Roman practices ; and there was the practical argument against continual Reservation that there was danger of desecration by brawlers and marauders.

The same quietness of devotion—almost approaching quietism—was shown in the eighteenth century, when a group of churchmen, lay and cleric, in the North-East came under the influence of the French mystics, including some not approved by their Church : notably Madame de Guyon and Madame Bourignon. The former had been defended by Fénelon, whose influence was already potent upon such devout laymen as Lord Forbes of Pitsligo, the valiant Jacobite laird who fought both in the '15 and the '45 and was long in peril of his life. Quietism on the Continent led to many vagaries of belief, even to heresy ; in these Scottish mystics it was but a steady flame of piety that comforted the life of the soul ; an increase of faith and vitality. (This chapter of the Church's inner life may be studied more fully in a volume of the New Spalding

Club, 'The Mystics of the North-East,' edited by G. D. Henderson.)

The troubles of the early eighteenth century were intensified after the '45 in measures of subtle and malignant vengefulness. In the dreadful years that followed Culloden, Scotland knew something of the horror, worse than bestial, that the German-invaded countries of Europe were to suffer during two world wars. The Duke of Cumberland, George II's most obedient son, was a forerunner of the Nazis. Episcopalian being poor and in a minority made excellent victims. Their clergy suffered imprisonment—even some who were not Jacobite, as the poet-priest, John Skinner of Linshart. In 1746 it was enacted that they should all abjure King James, take the oath of allegiance to King George, pray for him by name, and should register their Letters of Order by Sept. 1. After that date, no priest ordained by a Scottish bishop could qualify. To officiate for a congregation of more than five persons meant, for a first offence, imprisonment; for a second, transportation to slavery in the plantations for life; for a third, if any man escaped from that exile, death. The faithful laity were deprived of their civic rights: might not vote or be elected to Parliament, enter the universities, hold any commission or public office. In 1748 these penalties were made even more stringent; it was then decreed that Letters of Order be no longer valid unless given by a bishop of the Church of England or the Church of Ireland; that without such Letters no priest could register; and that all previous registrations be null and void. This, in the view of the persecuting Government, was a sure way of annihilating the hated Church by not merely cutting the branches but uprooting the very tree of priestly and apostolic succession. But the Church endured, having means of life beyond the reach of the power and malignity of her adversaries.

The clergy continued to fulfil, against all perils and penalties, their priestly functions. The people kept faith. There is a delightful story of three priests, Greig, Petrie, and Troup, who were imprisoned in Stonehaven gaol. One day they heard voices calling them, and looking out saw a group of fishwives who had waded through the stream beneath their window, clambered up the rocks, carrying their babies in creels on their backs, and were now holding

the children up to the window to receive the water of baptism from priestly hands.

With the accession of George III in 1760 the virulence of attack was modified ; and when Charles Edward, the Bonny Prince, *de iure* Charles III to his faithful followers, died in 1788 with only his celibate brother, Henry, Cardinal of York, as his heir, even the most fervent Jacobites felt themselves released from the old allegiance and able to swear fealty to the new. Episcopacy was tolerated, if not at once legalised. Then in 1792 the penal laws were repealed on two conditions : one, that the Scottish Church accept the Thirty-nine Articles of the English Prayer-Book ; the other that no Scottish priest hold a benefice or even officiate in the Church of England. This last disability was not removed until 1864. So the Church came to the end of her century of persecution, faithful and much-enduring, but so weakened as to be, in Sir Walter Scott's phrase, ' the shadow of a shade,' with some forty priests and four bishops, as against the 600 clergy of a hundred years before, and with less than a twentieth of the people instead of two-thirds.

The relief had been won largely through the efforts and offices of Bishop Skinner (later the Primus), son of the poet-priest ; and he had part in an act that made manifest the Apostolic authority of the valiant little Church. In 1784 Samuel Seabury, priest of the Church in America, was elected Bishop of Connecticut, and came to Britain to receive Consecration. The War of Independence having been fought and won by the States, it was now impossible for an American citizen to take the oath of allegiance to the king ; and without that oath the English bishops could not bestow episcopal consecration. The Church in Scotland, being disestablished, was not so bound ; her bishops were free to perform their Apostolic function. So Seabury came to Aberdeen, and there, in an upper room, three bishops, Kilgour the Primus, Petrie, and Skinner, laid their hands on him and transmitted to him the true and holy office of bishop. The Church beyond the Atlantic was secured in the Apostolic Succession.

Their minds must have been full of memories of the days of peril, their hearts of great thankfulness. For the new bishop there was the memory of an earlier visit to Scotland when he was a student in Edinburgh. He had

asked his host, one Sunday, to direct him to an Episcopal place of worship, and been told : 'Take your hat and follow me, but at a distance.' Following discreetly, for the 'Piskies' were not viewed with favour by Edinburgh citizens, he had been led to a store-room in Carubbers Close, off the High Street, where the Faithful Remnant had worshipped since their expulsion from St Giles. A church stands there now : Old St Paul's, with its Seabury Chapel, the oldest Episcopal Church in Edinburgh, with a rich tradition and a standard faithfully maintained of Catholic worship and teaching.

With her transmission of the Succession to the young Church overseas and with her own coming into freedom there ends the most vivid and most valiant chapter of our Church's history. It was a chapter with many heroic figures as well as many heroic incidents. There were bishops of a gentle saintliness, like Bishop Jolly, who won the hearts not only of the faithful but of sceptics like the man who excused himself for uncovering to his lordship : 'My hands winna keep from my cap.' There was Bishop Forbes of Aberdeen, the good father of a good son—John, one of the Aberdeen doctors. And there was another Bishop Forbes, Robert, of Ross and Caithness, whose Journals of his episcopal tours of his northern diocese, of his 'Remotes,' as he called his flock, make such delightful reading. He suffered imprisonment during the '45, and in captivity recorded the experiences of his fellow-prisoners; these, with other matters, he published in 'The Lyon in Mourning' : the most valuable and moving account we possess of the Rising. From his papers, too, Robert Chambers compiled a 'History of the Forty-Five.'

He was priest in charge of a church in Leith and at the same time bishop, a practice that lasted into the nineteenth century, and made necessary by the poverty of means and paucity of clergy. His first tour was made in 1763, his second in 1770.

Forbes writes with humour, sympathy and observation. His Journals give an excellent picture of the Church of his time and a loving portrayal of the people. The self-portrayal, so unconsciously made, is of a true Father in God, caring for his people, touched by their joy in welcoming him and receiving the Sacraments at his hands. Most of the districts he visited were Gaelic-speaking and he himself

had no Gaelic ; but the priest in charge had that tongue, and so the bishop would always have his sermon or Confirmation charge repeated to the people in Gaelic, with an explanation of the rite. Most of the services were held in a tent or in the open air, the little churches or chapels being too small to hold the multitudes that flocked together. On his first tour he confirmed some 616 persons, on his second 900.

Once, when he knew that the people ' had come from far ' and were hungry, he gave the priest money to buy food and drink, and came to bless his flock as they sat at meat. They rose to thank him, with the lovely Highland courtesy of word and gesture, moving him almost to tears. There is a breath of the air of Galilee about the episode. Altogether, the Journals, without being spiritual classics, reveal a devout and charitable mind. And they are no mere period-piece. The good bishop of two centuries past is still one of us : one in faith, tradition, and devotion.

In the nineteenth century the Church sailed into comparatively calm waters. There was still poverty—and there still is ; but there was little or no lethargy. The Catholic teaching, so faithfully preserved, was gradually enhanced by increasing richness of ceremonial and ritual, due in part to the influence of the Oxford Movement. The Tractarians revival of teaching and re-assertion of doctrine were not needed in a Church that had known how to maintain the essentials. There was little of the wild iconoclasm, the anti-Popish panic that attacked the ' Ritualists ' or Anglo-Catholics in the Church of England. There was, however, one sad and most unedifying episode, when the good and much-loved Bishop of Brechin, Alexander Penrose Forbes (a collateral descendant of Lord Forbes of Pitsligo), was indicted and reproved by his fellow-bishops for the Eucharistic teaching he delivered in his Charge to his Clergy, in 1858. He had made a full and clear defence of the Doctrine of the Real Presence and of the adorable Nature of the Blessed Sacrament. He was defended by his friend Keble and by the host of his own clergy and laity, who were with him in belief, and who gave him a love, approaching veneration, for the sanctity of his life. The case ended in his being admonished by his brethren, who declared that his Charge must not claim to be the official teaching of the Church.

The tendency of the Church was, however, towards more explicit expression of Catholic truths. There was a growth in numbers and in consequence a building of new churches and cathedrals. There were now seven dioceses, and the bishops became entirely diocesan in their sphere and activity.\* A cathedral was built in each of the sees : Moray, Ross, and Caithness ; Aberdeen and Orkney ; Argyll and the Isles ; Brechin ; St Andrews, Dunblane, and Dunkeld ; Glasgow and Galloway ; Edinburgh. The first to be built was that of Perth (in the diocese of St Andrews), which was dedicated to St Ninian, the first missionary-saint of Scotland. Through the generosity of the Earl of Glasgow a collegiate church was built in Millport, Isle of Cumbrae, to be also the Cathedral of the Isles ; this, though no longer serving its full, original purpose, is still much used as a Retreat House. With the revival of the Religious Orders for both men and women, in the Anglican Church, Scotland regained the help of Sisterhoods—first in Aberdeen ; and the habit of making Retreats began to find favour. There was founded also Trinity College, Glenalmond, intended to be a seminary, and continuing as the Church School in Scotland. Among those most active about its foundation were Mr Gladstone, and his friend James Hope-Scott, son-in-law of Lockhart and husband of Scott's only granddaughter.

In Church government the laity were given increasing power, notably by the formation in 1876 of the Representative Church Council, to which each congregation elects a representative. Each congregation also appoints a lay elector to vote in the election of a new bishop. The clergy and laity of a diocese together choose their Father in God. The clergy themselves are appointed to a charge by patronage, which in most cases is that of the bishop and the vestry together ; so that the people have, through their own representatives, a voice in appointing their priest.

As the century went on, the Episcopal Church became not only tolerable but, in some quarters, fashionable. There was sometimes a danger that she would be known as the church of the gentry. On the other hand there was, and is, a curious belief, or so it would appear, in establish-

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\* There is no Archbishop, only the Primus or First Bishop : *Primus inter pares.*

ment as essential to orthodoxy. There are many who, while duly confirmed, communicant members of the Episcopal Church and regular in their worship in the Church of England when they are living in the south, conform when they come to Scotland to the ways of the Presbyterian Parish Kirk. Whether courtesy and the policy of doing in Rome as the Romans do, should be carried to this point is a matter of difference between the fervid and the tepid Episcopalian. And what might have been the progress in general esteem and popularity of the Church had Queen Victoria extended to Scots Episcopacy her love for most things Scottish must remain matter for wistful conjecture.

The influx, in the past century, of English and Irish members has had its importance; the influence of the latter has often meant the maintaining of 'Low Church' standards, at least in externals; and where a Lowland congregation is largely composed of English living in Scotland the legend of 'the English Church' is strengthened. Actually, the presence of English and Irish with Scottish members proves that Episcopacy is Catholic as well as national and is not confined to 'C. of E.'—any more than Scottish religion is essentially 'C. of S.' In the north, especially the north-east, the old, authentic Scots Episcopacy, with its Jacobite tradition, still lives, with much of the old ethos, uncompromising, splendid in simplicity. There are many families, gentle and simple, that have held no other way of faith and worship.

But whatever the admixture of English, Irish, and Scottish nationality, whatever the mode or degree of ritual and ceremonial, the Episcopal Church in Scotland remains Catholic, Apostolic, the true descendant of the Church of the Saints, holding their faith, guarding their Sacraments and Orders; loved by the Faithful Remnant, now as in days of persecution; and needing more and more love and loyalty, and less Laodicean geniality.

MARION LOCHHEAD.

Art. 9.

## IN MEMORIAM

JAMES, DUKE OF BERWICK AND ALBA

THAT 'no man ignorant of history can govern' was a conviction as universally accepted in the sixteenth century as it is neglected to-day, when new lamps for old have been as alluring and as disappointing as in the nursery tale of Aladdin.

To turn one's back upon an obligation is not to cancel it; and it would be well if we revived the Elizabethan habit of taking warning from 'other men's forepast miseries,' as Sir Walter Raleigh advised in his great 'Historie of the World'; also were we to admit with Sir Humphrey Gilbert that 'It is better to avert a mischief betimes than to avenge it too late.' In our time there has been one outstanding exception to the world-wide tendency of politicians to forget the lessons of the past. When 'appeasement' and equivocation too often are the expedient of statesmanship, all Europe has had an example to the contrary in the writings and actions of a faithful friend of England, a devoted champion of his own country, one who dared to proclaim that 'Truth is the firmest support of thrones and the best guide for the ruling of people—La verdad es más firme sostén de los tronos e el major guia para la gobernación de los pueblos.'

Thus spoke James Charles Manuel FitzJames Stuart y Falcó, 10th Duke of Berwick and 17th Duke of Alba, to the Real Academia de la Historia so long ago as 1919. And to this principle he adhered both in public and private life. His sudden death, on September 24 last, has evoked many an appreciation of his talents and personality. But it will be for future historians to analyse and demonstrate the extent of his services. In the hope that his example may inspire some of the younger generation to follow in his footsteps, it is well to recognise the moral courage which was the foundation of his life and achievements.

Not only was the Duke of Alba a vigorous champion of 'the good, true, and beautiful,' whether in art or action, but he openly disdained and did not hesitate to rebuke the bad, false, and ugly. His pride of race was combined with personal modesty, and, as to his own attainments, a deliberate understatement, which sometimes misled those

who were not sufficiently acquainted with his writings. It was not his habit to speak of his academic and scholastic accomplishments except to those whom he knew to be already interested. To some of his English and French friends he was better known as a sportsman than as a connoisseur in art, music, and antiquities, in which he had a wider range of interests than any other one man in our time.

For him, all the arts were related ; all were regarded in their human aspects and possibilities ; and life was always eventful. Dangerous and tragic it might be : but never dull. An intellectual versatility yoked with steadfastness of purpose, a deep-rooted patriotism which enabled him to sympathise with the patriotism of other countries, an autocratic temper blended with real kindness of heart, a fiery Spanish pride linked with a tolerant readiness to make allowance for other people's vanities, combined to make a personality difficult to compress into a few pages of print without appearing to use expressions paradoxical or superlative, or both.

If we agree that a man can to some extent be estimated through what and whom he admires, the answer in this case is that the predominant influences upon the Duke's childhood and youth were that of his mother, who inspired him with a full realisation of the value of history, and that of the Empress Eugénie (his great-aunt), whose courage and generosity, dignity and charm he valued to the end, when she died in his Palace of Liria, after an operation, in the summer of 1920, aged over ninety but vivacious to the last.

In Spanish, French, and English he would describe with equal vividness her character, which never ceased to delight him. His introduction to her ' *Lettres Familierès* ' —which he published and which are hopelessly out of print—is a masterpiece of its kind. So is his Foreword to the *Reminiscences* of the Marqués de Villavieja, called ' *Life has been Good* ' (1938), in which frankness and tact are gracefully combined.

When praised by an English friend for his principles and attainments, the Duke of Alba answered, ' Ah well ! I had a wonderful mother ; ' and gave to her the main credit of his early initiation into the meaning and value of his inheritance. Her illustrated Catalogue of the Liria

MSS., ranging from 1026 down to the nineteenth century, was a model of what such a publication should be ; and her son's precision, punctuality, and efficiency, whether in small things or great, were largely due to her training.

That she died so soon after he came into his large responsibilities was for him a lasting regret ; and his first book was dedicated to her memory. Though it consisted mainly of despatches of a Spanish Ambassador to Tudor England, it was coldly received here : perhaps because academically these letters had been pronounced not to exist ; so his discovering and editing them put scholastic authority in the wrong. His dedication (so far as it can be rendered into English) ran thus :

‘ More than from legitimate desire to throw light on obscured points of history, and much more, of course, than any puerile vanity of liking to appear in print, I am impelled by the ever-present memory of my late mother to publish this book

‘ To make her subject mine, to let my pen follow her pen, to realise the plans which were suddenly interrupted by her death, and to have the pleasure of distributing these books among the learned men and women who were her friends, brings her beloved image vividly before my eyes, and as it were causes me to live in her life.

‘ The last of her projects was the publication of the present volume, which she had undertaken half in secret as a surprise for her mother and brothers in whose archives the original papers are preserved.

‘ Unfortunately for all, and for the book, it has fallen to me —whose predilection for such studies is as yet unaccompanied by any great preparation—to attempt a work in which all that is good must be attributed exclusively to the intrinsic worth of the documents, and to the filial love which inspires me in this task.

‘ May the noble end I have in view serve as an excuse for my inexperience.’\*

This in 1907 was the forerunner of a long and arduous succession of publications.† And he sustained con-

\* Footnote : ‘ My guide in this essay, as my Mother's guide in hers, has been our librarian, Don Antonio Paz y Mélia, to whom I here make the same acknowledgment as my Mother did in the first pages of the first volume that she published.’

† Issued by him, the most beautiful production was presented to the Roxburghe Club in 1920-22 : ‘ Biblia (Antiguo Testamento) Traducido del Hebreo al Castellana,’ by a Jew, Arragel de Guadalfajara, for the Grand Master

sistently his declared preference for direct evidence : raising the dead from their graves to speak for themselves and aiming always at strict justice. Above all, he objected to the hasty generalities which so often pass for 'historical analysis.' He said in one of his addresses to *los señores académicos* : 'If you think monarchs or any other highly placed personages erred or blundered, say when, where, why ; and produce what you take to be the evidence. But never generalise about a whole class.'

The opinion now expressed by an eminent living author that if the Duke of Alba had not been born to high place he would have been a greater historian appears to the present writer based on a misunderstanding : for it was his heritage and surroundings, his consciousness of personal responsibility that influenced him from early boyhood and throughout an eventful life.\* His own words in 1925 in the prologue to 'El Mariscal de Berwick' expressed this clearly :

'The inheritors of illustrious names, or noble titles won for eminent services to their country, owe it to their ancestors to enhance their fame, when newly found documents give them the opportunity ; they should rectify unjust censures and accusations, not permitting the memory of the dead to be clouded, but rather holding them up as an example to those who come after.'

This was not intended to suggest that proved errors or faults should be disguised, but that for good or ill the judgments should rest not on opinion but on evidence.

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of the Order of Calatrava in 1422-33 (?). It contains 290 miniatures and 29 illuminated capital letters, by a Toledan artist. The binding of the two folio volumes is copied from a Toledan missal. The Introduction is by Don Antonio Paz y Mélia, and the work was seen through the press by him and by Don Julián Paz.

\* Of his twenty-four hereditary titles the most modern was the Dukedom of Liria and Xérica conferred on the first Duke of Berwick for winning the battle of Almansa against the French and English forces (the English General being a Frenchman, Ruvigny, Lord Galway). The most picturesque was Hereditary Constable of Navarre, and the last book he published in the spring of 1953 was the 'Historia de la Guerra de Navarra. Edición y prólogo del Duque de Alba Conde de Lerín, Condestable de Navarra'—the Latin of Nebriga on one side and the Spanish translation by Jose López de Toro on the opposite page.

Of the Duke's personal honours the most eminent was Knight of the Golden Fleece (which, excepting only the Garter, is the oldest surviving Order of Chivalry). He was also Knight of Calatrava, and had Portuguese, Italian, French, and Polish Orders ; also from England the Victorian Order and from Japan the Order of the Sun.

It was indeed merciful that destiny—he would have said the grace of God—placed him in a position in which he could be entirely independent, instead of being, like many a professional author, compelled to dance in fetters to suit what is thought 'to pay.' Also being his own publisher, he could produce his books so that their soul and body accorded. In his first venture, '*Correspondencia de Gomez Gutierre de Fuensalida*,' he had not yet completely mastered the art of the bibliophile. But by 1919, when he printed his '*Discurso*' on his great ancestor the 3rd Duke of Alba, the harmony between text and illustrations could not have been bettered. Yet so far as can be ascertained no English historian quoted this masterly character-study until it had been fourteen years in print; and even so late as 1946 the Duke uttered some mild reproaches to such folk as still took their ideas of the Dutch War from Motley, whose prejudices affected his choice of materials. When the 17th Duke of Alba allowed the 3rd Duke to speak for himself, he indicated that a Grandee of Spain in the sixteenth century could not be expected to anticipate and embody the agnostic socialism of the twentieth century. Within the lines which the 'Great Duke' laid down for himself as a general, a patriot, and a statesman, his actions were consistent. Most characteristic was his letter to King Philip II in August 1580, after the battle of Alcántara: 'It has pleased God to give your Majesty's forces a great victory: for which I render Him thanks and Your Majesty my congratulations.' Then follow commendations by name of the principal officers who served under him, but nothing about himself. Yet it was his generalship, plus the sea-power of Spain—the Marqués de Santa Cruz and King Philip's fleet were in the Tagus—which facilitated the conquest of Portugal and ultimately altered the map of the Old World and the New, by bringing under Spanish rule the vast Portuguese Empire, which had enabled the kings of the dynasty of Avis to regard themselves as supreme monarchs of the 'Ocean Sea.'

As the many times re-elected Director of the Real Academia de la Historia, the Duke of Alba's earlier actions should not be forgotten. In 1913 a British naval officer remarked that 'unless one knows Spain, one cannot realise the courage required by him in allowing it to be known

that he does not care for bull-fighting.' He and his brother, the Duke of Peñaranda, with their father's old friend the Marqués de Villavieja, were largely responsible for bringing polo into fashion in Spain; as also other English sports and games. It was not his way to make an objection without offering a substitute; for his were the positive and not the negative virtues.

A foreword which he wrote to 'The Spanish Arena by William Foss and Cecil Gerahyt'—a book published during the Civil War and now out of print—was unequivocally direct:

'... Nationalism is at stake not only in Spain; it is threatened in many other countries by international forces. What has happened to the Spanish nation in the last few years may well happen, if it is not already on the way to happen, to others. . . .'

Touching upon the 'unequalled height' of progress to which Spain had attained under King Alfonso XIII, he continued:

'Then Spain herself seems to have lost the sense of proportion. Not content with enjoying the peace and prosperity conferred upon her by that political system, she must needs exchange it for another. The Monarchy fell and was beneficent even in its fall; . . . the pacific entry of the Republic was not a first success of the new régime, but the last act of generosity of the old.'

'Before the Republic was a month old, the ship of State had run on the rocks. . . .' And after years of disorder, the 'Popular Front was formed and allowed to seize power,'—after which 'confiscation, outrage, and murder' became the order of the day.

'[But] the crisis produced the man. Franco's prestige was great among all who had followed his work in Morocco, and among none greater than among men such as Mola, Queipo de Llano, and Sanjurjo, who had been his senior officers there . . . he realised that only the Army could save the country in the dire straits into which it had fallen, and with characteristic courage placed himself at the head of the troops in Morocco . . .

'The rising started as a protest against a ruthless tyranny . . . ' and as it advanced to success against heavy odds 'it was a triumph of quality over quantity, of the spirit over matter. . . . Toledo, whose heroic defence will live for ever in epic story, had become an emblem. At the relief of the Alcazar, a

wave of patriotic enthusiasm swept over the country . . . men and women of all classes, aware that their very existence was at stake, were eager to share the sacrifice. . . . This is the first time that Bolshevism is being challenged in Western Europe, and the credit belongs to Spain and her leader. . . .

For a while there were five different Republics, each refusing to recognise the passports of the others ; but all were collectively saluted by Great Britain as ' the Government,' while the Nationalist Forces were rebuked as ' the rebels.'

When Generalissimo Franco had only as ' agent ' in London Mr O'Neill, a journalist by profession, the Duke of Alba took what for him—fourteen times a Grandee and holder of twenty-four ancient titles—was a most unconventional step. He offered to act as Nationalist Agent, believing he would thereby demonstrate to the world at large that Franco was a Christian and a patriot : likewise that the efforts of mischief-makers to stir up strife between Spain and England would be frustrated. He said to a British officer, ' Can you seriously suppose that if Franco had any designs on Gibraltar, *I* would be acting for him ? '

But so little did some of our pressmen understand Spain that a variety of fantastic tales were set afloat. One of the most widespread in 1937 was that the Duke, with his cousin the Duke of Montellano, had met Mussolini by appointment at Genoa and ' implored him not to forsake Spain.'

Grandees of Spain are not in the habit of ' imploring ' aid. Moreover, the Duke of Alba liked to recall that it was his ancestor who had captured Rome and held the Pope his prisoner ; treating him as the Holy Father with all personal deference, but from him in his temporal capacity exacting drastic terms. The description of the alleged rendezvous with Mussolini was vivid and eye-striking, but left those of us unmoved who happened to be aware that the Duke was not at Genoa but at Geneva. Subsequently on his arrival in London he was shown by an old friend some of the newspaper flights of fancy. He then said, ' I received a cable demanding " details of interview with Mussolini." I wired back, " Interview damned lie. No such thing." But the tale went on just the same ! '

About this time there was a double attempt to dis-

credit the Duke. To ultra-Catholic folk, whether in or outside Spain, it was alleged that he had turned Freemason, which in Latin countries denotes an agnostic subversive association. On the other hand the atheistical demagogues were informed that he was a bigoted Catholic and an irreconcilably rigid reactionary. The Freemason story spread rapidly, and even obtained some credence in Spain. A Spaniard of considerable repute assured a British friend that on such and such a date the Duke of Alba had been seen 'entering a Masonic lodge in Madrid.'

The English friend asked, 'Are you sure of the date?'

'Certain. So-and-So actually *saw* him go in on that day.' Mere contradiction not sufficing, it became necessary to mention that on the date specified the Duke could not have been entering a Masonic lodge in Madrid, as he was in Rome at the wedding of his cousin Prince Pio, after which he had an audience of the Pope. Several hundred wedding guests could have been invoked to testify to his presence in Rome that day; so whoever was seen going into a Masonic lodge in Madrid, it was not the Duke of Alba!

Many and various were the legends about him, most of which he treated with silent scorn. One English subversive author stated that the Duke of Alba could sit in an armchair and give valuable opinions on works of art, but was too feeble for 'the rough and tumble of polities.' The writer obviously was not aware of the Duke's reputation as a sportsman, nor can ever have seen him come into a room, with swiftness and agility suggestive of an arrow from a bow. But perhaps historians in the future will call this prattle 'contemporary evidence' of his incapacity!

He more than once insisted that though error had 'extraordinary vitality,' it was with him a matter of principle to believe that truth and justice must prevail in the end.

His position while he was Agent for the Nationalist régime, which the British Government had not yet accepted, was one which to a lesser man might have been mortifying. In 1938 an old friend, the day before a Buckingham Palace garden party, said to him, 'In such a large crowd I can hardly expect you to look out for me.' He replied, 'I am not invited. My position now is too "irregular"!' But instead of being huffed, he never allowed his disapproval of the conduct of some of our politicians to cloud

his admiration for our Royal Family and his old affection for our country.

Educated as he had been at Beaumont and never for a moment forgetting his Stuart ancestry, he regarded England as his second home. No Spaniard in our time—not even King Alfonso—was so ready to see the best and forgive the worst in us. But English ignorance at times was astonishing ; even though the Duke in 1930, when Minister for Foreign Affairs, had given audience at Londonderry House to as many pressmen as cared to come. He had answered their questions with his usual frankness ; and repeated that one of the main objects of his life had been to 'help England and Spain to understand and love each other better.'\* Though a certain section of our Press remained obstinately deaf, he did not permit himself to become impatient or exasperated. But even when the procrastinating English Government at last accepted Franco's régime as a *fait accompli* and the irregular 'Agent' became the Ambassador and went to our King on St Patrick's Day 1939, the fiction factory still kept busy. It was the Duke's habit to go to Seville for the Easter celebrations ; and as Seville had never been captured by the Reds, his palace there remained unblemished.

The ensuing dialogue took place in an English country house :

' You see, he has been telegraphed for by Franco. He was only a temporary Ambassador, because Hitler and Mussolini strongly object to a Grandee being Ambassador.'

' But what have they to do with it ? '

' Everything. Franco can't afford to offend them.'

To this the answer was, ' But Franco was not afraid to offend Hitler by refusing him a passage across Spain to attack Gibraltar. Franco is not open to the influence of Hitler or of Mussolini, or of anyone—unless perhaps of God Almighty.'

' Well, you will see,' retorted the other ; ' the Duke of Alba will not return. Hitler will not allow it.'

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\* It was to forward this unwavering aim that seventeen years later he published and prefaced a large volume of ' Documentos relativos a Inglaterra (1254-1834)', selected by his archivist, Don Julián Paz, and by Ricardo Magdaleno (600 pages) 1947. This he dedicated ' Al Excmo Señor Conde de Halifax, K.G., . . . Canciller de la Universidad de Oxford en recuerdo de amistad durante mi embajado en Londres.'

Actually the Duke had arrived back in England that very day. But as this assertion that Hitler and Mussolini objected to him (as most likely they did) reverberated in London, it seemed desirable to mention it to the Duke. (This was on May 1, 1939.) He answered, 'I am here for three reasons : By the will of God ; by the will of Franco ; and by my own will. And, for the present, I mean to remain.'

It will perhaps yet be made clear how, during the world war ensuing, it was he who counteracted the efforts of enemies of England to make trouble between ourselves and Spain. He had the great advantage of not being a professional politician. For he did not need to consider the conventions of a party. As a diplomatist he was a remarkable blend of tact and candour, frankness and discretion. And what he had gone through in relation to his own country enabled him to feel a more than academic sympathy for us during the war. But despite the tragic times, there were occasional gleams of comedy. He never became entirely accustomed to the amazing ignorance about Spain and Spanish history displayed by some of our most esteemed politicians. One who was invited specially to meet him opened the conversation with, 'I know nothing at all about Spain—except Don Quixote.'

'Ah well !' said the Duke. 'We are very fond of Don Quixote in Spain !'

His many inspiring public speeches might with advantage be collected ; for he had the art of getting in touch with his audiences, and (what is not always the case with a magnetic orator) his speeches read extremely well. However opportune they were at the moment, they had also an element of what Spaniards call the *sentimiento de la perpetuidad*. Of the Civil War he said :

'The loss of life has been enormous in all classes. Much of our best youth has perished. . . . Works of art, never to be equalled, have been obliterated. Many thousands of our most venerated churches are in ruins.

'All this destruction has been organised with the deliberate intent of clouding our faith in God ; breaking our hearts and hopes, and quenching our pride of race.

'But I would assure both our friends and our foes that the spirit of Spain has arisen resolute from the ashes of disaster. . . . Adversity has ever been the touchstone of courage. . . . And though Spain has lost her wealth, she has saved her soul.'

As to his own high office, in private he referred to it deprecatingly: 'It is my duty; but it interferes with my leisure—and my studies.' But these studies were only postponed, not abandoned; for an element of tenacity was one of the main sources of his strength.

In his lectures on the Empress Eugénie he commended her especially for her willingness to amend a hasty or unjust judgment; and to his Academy he said, 'Any of us might make a mistake. We are but mortal! There need be no dishonour in an error; only in refusing to correct it if it is proved as such.' That the Real Academia de la Historia re-elected him again and again to the Directorship showed the wisdom of *los señores académicos*. (It would be rash to hazard an opinion as to who will be capable of taking his place.)

Much that he did for the arts in Spain is perhaps being forgotten by the younger generation; his Wagner society, for example. As the Royal Opera in particular and Spaniards in general then cared only for Italian music, he took to giving Wagner concerts at the Liria Palace, and only ceased doing this in 1915 when such championship was no longer necessary.

It was he who had noticed that several of the oldest and most valuable pictures in the Prado Gallery were being adversely affected by the extremes of heat and cold of the Madrid climate. He spoke to King Alfonso about this, and a system was installed to keep an even temperature winter and summer, which saved some of the most precious paintings from perishing. For many years as President of the Board of the Prado Gallery he did a national service.

Reverting to politics: we now come to a sudden change which several of his English friends criticised adversely, but as to which his own countrymen should be the best judges. He had realised—retrospectively—that the debacle in 1931 had been organised from alien sources; and from the autumn of 1936 onwards his was one of the most decisive voices proclaiming that Franco had stood between the world-revolution forces and their objective. To Franco accordingly he dedicated his edition of the 'Disciplina Militar' of Sancho de Londoño, the original of which had been presented in 1568 by the soldier-author to the 3rd Duke of Alba, 'Lugarteniente y Capitán General de

Su Majestad.' The 1939 dedication to 'S.E. el Generalísimo Franco Jefe del Estado' ended by linking the names of 'tres glorioso Capitanes : Franco, Londoño y Alba.' This was not printed until 1943. It stood then and stands now to witness how thoroughly the Duke then appreciated the Chief of State whom he saluted in such respectful terms. But by heredity and conviction the Duke was Royalist, and had never ceased so to be at heart : not even when in April 1931 King Alfonso had bidden him and the other Grandees to 'try to make the Republic a success.' The Duke in 1936 gave his support to Franco on the assumption that as soon as the reign of terror could be ended, the monarchy would be restored. There were reasons against this which he seems not to have known. For instance, an Englishman travelling in Spain heard it said in subversive circles that a monarchical restoration must be contrived, because whereas it would be extremely difficult to unseat Generalissimo Franco, it would not be nearly so hard a task to overthrow the Crown once and for all, especially if the King *de jure* should gather round himself the same politicians as those who had wrecked his father. H.R.H. Don Juan, Count of Barcelona, had issued a manifesto in which instead of thanking Franco for his services to Spain he rebuked him for remaining in power. The next news was that the Duke of Alba had resigned from his post of Ambassador ; whereat some of his English friends were astonished, and said so to him. He answered briefly, 'my King commanded me to resign,' as if that sufficed. (The other Spanish Ambassadors received a similar commandment ; but only the Duke of Alba obeyed it.)

We cannot but think that he was thankful to return to the superpolitical work which had suffered so long an interruption. He was not personally ambitious—Destiny having placed him above the need to covet power, and his heritage providing him with a multiplicity of interests. His trip to Brazil in 1950 gave him considerable satisfaction ; and he spoke of intending an expedition to Mexico. The Real Academia de la Historia was parent of the eight South American Academies ; and what Spaniards call *Hispanidad* was operative (or the Duke hoped it was) in every region where Spain had originally been the pioneer civilising power.

The book he had planned on Spanish American carto-

graphy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the collection of letters of the 'Great Duke,' who had played so large a part in the Spanish Empire of Philip II, had long been deferred; but the tasks were at last accomplished.\* He wrote in 1953 to an English friend that, having produced all the letters written by the *Gran Duque*—all that he could find—he was now about to collect all the correspondence addressed to the same Duke, which would take time and might run to four or five volumes. Then came the announcement of his sudden death. A retrospective rumour in some of our newspapers that he had been in poor health for years was entirely mistaken; for a friend who saw him ten days before his death testifies to his energy, zeal, and plans for the future; also his satisfaction in and lively affection for his grandchildren. His one personal vanity had been that at seventy-three he could still wear the same uniform as when he was twenty-five. And despite all he had gone through of strain and stress and tragedy, he appeared as if he were timeless.

The fate of his brother, the Duke of Peñaranda, murdered by the Reds—for no crime except of being a Grandee and a Christian—was a lasting grief. And so fiery a spirit and so ardent a nature as the Duke of Alba never lapsed into apathy or indifference. During the reign of terror, when the statue of Christ on the Hill of the Angels had been shot to pieces by alien-controlled subversives, and murders and massacres, destruction and devilry had hit him hard, he was informed that he was on the black list to be assassinated. Slightly raising his eyebrows, he said, 'Ah well! I am in the hands of God.'

In our atheistical age, when the attacking forces are vehement and vigorous, he was challengingly defiant, and was at a loss to understand how anyone outside a lunatic asylum could wish to deny the reality of eternal life. His influence was very far reaching, and will not end with his earthly existence.

When the Academia de la Historia celebrated its bicentenary in 1938, in a speech touching upon the ancient origin of discord on earth 'when Cain first lifted a fratricidal hand against Abel'—and adjuring all men of intellect

\* 'Mapas españoles de América, siglos xvi-xvii.' Madrid 1951.  
'Epistolario del III Duque de Alba. Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo.' Madrid, 1952.

to help each other in the battle for truth—the Duke ended with a prayer to God (which our Press did not report):

‘ Absolute Lord of all living beings, Who created the soul of man in Thine own Divine Image, and enjoined upon us mutual aid and affection, . . . vouchsafe to direct and guide the labours of this Academy. . . . Grant that we may all work together for the good of our country, united by links of affection, illumined by Thy Wisdom, and obedient to Thy Sovereign Will.’ \*

After his death was announced, many were the tributes to his versatile talents and his steadfast principles. But it is through his own words that he can best be understood.

That he failed to foresee the crash of 1931 and did not anticipate the ensuing calamities until the storm burst is a fact which must be admitted. Himself entirely honest and straightforward, devoted to his homeland, believing in his countrymen, he was reluctant to recognise the extent to which alien influences had been penetrating, until he saw this for himself when the Reds flaunted banners inscribed :

Francia	1789
Rusia	1917
España	1936

thus proclaiming the foreign origin of their hideous doctrines.

When evils surged up volcanically and the outlook was terrifying, when a less courageous spirit might have surrendered, the Duke of Alba was sustained by the faith which refuses to allow the devilry of man to overthrow a resolute fidelity to God.

He said in public, ‘ We hear much now of “ planning,” but I prefer an older word, *Christianity*. ’ In this preference we have the key to his character, the explanation of that vigour, persistence, and valour which brought into our turbulent era something of the grace of a past which for him was never dead.

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\* ‘ . . . trabajemos unánimes en bien de la Patria, unidos por vínculos de amor, iluminados destellos de Tu Sabidura, y rendidos a Tu Soberan Voluntad.’

## Art. 10.—CAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS PREVENT WAR?

IT is the paradox of our age that while the nations of the world claim the pursuit of peace as one of their major objectives, all are, at the same time, preparing for war. While it is true that applied science has made the consequences of world conflict more devastating than ever, so that no nation will lightly set off the conflagration, recourse to war is, in the last resort, still a very real alternative from the point of view of international relations. Whatever lip-service may be paid to peace by the major powers the fact remains that the maintenance of 'peace at any price' does not figure in practical politics. Even Switzerland has its army and compulsory military service. The avoidance of war may rank high in the scale of values shared by policy makers, but it is not at the top. When politicians use the word 'peace' they always mean a qualified peace and the nature of the qualification varies according to time and place. They may mean 'peace with honour,' 'peace with freedom,' or 'so long as certain strategic interests are not threatened.' In the last resort the preservation of the nation-state as a sovereign unit, whose members are free to pursue a way of life chosen by themselves or their leaders, ranks highest among political values. For this ideal peace will be sacrificed. International diplomacy is largely concerned with exploring the other nation's scale of values to discover the circumstances in which a policy of maintaining peace would be abandoned in defence of other interests. It is this which creates a macabre similarity between the 'cold war' and the calculating moves of the players in a game, such as chess, where strategy is all-important. Sociologists with a mathematical turn of mind have observed the analogy and have applied the 'theory of games' to the analysis of various kinds of conflict.\*

While, however, it may be helpful to have a clearer understanding of the nature of the conflict process derived from socio-mathematical studies, such enquiries hardly further the knowledge of how to avoid war as such. Many natural scientists, to say nothing of the public at large,

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\* See for example the works of Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann.

have been appalled at the implications of modern technology when harnessed for purposes of war. More and more people are turning to the social scientist, hoping he will be able to tell them how best to avoid war and ensure that, among other things, atomic energy is put to the service of mankind.

Until very recently few, if any, sociologists devoted much attention to international affairs. The scientific study of human relations is, as yet, in its infancy. Most people devoting themselves to research in this field have wisely chosen to investigate less complex problems. They hope that, by so doing, a body of sociological theory will be built up which may prove to be of value, eventually, in the analysis of major social systems such as modern nation-states. Meanwhile, international relations have remained, by and large, the province of historians, economists, and political scientists. But events have moved faster than the rate at which sociology has developed. Social scientists have found themselves under pressure to study international tensions, despite the immaturity of their subject. Aided by funds provided through U.N.E.S.C.O., a number of sociologists and social psychologists set to work, at first modestly confining themselves to local studies of racial and cultural conflict, together with one or two broad statements of some of the factors contributing to international friction.\* Not satisfied with this, in 1951 the General Conference of U.N.E.S.C.O. decided that studies of tensions should be brought to bear more directly on 'areas of major conflict threatening peace' or 'impeding the restoration of peaceful relations.' Although no major project of this kind has yet been instituted, a number of papers were presented at the second World Congress of the International Sociological Association,† which came under the heading of 'International Conflicts and their Mediation,' and plans were discussed for intensive investigations of this problem. What, it may be asked, can sociology contribute to the practical question of preventing a third world war?

Sociologists and social psychologists can provide the

\* For example Otto Klineberg's 'Tensions Affecting International Understanding,' Social Science Research Council, New York, 1950.

† Held under the auspices of U.N.E.S.C.O. at the University of Liège, August 24 to Sept. 1, 1953.

answers to a number of important questions concerning the functions of war. In the light of this knowledge it may then be possible to make realistic proposals to enable other social institutions to assume these functions, with less devastating consequences in terms of human welfare. If, after the horror of two world wars and the apparently universal desire for peace, war is still a practicable alternative, it will hardly be denied that it must fulfil certain very significant functions and be supported by powerful social forces. It follows that any attempt to prevent war in the future must, if it is to be successful, make allowances for these social forces and offer an adequate substitute for war, which will perform the same essential functions. Alternatively, an attempt must be made to create a situation in which the needs, which war at present answers in society, no longer arise. The manifest purpose of war is political but it has acquired other functions of an economic, psychological and even moral character. The problem with which the sociologist is faced, therefore, is not merely the provision of a social alternative to war, but of providing one or more political, economic, psychological, and moral 'equivalents' which have a sufficiently strong appeal to overcome a conservative preference for war, and which are not incompatible with each other.

The political function of war, from the sociological point of view, is, clearly, the resolution of conflict between nations. War attempts to achieve this by the use of coercion. It aims at the extermination of the opponent, his forcible withdrawal from the area of conflict, or his subjugation and domination by the victorious nation. Conflict of any kind arises because there is some incompatibility between the ends simultaneously pursued by different individuals or groups, between the position on their scale of values that these ends are placed, or the means that are adopted to achieve them. In practice international conflict usually arises over the government of certain territories or peoples, as a result of economic competition, or in consequence of a real or imagined threat to the independent existence of a sovereign state.\* The historian is better equipped than the sociologist to

\* Cf. Morris Ginsberg, 'The Causes of War,' in 'Reason and Unreason in Society,' Longmans, London 1947.

account for the long-term and precipitating causes of particular conflicts.\* The latter is more concerned with the way in which nations attempt to resolve the conflict when it has arisen. Even if war were to be abandoned as a legitimate means to this end, it would be too much to hope that conflict between nations will suddenly cease. The question is, what alternative ways are there for resolving conflict? Apart from a tacit 'live and let live' policy, in which open conflict is avoided by simply pretending that it does not exist, the only alternative to coercion is the use of persuasion.

Useful work has been done, notably by Stuart Chase,† in summarising what is already known about methods of resolving conflict peacefully, and promoting agreement between individuals and groups. Chase is particularly impressed by the way in which the Society of Friends has traditionally handled this problem.‡ He draws attention to the use, in Quaker business meetings, of the principle of unanimous decision, of silent periods, opportunities for 'cooling off' after heated arguments and before decisions are reached, the participation of all members on an equal basis without formal leaders, and so on. He considers that the method has a much wider application and advocates its use in international conferences. However, Chase probably misses the most significant factor with regard to a Quaker business meeting, and that is its religious basis. The members are 'waiting upon God' for enlightenment, and it is this fact which distinguishes the state of mind of the participants in a Quaker meeting and an international conference. It must, after all, be recognised that the logical concomitant of unanimous decision is the veto, which has been the source of so much difficulty in the United Nations.

Chase also summarises the results of research into group dynamics, notably that inspired by the late Dr Kurt Lewin.§ Experiments, mainly conducted with small

\* For example, Lingi Albertini, 'The Origins of the War of 1914,' trans. and edited by Isabella M. Mussey. Oxford University Press, 1952-3.

† Stuart Chase, 'Roads To Agreement.' Phoenix House, London, 1952.

‡ Chase obtained much of his material from a book by Francis, Beatrice and Robert Pollard, 'Democracy and the Quaker Method,' Bannisdale Press, London, 1949.

§ E.g. Kurt Lewin, 'Resolving Social Conflicts.' Harper, New York, 1948.

groups, have shown the importance of a sense of participation in determining the goals of group activity, minimising friction within the group, promoting a sense of loyalty, and achieving effective decisions. Emphasis is placed upon creating a sense of security and 'group-belongingness' as well as avoiding authoritarian leadership. While work in group dynamics has produced some valuable results it is as yet undeveloped and it is difficult to see how it can be applied satisfactorily to international relations. Greater hope lies in the study of techniques found to be successful in the field of industrial relations. The large majority of industrial conflicts are now resolved without resort to the strike weapon, through the machinery of negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation that has been set up. The success of these mechanisms depends entirely on the good-will of the several parties and cannot be made to work without the active support of all concerned. In the international field machinery has also been set up for the settlement of disputes. The League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Court at the Hague are examples of these. The fact that these international organisations have been less successful than their counterparts within each nation requires further investigation.\* There is a certain analogy between the situation in international relations to-day and that observed in primitive societies where a system of justice is only just beginning to emerge. In these circumstances it is the minor disputes between the members, which do not arouse serious issues or invoke great passion, which are settled by the court. In primitive societies the jurisdiction of the court often does not hold when major disputes occur, because neither side is willing to accept the consequences of defeat. Each side wishes to obtain its own way at all costs and is not willing to submit to arbitration. Much the same applies to international affairs to-day. Agreement can be reached on postal charges or fishing rights, but agreement is not so

\* A useful summary of existing studies in this field and suggestions for further enquiries are contained in a publication of the Centre for Research on World Political Institutions : 'Research in the International Organizational Field : Some Notes on a Possible Focus,' by R. W. Van Wagenen. Princeton, 1952. The author concludes, 'Political scientists might do well to use, more than we have in the past, the help to be derived from the field of sociology, psychology, and anthropology, in exploring further the great questions of international organisation' (p. 78).

easily reached over such questions as the future of Korea or the unification of Germany. Just so long as nations are prepared to accept the consequences of war, even when the odds are heavily against either side emerging unscathed, rather than the possible humiliation of having to accept the adverse decision of a supra-national authority, war will continue to be practical politics. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the latent functions of war and to observe the way in which they reinforce its significance and perpetuate its use.

Explanations of the origins of war in economic terms may or may not be valid. Imperialism, pressure of population, and the competitive struggle for markets have, from time to time, been postulated as contributory causes of war.\* From the sociological point of view war performs certain economic functions which are independent of any question of causation. Once war, or preparation for war, is an accepted fact, whatever the reasons for it, there follow certain economic consequences, particularly with reference to the mobilisation of resources. One of the consequences of additional investment and employment is to stimulate further economic activity, which has a cumulative influence resulting, eventually, in the full employment of a nation's resources, both material and human. This is the famous 'multiplier effect' so brilliantly expounded by J. M. Keynes. As he pointed out, in a period of unemployment "wasteful" loan expenditure may enrich the community on balance. Pyramid-building, earthquakes, *even wars*, may serve to increase wealth.† As the recent panic on Wall Street showed when the Korean truce was signed, war and preparation for war create 'vested interests' which are dismayed at the prospect of returning to a peace-time economy. What is even more terrifying in its implications is that these 'vested interests' are not limited to financial magnates. Almost every man or woman who is employed in industry, from textiles and boot manufacturing to the makers of precision instruments and electrical equipment, to say nothing of tanks, aeroplanes, and other items more strictly within the category of 'armaments,' has a 'vested interest,'

\* Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 180 et seq.

† J. M. Keynes, 'General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,' p. 129. Macmillan, London, 1936 (my italics).

whether conscious or unconscious, in the persistence of international tension. Armaments represent one commodity for which the demand is inexhaustible. If stocks ever get too high they can be disposed of, assuming that a real war does not materialise, by staging mock warfare for training purposes.

National considerations suggest that war is a phenomenal waste of natural and human resources which could be used for constructive purposes and the benefit of mankind. The crying needs of the under-developed countries provide an obvious alternative to war as a means of mobilising economic resources. The United Nations report on the world social situation in 1952 \* calls for a programme of world social welfare as an alternative to global warfare. In practical terms such a programme would mean a campaign against disease, ignorance, and poverty as well as attempts to improve administrative machinery and build up increased agricultural and industrial productivity. Yet such a programme is itself bound to give rise to conflict. Already, the rehabilitation of countries such as Japan and Germany, devastated by the Second World War, is proving a threat to long-established industries in Britain and elsewhere. How much more will this be true if Africa were to become a highly industrialised country? A rationally planned economy on an international scale could probably smooth out the difficulties in the long run. But in the short run the adjustments which would be required, both by employers and employees, in long-established industries such as textiles in Britain, would be considerable. The fallacy of the old 'liberal' concept of self-adjusting qualities of international free trade was that it did not allow for the consequences of structural unemployment or for the now well-established policy of maintaining internal full employment, to which most nations are now committed.† Furthermore, attempts to raise standards of living, with consequent diminution in infant and adult mortality and rapidly increasing populations in backward areas, are already creating serious problems. European

\* United Nations Department of Social Affairs: 'Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation.' New York: U.N. Publication Sales No. 1952, IV: II, 1952.

† For a series of articles discussing various aspects of the economic 'Problem of a Long Term International Balance' see 'International Social Science Bulletin,' vol. III, No. 1, Spring 1951.

populations in under-developed areas are not yet reconciled to the improving status of the indigenous populations, and are already expressing fear of being overwhelmed. Well-intentioned schemes for social welfare can actually aggravate ethnic prejudice and produce internal conflicts almost as serious in their consequences as war.\* These problems may not constitute insuperable barriers to international co-operation in social and economic affairs. Nevertheless, they do make such co-operation extremely difficult, especially in the face of strong nationalist feelings and unwillingness to make sacrifices. It is a tragic reflection on human nature that rational policies tend to be swept aside in the face of overwhelming emotional feelings, centred on the need for self-preservation and national survival. It is these factors which head the scale of values of all nations and not the maintenance of peace for its own sake.

This leads to a consideration of the psychological functions performed by war. It promotes social solidarity within a nation and heightens the identification of constituent social groups with one another. Class, religious, and ethnic differences tend to diminish in significance in the face of a threat to the nation as a whole. For this reason many barriers between people due to colour, class, and creed are broken down in war-time and many social reforms are initiated which would not otherwise have come about. Furthermore, the fundamental urge for self-preservation, that all human beings experience, appears to be carried over, first to the family and then to an ever-widening circle of social groups with whom the individual identifies. Social psychologists are not yet clear as to how the mechanism works and how far the attitude is instinctive or acquired as a result of cultural conditioning. The fact remains that it is a powerful social force. Most people, faced with a threat to the existence of one of these groups, are prepared to sacrifice their own life for the preservation of the larger unit. The perpetuation of a certain way of life, usually that in which a person has been born and bred, becomes of supreme importance to him

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\* Cf. Leo Kuper, 'The Background to Passive Resistance (South Africa 1952)', 'British Journal of Sociology', Vol. iv, No. 3. September 1953. See also the present writer's forthcoming book 'Racial Relations' to be published in the Pelican series by Penguin Books Ltd.

and ranks higher on the scale of values of the majority of people than avoiding war, with all its horrors. To believe, rightly or wrongly, that another nation is threatening to prevent the members of one's own nation from pursuing their traditional pattern of life or is endeavouring to interfere with their liberty to work, play, govern themselves, or worship as they please is to stir the deepest emotions. The sacrifice of the individual in such circumstances is believed to be justified for the sake of posterity.

For some time sociologists have been asking themselves whether loyalty to a world-wide community of peoples could ever replace the present close identification with the nation-state. What are the factors which bind small groups into larger aggregates and create social solidarity? Shared values and goals are clearly important as well as a recognition of mutual inter-dependence. One factor appears to be more powerful than any other in creating cohesion and integration within the group. That is a real or imagined threat to the group as a whole, from outside. The cynic is tempted to suggest that an invasion from Mars would be the only thing likely to promote world unity. Social scientists have yet to find a more practicable alternative.\*

Why, it may be asked, are patriotic emotions so easily aroused often with a minimum of rational foundation? Why are people so ready to answer the call to arms when it comes? We know, of course, that in most countries there are a few people who are not so aroused. They are variously designated as neurotic, maladjusted, unpatriotic, or treacherous, as the case may be. They come before Boards of Conscientious Objectors, go to prison or concentration camps, according to the society in which they happen to be born. They are undoubtedly the exception to the rule. Social psychologists who have devoted themselves to the problems of aggression in society recognise that not all forms of aggression are disapproved of by the majority of people. On the contrary, while murderers and other violent criminals are severely punished, similar behaviour by a member of the armed forces in the course of his duty is highly approved of. Similarly, those in

\* This problem is discussed by Professor J. C. Flugel in an essay contained in 'Psychological Factors of Peace and War' (ed. by T. H. Pear). Hutchinson, London, 1950.

positions of authority, from parents and school-teachers to policemen, magistrates, and prison officers, are permitted a limited amount of aggressive behaviour, as necessary to their role. Furthermore, many people gain a vicarious satisfaction out of identifying, at a fantasy level, with criminals as well as with those entitled to impose punishment.\* What, then, is the source of all this 'free-floating aggression,' as it has been described? Have the members of some societies greater tendencies to aggression than others, and if so why? It is generally acknowledged that aggression is one of the main responses to frustration. Frustration is something that all human beings experience from the day they are born. The whole process of adjustment to society requires a gradual modification of behaviour to bring it into line with what is expected of the individual, firstly, by parents and, eventually, by society as a whole. Aggression, thus generated, has to be repressed or diverted into socially approved channels. Alternatively, the consequence is punishment which only generates further aggression. It follows that aggressive tendencies are very much a function of the child-rearing practices and the social disciplines of the society in question.

Social anthropologists and psychologists have combined their resources to demonstrate the relation between culture and personality in a number of primitive societies.† Other writers have suggested a similar interpretation of national character in more highly developed societies, among which the best known is probably the interpretation of German national character in terms of the authoritarian relationships said to exist in the family.‡ Unfortunately, suggestive as these hypotheses are, they still lack sys-

\* For an interesting and provocative discussion of these questions, see Alex Comfort's 'Authority and Delinquency in the Modern State.' Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1951.

† Margaret Mead has provided the classical example in her contrast between three tribes: the peace-loving Arapesh, the war-like Mundugamor, and the effeminate Tchambuli. See 'Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies.' Routledge, London, 1935.

‡ See, for example, Erich Fromm's 'Fear of Freedom.' Kegan Paul, London, 1944. Recent studies carried out in Germany by Dr Knut Pipping and associates (one of the U.N.E.S.C.O. 'tensions projects') suggest that the simple equation of stern parents with authoritarian attitudes in children requires modification: K. Pipping, 'Attitudes of German Youth towards Authority,' a paper presented to a Section of the Second World Congress of the International Sociological Association, 1953.

matic confirmation on the basis of empirical data. We are told, for example, that in modern urban civilisation many people get a certain satisfaction out of the socially approved aggression and the release from moral responsibility and decision making that modern warfare offers, at any rate to those in subordinate roles. Yet we lack the evidence necessary to establish this hypothesis on a sound quantitative basis. Does it apply to everybody? If not, to how many does it apply and why? Some studies of culture and personality based upon sounder empirical foundations have been done,\* but many are still merely at the level of conjecture. Although we may not be, as Margaret Mead has claimed we soon shall be, in a position to determine the character of a nation by controlling its child-rearing habits, we do now understand better those factors in the environment of a child most likely to promote successful adjustment and those creating aggressiveness, delinquency, and neuroticism.† Further work in this field should produce valuable results in future generations if properly applied.

Even supposing hypotheses concerning the relations between culture and personality and between frustration and aggression were demonstrated beyond question, would we be any nearer understanding why one country makes war upon another? At the conference of the International Sociological Association to which reference has already been made, one speaker ruthlessly poured cold water on the more enthusiastic supporters of the view that war was the product of culturally generated aggression. Professor W. J. H. Sprott asked, 'If I were to offer you an exhaustive account of the parent-child relationships throughout the whole population constituting Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, in one hand, and a full transcript of the discussion on foreign affairs in the British Cabinet, in the White House and in the Kremlin, together with dictaphone records of certain unspecified informal conversations covering the past six months, in the other hand, which would

\* E.g. B. M. Spinley, 'The Deprived and the Privileged.' Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953. This is a study of the effects of social class differences on the personality development of children in England.

† John Bowlby, 'Child Care and the Growth of Love.' Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1953.

you choose, if you wanted to know what the present state of tension is in the world to-day? ' \* The answer is, of course, obvious. Professor Sprott was pleading for a study of the policy makers, or 'men of affairs,' as he called them. He ended on a note of despair because of the inaccessibility of the material necessary for such a study.

Professor Sprott's question raises a further important point upon which the sociologist can give some help. What is the relationship between the decisions of policy makers and public opinion? It is reasonable to assume that in authoritarian régimes the political élite is limited only by considerations of expediency: the fear of possible counter-revolution by political opponents. It appears to be an unpleasant truth that the attitudes and opinions of the 'masses' in such circumstances are all too easily manipulated. But is there a limit to such manipulation? Will a breaking-point eventually be reached? What about the 'Western democracies'? How far are the foreign policies of these countries governed by any consideration of how public opinion will react? Internal policy in such countries is undoubtedly sensitive, within certain limits, to what the voters will tolerate, but is this true of foreign affairs? Or are these matters so far 'above the heads' of the majority of the citizens that they just take for granted that their government's policy is the only possible one in the circumstances? These and many other similar questions provide fruitful fields of investigation for the sociologist and a few studies are already being made. The first stage of any such investigation must be to obtain a clearer understanding of just what constitutes 'public opinion.' Do the newspapers reflect it or mould it? Are they the mouthpieces or the creators of public opinion? To what extent are politicians governed by what certain papers will say of their policies? How far is the monopolistic element in the newspaper world potentially dangerous in a democratic country? These and similar questions come within the legitimate province of the sociologist. It is, in fact, the intention of the International Sociological Association, with the aid of U.N.E.S.C.O., to encourage a

\* W. J. H. Sprott, 'The Policy Makers,' a paper presented to Section II.2 of the Second World Congress of the International Sociological Association, p. 3. 1953.

number of such studies between now and its next world congress in 1956.

Finally, the social scientist who seeks ways of preventing war must attempt to find a 'moral equivalent' for war. The argument that, for all its devastating consequences, war promotes certain moral qualities in the individual personality and character which would not otherwise be apparent is as old as war itself. Throughout the ages the writings of poets and musicians, dramatists, and novelists, to say nothing of deliberate political propaganda, have all emphasised the virtue of 'service for one's country.' Only in war, it is asserted, are the qualities of discipline, self-sacrifice, endurance, courage, and devotion to duty seen at their best. This point of view has been forcibly stated by William James :

' Reflective apologists for war at the present day all take it religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor ; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its " horrors " are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of " consumer's leagues " and " associated charities," of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valour any more ! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a nation ! ' \*

Although James was able to see the point of view of the militarists as expressed in the paragraph above, nevertheless, he aligned himself with those who sought to abolish war. To him the 'fatalistic view of war-function' was nonsense and 'when whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production,' war becomes absurd from its own monstrosity. Yet James went on to say that he did not believe that peace will be permanent on this globe unless the states pacifically organised preserve some of the elements of army discipline. As he put it, 'a permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy . . . we must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings.'

\* William James, 'The Moral Equivalent for War' (1910) reproduced in 'Memories and Studies.' Longmans Green, London, 1911.

From time to time a variety of suggestions have been made for providing a moral equivalent for war. James himself favoured the idea of a tremendous war on *Nature* which has its more recent counterpart in the campaign for a 'war on want.' Like Carlyle, he advocated a 'regimentation of labour' or conscription of youth to undertake all the more strenuous tasks, both mundane and inspiring, in which the virtues of discipline, hardiness, service, and self-sacrifice would be learned in the performance of tasks vital to the welfare of the community. Dr L. P. Jacks examined James's proposal and perceived its weakest point. It fails to grapple with one essential characteristic of war—the willingness of the individual to die for a common cause when the society to which he belongs is threatened with destruction. It may be, as F. C. Palmer has suggested, that support for war is a manifestation of an unconscious 'death instinct,'\* in which case a 'war on want' will never succeed in stirring up the same fervent support as a war on men. One thing is certain: Dr Jacks was right when he concluded that 'dangerous as our state may be in the absence of a moral equivalent for war, it is only made more dangerous by thinking that we have found the equivalent when, clearly, we have not.'†

Social scientists have no panacea for war to offer the world. It is doubtful if one exists. If war is ever abolished it will be as the result of long and patient work by a few inspired reformers in the face of much resistance. The time may come when we shall look back upon war with as much shame and incredulity as we do now upon the institution of Negro slavery, once thought to be not only economically inevitable but morally justified. Meanwhile the search for some alternative to war must continue.

A. H. RICHMOND.

\* F. C. Palmer, 'The Death Instinct in Western Man,' 'The Hibbert Journal,' Vol. LI, No. 4. July, 1953.

† L. P. Jacks, 'Moral Equivalent for War.' First published in 'The Hibbert Journal,' 1932, and reprinted in the Jubilee Number, 1952.

## SOME RECENT BOOKS.

**Cardinal Gasquet.** Sir Shane Leslie.

**Glyn's.** Roger Fulford.

**Archangel 1918-19.** Edmund Ironside.

**Oxford Triumphant.** Norman Longmate.

**English Law and the Moral Law.** A. L. Goodhart, K.B.E., Q.C.

**London General.** Frederick Willis.

**The Juvenile Offender.** G. L. Reakes.

**William Roscoe of Liverpool.** William Chandler.

**The Strachey Family, 1588-1932.** Charles R. Sanders.

**Shaw and Society: An Anthology and a Symposium.** Edited by the late C. E. M. Joad.

**A Layman's Love of Letters.** G. M. Trevelyan.

**The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921.** Isaac Deutscher.

**The Impressionists and their World.** Basil Wright.

**Experience and Interpretation.** Canon Raven.

**Mind You I've said Nothing!** Honor Tracy.

**Sartre.** Iris Murdoch.

**Rivièrè.** Martin Turnell.

**Mistral.** Rob Lyle.

**Report on the Atom.** Gordon Dean.

SIR SHANE LESLIE'S 'Cardinal Gasquet' (Burns Oates) is professedly more of a series of essays on various sides of the Cardinal's life than a connected biography. This means that there are certain overlappings of time in the chapters and goings backwards and forwards, but this is not a serious handicap to a really interesting study of a remarkable man. We are shown him as monk, schoolmaster, abbot, historian, researcher, correspondent, controversialist, unofficial diplomatist, and dignified cardinal, resident in Rome and a member of the Curia there—a very unusual position for an Englishman. It was this position in Rome which permitted him during the First World War to play a prominent and most useful part in opposing the decidedly pro-German entourage at the Vatican, and to be instrumental in getting this country officially represented there. We are given a penetrating account of the intrigues which went on behind the scenes before the appointment of Cardinal Bourne as Cardinal Vaughan's successor at Westminster. We are also given an excellent account of the discussion between Lord Halifax and others with the Pope and Curia in 1896-7 over the validity of Anglican orders. Cardinal Gasquet took a leading part in getting them declared invalid, which was expected to cause a clerical upheaval in this country and a large accession to Rome. This was not the case. Sir Shane succinctly sums up: 'The British Public did not care twopence whether their parsons were valid or not, provided they were good

fellows.' The book, written with the author's customary acumen and sense of humour, is of real importance to members of the Roman Church and of instructive interest to Anglicans and others.

The inner workings and methods of bankers tend to be somewhat mysterious to general readers, so the history of a bank written from a technical point of view would make esoteric reading. The directors of Messrs Glyn, Mills & Co. have, therefore, been wise to get a skilful and popular non-banking writer like Mr Roger Fulford to deal with their history, under the title of '*Glyn's*' (Macmillan). 'The object of the book,' says the author, 'has not been to tell a purely economic story, but to show the Bank and its partners as a microscopic tributary to the stream of British history.' *Glyn's*, to begin with at any rate, unlike Childs, Coutts, or Drummonds, did not seek aristocratic and illustrious clients. It was a commercial bank, with commercial customers, and their success in this line is typified by a list of over 220 British and foreign railways for whom they acted at one time or another. The early Glyn's, Mills and Curries were bankers only, with all their interests centred in Lombard Street. Afterwards, when the Glyn and Mills partners blossomed out into politics, peerages, sport, and Society, the management necessarily changed, though the Curries remained bankers only, and great was the gratitude which the bank owed to partners like Bertram Currie. For many years Glyn's fought the battle of private banks against the ever-increasing onslaught of public joint-stock ones. In the end they, like Childs, Drummonds, and Coutts, had to amalgamate with a large joint-stock organisation, though still keeping their own name. Mr Fulford has given us a most interesting story of honourable and skilful trading, progress, and prosperity, and in the process paints life-like pictures of the outstanding members of the families concerned.

'*Archangel 1918-19*,' by Edmund Ironside (Constable), deals with a curious and now largely forgotten sideshow of war. General (now Field Marshal Lord) Ironside was sent to north Russia in September 1918, in command of a small force, mainly British, but with some Russians, Americans, and French, to create a small but possibly useful diversion while German pressure still seemed strong in France. After the German surrender the force was kept

on to support the White Russians against the Bolsheviks and also to train Russians to defend themselves. Both aims were really hopeless ; the White Russian forces were far too ineffective ever to join up with our force, and the local Russians whom General Ironside tried to organise collapsed three months after our departure in September 1919. It was an interesting experience of campaigning under extreme climatic conditions—down to 30° below zero in winter and over 100° of heat in the summer. Was it all really worth while and did the campaign really do any good ? Readers can form their own opinions after studying this book. Lord Ironside tells his story in a simple and graphic way, neither exaggerating the trials and difficulties, which were great, nor minimising the efforts made.

‘Oxford Triumphant,’ by Norman Longmate (Phoenix House), claims to be a documentary, and to a certain extent statistical, account of the University as it is to-day. Readers may wonder whether ‘Triumphant’ is written in sarcasm, when they have read the chapters on rowdyism and sex, or the conclusion that ‘for the poor man an Oxford degree, unless he elects to teach, is of little material value. Without private means, the law and other professions are virtually closed to him’ ; while ‘from the point of view of financial gain, either to the nation or to those who receive it, an Oxford education is for the majority of women a waste of public money.’ Yet in spite of all Oxford is triumphant. ‘Mysteriously, unfailingly, universally all men enjoy their Oxford career. This in fact is perhaps the greatest justification for the institutions and traditions of Oxford.’ The author is illuminating on the subject of aesthetes and athletes, on daily life and work, on religion and immorality, and he has strong views about the desirability of greatly reducing the intake of students, owing to the large number of degree-takers who can find no suitable work in an overstocked market. Older Oxonians may wonder at the changes since their day and be upset by much that Mr Longmate writes, but he writes with sincerity, and experience, and his book should be widely digested —there is much to learn from it, and quite a lot with which to disagree.

The fourth series of Hamlyn Lectures was delivered in 1952 by the Master of University College, Oxford, A. L. Goodhart, K.B.E., Q.C., and has now been published in

book form under the title of '**English Law and the Moral Law**' (Stevens). The lectures discuss an interesting and important subject and no one is better qualified to deal with it than the Master, who though long resident in this country and head of an Oxford College is yet an American who can look at our law with expert eyes from both outside and inside, so to speak. He says of this book, 'I have attempted to show that law is a rule of conduct which is recognised as being obligatory. This sense of obligation is based on various grounds, including that of morality. In English law we shall, I think, find that morality has played a particularly important part.' The author defines law and then deals with its branches, constitutional, administrative, international, and criminal law, torts and contracts. The whole is written in simple and clear manner and provokes and deserves keen study and reflection.

Mr Frederick Willis, ex-hatter, broadcaster, 'character,' and author, gave us real enjoyment in his '**101 Jubilee Road**' and promise of more enjoyment to come. This has been well fulfilled. The former book dealt with the 1890s, the new one, '**London General**' (Phoenix House), with the first fourteen years of this century. The author is pleasantly nostalgic and attractively informative. Where many present-day writers would envenom their pages with class hatred and envy in writing about the Edwardian 'privileged,' Mr Willis is tolerant, humorous, and in no way covetous. He shows how life could be enjoyed thoroughly in those days in Camberwell, Dulwich, or the Old Kent Road with very little money, as well as in Mayfair and Belgravia with much money—perhaps more so, for Society had many restrictive conventions and Society life was expensive. Mr Willis saw something of Mayfair as he worked in a fashionable hatter's and made friends with his customers, but his home and his heart were in South London—its streets, amusements, pubs, occupations, houses, views on life, sometimes jovially vulgar, often really good and sympathetic. Mr Willis remembers the lights and shades, and how in spite of hard work and very little money he had a good time, and he is duly grateful for it and wants to share his love of life with others—his readers.

'**The Juvenile Offender**,' by G. L. Reakes, with a foreword by the Hon. Mr Justice Lynskey (Christopher Johnson), is a useful book on a subject of very great

importance. The author writes with long and intimate experience of work as a magistrate, and he looks on the subject from all points of view. He deals with causes of delinquency, sex offenders, probation, birching, remand homes, Borstal training, approved schools, detention centres and psychiatry. He points out that 'the aim of Juvenile Courts must be to combine appropriate treatment with the most effective method of turning the offender into a useful citizen. This would be an easier task if all individuals were even approximately the same.' But they are not. Over and over again the author comes back to the chief and basic cause of the evil, namely a bad home background, lack of parental control, responsibility, and example, and, too often, bad housing. Mr Reakes gives many instances of cases, which have come within his personal experience, to prove his points. It is a sad story, and convincing ; but, bad though things are now, there is always hope.

The Liverpool City Council has done well to commemorate the bicentenary of William Roscoe's birth in 1753 by sponsoring Dr William Chandler's '**William Roscoe of Liverpool**' (Batsford), which gives an account of a remarkable man, presumably but little known nowadays outside his own native locality. He began in humble circumstances, but by his intelligence, hard work, common sense, and study became in due course a prosperous lawyer, author, poet, artist, bibliophile, expert botanist, M.P., agricultural pioneer, and, unfortunately, banker, for it was the last occupation that finally landed him in the bankruptcy court. The first part of Dr Chandler's book gives a factual and well-documented account of Roscoe's life ; this followed by 300 pages of his poems collected together for the first time—and possibly some readers will consider that a selection of this tremendous outflow might be preferable to the whole. He was also a prolific writer of prose pamphlets and author of two notable biographies, '*Lorenzo de Medici*' and '*Leo X.*' His collection of Italian pictures, now largely in the Walker Art Gallery in Liverpool, showed wisdom and foresight unusual in his generation. The book includes over a hundred illustrations and a select bibliography. The whole work forms a notable tribute to a remarkable man, and if there is any criticism of Dr Chandler's work it is that perhaps he overloads his subject too much with facts, thus rather squeezing out flesh and blood.

**'The Strachey Family, 1588-1932,'** by Charles R. Sanders (Duke University Press, U.S.A., and Cambridge University Press in this country), is a memory tester for readers. There are 160 Stracheys listed in the index and in many generations the same Christian names are repeated, so to keep them all apart requires mental gymnastics. The book begins with William Strachey, who died in 1594, and ends with a chapter on the brilliant literary iconoclast Lytton Strachey, who died in 1932, though there are references to some later members of the family, like Mr John Strachey, who was a minister in the recent Labour Government. To give information about so many people means that too often the text reads like an amplified 'Who's Who,' and it might have been better to deal with fewer people and make them more vivid. However, the Stracheys through the generations have been a remarkable and interesting family, sometimes with notable eccentricities. There are revealing sidelights on Carlyle, Edward Lear, Tennyson, S. T. Coleridge, and others, but the book, being printed on heavily surfaced paper, is physically weighty beyond comfort.

The last years of George Bernard Shaw seem to many people to be the years of a whimsical, provoking and perky legend in popular esteem. If the amazing alacrity of the man often found expression in public posturing there were also many refreshing cold douches of his own particular virile sanity. **'Shaw and Society: An Anthology and a Symposium'** (Odhams) is edited by the late C. E. M. Joad for the Fabian Society, and is designed to show that primarily Shaw was a social reformer, not only politically as a life-long Socialist, but in the sphere of human relationships as an iconoclast jibing at out-dated conventions and at what he considered to be the stereotyped and sterile machinery imposed on man as a social animal. The book is in four sections: 'I. Shaw the Man, the Socialist.' This part consists of three essays: 'G.B.S.', by Kingsley Martin; 'The Early Fabians and British Socialism,' by Leonard Woolf; and 'Some Recollections of Shaw as a young Socialist,' by S. K. Ratcliffe. 'II. Extracts from Fabian Tracts and other Socialist Writings,' from Shaw's speeches and from his letters to the Fabian Society. 'III. Extracts from Prefaces, Plays, Essays and Articles.' 'IV. The Fabian Memorial Lectures,

1951,' by C. E. M. Joad, the Rt Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., and Benn W. Levy. It is a good book to have, for it is quite free of the awed cant that nullifies so many memorial volumes. It reveals really sound appreciation of a mind that saw life whole and not as a departmental store where one can satisfy segregated personal requirements cheaply and always in the latest fashion and rely on spring and autumn sales for bargains. As can be expected, the best part of the book is Shaw's own writing. The other is welcome documentation and provides sufficient controversial equality of opinion that would have delighted Shaw.

The title of Dr G. M. Trevelyan's latest book, '**A Layman's Love of Letters**' (Longmans), may surprise readers, for if anyone so highly distinguished can be described as a layman in the world of letters, who can qualify as a professional? Dr Trevelyan says that he has never been a professional teacher or critic of letters. His province is history, but where is the line (if indeed any exists) to be drawn between history and letters? On which side of it would Macaulay and Carlyle be found? The present volume contains the Clark Lectures delivered in 1953. Dr Trevelyan deplores the modern habit of 'debunking' great writers of the past and he very rightly champions them. Byron, Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, Gray, Scott, Matthew Arnold, Browning, Kipling, Housman, and Meredith all come under examination—all treated with the discernment, skill, and kindness which we expect from Dr Trevelyan. He illustrates his theme with many quotations from the poets—and readers will find much pleasure.

Mr Isaac Deutscher now follows his widely studied political biography of Stalin with the first of a two-volume life of Trotsky: '**The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921**' (Oxford University Press). Mr Deutscher's thorough documentation is again everywhere evident as is his complete and probably—outside Russia—unrivalled knowledge of the origins and course of the Revolution. He intends to call the second part of his Trotsky biography '*The Prophet Unarmed*,' taking these twin titles from a Machiavellian quotation which stresses that the leader who does not keep force within his own direct control must inevitably pass from the scene. With all the

respect that must be due to the author for a detailed and essential book, we must still wonder whether subjects of the size of Trotsky ever give their full secrets into the hands of a single biographer. Mr Deutscher seems perfectly at home in the exciting pages in which he reveals the true stature Trotsky had attained as a literary critic by the time he was twenty-three. Soon after this period came the first meeting, in London, with Lenin and one begins to doubt whether the encounter of these two minds, which were to have such a profound effect on history, can ever be presented to us at full pitch, so to speak. Generally it seems unlikely that the author's account of Trotsky's intellectual relationship with the Revolutionary Party will ever be bettered, and we can expect that the hard-to-assess but potent influences of temperament and individual backgrounds of the leading actors will continue to be debated for a long time to come.

'The way to understand pictures is to look at pictures' is one of the maxims quoted by the publishers of '**The Impressionists and their World**' (Phoenix House) to justify this extraordinarily gratifying book. At a guinea it is remarkably cheap, for it contains 96 full-page plates, half of them in colour, and its selection is fresh and, in the main, unfamiliar. Manet, Monet, Pissarro, Sisley, Renoir, Degas, Cézanne, Gauguin, van Gogh, Toulouse-Lautrec, Seurat, Redon, and Rousseau (*douanier*) are the painters included, and the emphasis, whether intentional or not, is on landscape except in the case of Toulouse-Lautrec, whose work seems to lack all the finesses and artistic delicacies of other great originators. Mr Basil Wright contributes a long introduction in which he expresses the latest approach to the achievement of the Impressionists and touches on the causes of their devotion to their own mode. Looking at such complete pictures one wonders why so much intellectual justification is deemed necessary. It is true that most of the Impressionists had very clear-cut, individual ideas of their aims, and their own statements of these will never cease to be of prime importance to other painters. Their apprehension of a new world of artistic consciousness is triumphantly demonstrated by the best of their pictures. The technical innovations which once seemed to be the main rallying point for and against them, are seen in the main

to be completely justified except where technique engulfed all the surface values, as with Sisley and van Gogh. Many of the pictures here can be regarded only as an enlargement of the great tradition of painting, and the whole selection coupled with the admirable little chronological biographies of each painter makes this a book that should be in any collection.

In the spring of 1953 Canon Raven published a first group of his 1951-2 Gifford Lectures under the title 'Science and Religion.' This book exhibited a writer who is both a perceptive theologian and a scholarly biologist uniting both these fields of learning in a holistic approach to the history of science. Now in '**Experience and Interpretation**' (Cambridge University Press), he gives us a second series of the lectures in which he surveys the character of Christian interpretation that must follow from this holistic philosophy.

The publishers say that this second volume completes a modern 'Religio Medici,' though the reader must be warned against expecting a prose achievement as formative for our day as Sir Thomas Browne's was for his. Canon Raven does not give much in the way of vivid imagery to carry his arguments: indeed, though we can have nothing but praise for the high and noble inspiration which has guided him in the task of relating eschatological experience to interpretations in the various fields of ordered thought, it seems unlikely that he would claim more than that. He has attempted to delineate more clearly ground which still remains very largely to be covered: certainly the opening lectures of the present volume, where he asserts his basic starting-points, seem more definitive than his later developments. He shows that while Science is finding it necessary more and more to treat phenomena both locally and individually, History is, on the other hand, retreating from the individual approach of Carlyle's 'Heroes' to the study of collective behaviour which forms the basis, for instance, of Marxian doctrine. Similarly, he argues that theology must draw away from a tendency to debate interpretations without adequately accounting for original primitive experience of the ineffable. However, in sustaining these views in his discussion of the Person of Jesus and, at the end of the book, of the question of Eternal Life, Canon Raven seems

to attach footnotes to subjects which by their very nature cannot be contained within a highly specialised view. But the attempt is a most important one, and one that should certainly have been made by this superbly equipped thinker, and it is certainly not criticism of Canon Raven's great achievement to remember that many vaguenesses are to be expected in a field where progress can come only through concentrating on one point of view even if temporarily the known alternative has to be abandoned.

Trailing the coat is an Irish controversial gambit and Miss Honor Tracy does it to perfection. '**Mind You I've said Nothing!**' (Methuen) is a lively-minded account of the return of a prodigal who has tasted the heady flesh-pots of England, liked them, and, fortified by that diet, gone back temporarily to be her own cat among her own country pigeons. She is deft at a quick striking off of her compatriots' characteristic attitudes however multifarious and conscious they might be. She has that free critical affection of her countrymen. She regards public self-expression as a duty to amuse, to make contribution, to strike sparks, and to be adept in that sprightly fecklessness which is not only deliberate in its effects, but calculates, to the last inconsequence and gesture, the method of obtaining them. Not that she neglects the fuller picture for the high-lighted details of its personnel. She knows the importance in Irish life of the character actor, but her vigorous intelligence fits them beautifully into a warm picture of a country that keeps its everyday business in its place for working hours, and then gets down to the serious concern of its fanaticism, cults, play-acting, Celtic languors, antagonisms, extreme gestures arising out of extreme gestures, high and proud talk, and all the diversions of ready wit and the intricacies of illimitable gusto. She has written one of the best of recent books on a country that makes a cult of the individual. She herself counters this cult with a delightful consciousness of scene—urban and rural. She trails her coat mainly where she implies—and this implication permeates the whole book—that natural, spontaneous good humour has too often been clouded by the intensities of the few who are carried away by the cult of fanaticism and, by their intensity, involve a good-natured following in extremities that so often end in bitterness.

Three more titles, 'Sartre,' by Iris Murdoch, 'Rivière,' by Martin Turnell, and 'Mistral,' by Rob Lyle, have been added to the series 'Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought' (Bowes and Bowes). The three books have one thing in common. They treat their subjects with the devoutness of a wholly theological exegesis of the Old Testament, and achieve a slightly frightening exclusiveness. Miss Murdoch's book is the most intense. To her, Sartre is 'profoundly and self-consciously contemporary. He has the style of the age. The landscape of his activity exhibits to us the development of this style as a natural growth out of the European tradition of Thought on ethics, metaphysics, and politics.'

Her close examination of his work, her knowledge of its sources and its motives, her determination to relate it as a constructive element in 'our tragic time' carries her to a point of objectivity that rouses a measure of impatience in the reader, whom such unrelenting and rapacious devotion to 'significance' forces into the posture of man as victim frustrated in a great fundamental cynicism of inevitable misery. One wishes Miss Murdoch had picked more of a quarrel. Her critical ability would have been given much more rein, and she seems aware of this: 'we know that the real lesson to be taught is that the human person is precious and unique: but we seem unable to set it forth except in terms of ideology and abstraction.' One would have liked this reaction to Sartre applied with more acknowledgment of sunshine and warm emotion.

Mr Turnell's book has the same obsessed assumption that Gallic intellectualism is, by its very existence, important. This, sometimes, is like saying that a feverish temperature is a normal heat. Can it be assumed that its undoubted intensity guarantees its emergence as a creative art? Rivière as an originator of ideas is not so iconoclastic as Sartre. There is less of the night in the backstreet about him. His intellectuality turns on a more believing pivot. He is a warmer man, and one out of whom crises proceed as a matter of heart as much as of brain. This is one of the major differences between him and Sartre.

Mr Lyle has a far easier task with Mistral. The poet is more concerned with tangible, physical things, and Mr Lyle makes no assumptions as to his profundity, significance, or

kingship. It is difficult to criticise his appreciation of Mistral, who wrote in the Provençal dialect. Mr Lyle provides many translations, but most of them for which he has special praise seem, as he gives them, to be a curious stringing together of classical imagery and more obvious natural similes. But there is a boyish enthusiasm about his book which, though it may over-assess the European stature of Mistral, does convince that much uncomplicated pleasure has been obtained out of writing on him.

‘Report on the Atom,’ by Gordon Dean, chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1950–53 (Eyre and Spottiswoode), appeared suitably just before President Eisenhower’s message to Congress about the release of more information to friends and allies. The book may have influenced the President. It contains much appeal for such action.

In 270 pages the writer has included all that could be released last year: all that can interest, and astonish, an intelligent reader and much that must be useful to scientists not engaged with ‘splitting the atom.’ Rightly the blessings are stressed, the many uses of radioisotopes; the evils are dealt with seriously, but not in the style of cheap journalism; and cautionary phrases cool the persistent hope of a wonderful, a mobile, and perhaps a cheap source of power in the immediate future. There are repetitions; they are necessary to keep one’s attention to the important facts. They maintain the writer’s wish to explain clearly what has happened, why it did, and where progress can be expected. The list of places, in the Free World, where research is in progress is interesting: it is a long list. If information is freely exchanged between those places, one can hope that the Atomic Age will blossom sooner than Gordon Dean so cautiously anticipates. It is folly that Brazil discovers something which Switzerland knew a year before. But for the ‘incidents’ of Fuchs and Pontecorvo, England could have exploded her own atomic bomb years ago. The United States plainly could not give secrets to a country in which security was so insecure.



